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There was a time when meadow, grove, and
stream,
The earth, and every common sight
To me did seem
Apparell'd in celestial light,
The glory and the freshness of a dream.
It is not now as it has been of yore; Turn wheresoe'er I may,
By night or day,
The things which I have seen I now can see no
morel
Whither is fled the visionary gleam?
Where is it now the glory and the dream?2

I. INTRODUCTION

VIII. CONCLUSION
A defining characteristic of the Pacific
Northwest is the Columbia River Basin's legendary
wild salmon runs.2 Sadly, however, some commentators say the Columbia River Basin is now "the
most endangered river system in the country, "' The
backbone of an industry that supports 60,000 jobs
in the Pacific Northwest 4 the region's salmon' population has plummeted since the late nineteenth
century. From stocks6 numbering in the many millions 7 the wild runs have deteriorated to levels

IX. AFTERWORD

1.W. Wordsworth. Ode on Intimations of Immortality, in
RECOLLECTIONS OF EARLY
CHILDHOOD.
2 New York Times reporter Timothy Egan has described the
Pacific Northwest as "anywhere a salmon can get to.- Michael C.
Blumm. Saving Idaho's Salmon: A History of Failure and a Dubious
Future, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 667. 668 (1991-92) (hereinafter Blumm,
Saving Idaho's Salmon] (citing Pat Ford, And Now-The Last Salmon
Ceremony?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWs. Apr. 22, 1991, at 8). Captain
Menwether Lewis knew that his two-year-long expedition to the
Pacific Ocean had neared an end when he ate roasted salmon
"with a very good relish- as a guest of Shoshoni Indians on the
banks of the Lemhi River, in what is now Idaho, on August 13,
1805. Charles F Wilkinson & Daniel K.Conner, The Law of tihe Pacific
Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of a TransboundaryCommon
Property Resource, 32 KAN. L. REv. 17. 22 (1983) (citing THE JOURNALS
OF LEWIS AND CLARK 194 (B. DeVoto ed. 1953)).
3. Brad Knickerbocker, Salmon Issue Poses a Stiffer Challenge
CHRISTiAN SCIENCE MONITOR. Oct. 20, 1993, at 7.

Than The Spotted Owl,

4. OREGON RIVERS COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE OF
PROTECTING RIERINE HABITAT IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 10 (1992). See
also THE WILDERNESS

SOCIETY, I THE LMNG LANDSCAPE: WILD SALMON

Ihereinafter SALMON As CArrAL (estimating that fishing industry provides 20,000 lobs in region).
Salmon may have a current economic impact on the region of as
much as SI billion. SAVE OUR WILD SALMON COALITION. WILD SALMON
AS NATURAL
CAPITAL
V(1993)

FOREVER: A CITIZEN'S STRATEGYTO RESTORE NORTHWEST SALMON AND
WATERSHEDS 3 (1994) [hereinafter CmzENs' STRATEGY!.

5. The term "salmon," as used in this article, refers to all of
the species of salmon native to the Columbia River basin, as well
as to steelhead. Salmon are anadromous fish, which means that

they are born in fresh water, migrate to and live most of their lives
in ocean saltwater, and then return to freshwater to spawn.
Wilkinson & Conner supra note 2, at 23-26. There are five species
of anadromous salmon native to the Pacific coast. These are
Oncorhyncus (0.) isawyischa. or chinook (king) salmon; 0. nerka, or
sockeye (red) salmon; 0. kisutch, or coho (silver) salmon; 0 keta,
or chum (dog) salmon; and 0. gorbuscha, or pink (humpback)
salmon. A sixth species of anadromous fish found in the
Columbia River Basin is Salmo gairdner, or steelhead trout. The
steelhead is a sea-run rainbow trout. Wilkinson & Conner, supra
note 2,at 18 n.2 (citing R. CHILDERHOSE & M TizIM, THE PACIFIC
SALMON

25-26 (1979)).

6. The term "stock7 is often used interchangeably with the
words "run- or "population," A stock is "an isolated reproductive
unit that shares both a common environment and a common
gene pool and is identified with a specific season and watershed
or stream." Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 24 n 33 This article discusses spring, summer, and fall runs of Snake River chinook and Snake River sockeye runs.
7. During the mid-nineteenth century, the estimated salmon
population of the Columbia River Basin was 10 to 16 million fish.
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NECT MERIDIAN

LAND. WATER,

AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 201 (1992); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE. ENDANGERED SPECIES: PAST ACTIONS TAKEN TO ASSIST COLUMBIA

RIVER SALMON 8 (July 1992) [hereinafter GAO ENDANGERED SPECIES
REPORT]; SALMON AS CAPITAL, supra note 4, at 5.

11:H
ftr Rec s6rca?
cn~n
keFrPcf
fo Hue

F 1995

1995
Focl

approaching extinctions The salmon's decline is the
result of ecological harm caused by a variety of
human activities. 9The most significant contributors
to salmon mortality, however, are the numerous
dams that transformed the once-wild Columbia and
Snake Rivers into a series of flow-controlled reservoirs.'0 Not surprisingly, from the dawn of the dam
building era, Congress has often expressed its concem over the fate of the Pacific Northwest's oncemagnificent salmon runs," Finally, in 1980.
Congress passed the Pacific Northwest Electric

Power Planning and Conservation Act (Northwest
Power Act or the Act).'" The Northwest Power Act
directs that fish and wildlife in the basin be placed
on an equal footing with hydroelectric power generation."
Unfortunately, the Northwest Power Planning
Council" (Council) has not generally implemented
the Northwest Power Act in a manner likely to
achieve the Act's promise of restored and harvestable runs. During the first decade of its existence, the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife

8. Recent estimates indicate that the Columbia River
Basin's salmon population has declined to approximately 2.5 million fish. SALMON AS CIrrAL., supra note 4,at 5: Michael C.Blumm
& Andy Simnn. The Unraveling of the Parity Promise. Hylro er
Salmon. and EiidangeredSpecies inthe Columbia Basin. 21 ENmT,. L 657.
663 (1991) [hereinafter Blumm. Parity VI (citing NoRmvEsT POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL. 1987 COLuMB RIVERBASIN FisH ANDWaDUIE
PROGRA § 203. at 35 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 PRoGnRvAl): John
Daniel. The Dance of Denial. SIERA. March 1993. at 64. In 1990 only
I.1 million adult salmon retumeol to the Columbia River Basin
from the ocean, of which 300.000 were believed to be wild or naturally spawning fish. GAO ENDANGERED SPEaCEs REPORT. supra note
7. at 11. In 1991. only four sockeye salmon returned to their
spawning grounds at Redfish Lake, Idaho. Blumm. Saving Idaho's
Salmon. supra note 2. at 668. That was an improvement over the
returns in the immediately preceding two years when none and
one Redfish sockeye successfully reached its native spawning
bed. id.. and compares to a total return of 771 spawners In 1976.
Id.Unfortunately, even this minimal improvement did not continue. By 1994. Redfish Lake again was graced by only one sockeye
spawner. Interview with Adam 1.Berger. Sierra Club Legal Defense
Fund. Inc. (Dec. 14. 1994). Nor are sockeye Idaho's only endangered run: chinook nests in the Salmon and Clearwater Rivers of
that state declined 92%between 1957 and 1992. Blumm, Parity V.
supra. at 668-69 (citing S. Stuebner. Counting the Dcdining "Rds' cf
Frenchman Creek. HIGH COUNTRY NEws. Apr. 22. 1991. at 12.

10, Blumm. Parity V supra note 8. at 663-64 (referring to
LOSSES SwUo'e. supra note 9;US. GEtsNEA'L AcCOUNrinG COsCE.
! P'.r'XNS
AND LF C~AMo: OSTHE Non-4ST PoER BtLL 20. app. IVat
1(1979) thereinafter GAO STu dl). Clay Hathom. Saze ourSalmon.
Save cur Sul. Nxnou. Jan 6,1992. at 14;
leanne McDowell, A Ra-e
to Rescur the Salmon, TL'.!E. Mar 2. 1992. at 59. By 1963, the proliferation of dams along the Columbia River left only one. fifty-mile
stretch of the nver - the Hanford Reach - free-floning. The
completion of Lower Granite Dam in 1975 had a similareffect on
the Snake River. The National Manne Fisheries Service estimates
that 80T of the ten million fish loss that has occurred since the
1930s has been caused by the hydropmer dams. NMFS. NATonlOcs':C AND AnD!osmEFo~c Aw :,sTRAz::. FAzos roR. DzcWi:.E A
SUFFLE.Et.'r TO THE NOmwE OF DzrE :;AmIO:
'oR Sn:x RrsR.
S FrJNGSum.msn CHinnc UnmDE noTHE-.s.
EwM SPciES Ar 8 (June
1991). The Columbia and Snake Rivers are commonly described
as -placid pools - Se. e.g. %u±1.',t Drm ci. NomxrUSr PASSu-':
THE GREAT CcLumEA Rz.r,42 (1995).
11.
Michael C. Blumm. Hylrc,'zerts.
Salmon: TL,Stungz of
th ePariftc Nort.ast'sAn arr:us Fh Prsurces raPeeful Ccestenc
ulth the Federal CclumEfa Wr;zr
Pc,rer
Sj;ptem. I!EI
n',L L 211. 223
(1981) Ihereinafter Hy~kcr;-er vs Samnl. See Bonneville Project
Act of 1937. Pub. L No, 75-329. 50 Stat 731 (1937) (codified as
amended at 16 UoSC. § 832-8321 (1935 &Supp. 1995)): S. Doc
No. 87. 75th Cong,. Ist Sess. 1 (1937) (directing Commissionerof
Fisheries to study effects of BonneAlle Dam on Columbia River

BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION,
BIOLOGICAL AsS SSMENT ON THE
1992 OPERATION OFTHE FEDERAL COLUMBiA RIVER POWER Sms
5 (lan.

13. 1992)). Idaho's runs of Snake River spring and summer chInook are at approximately one-half of one percent of their histonc average levels. Idaho's histonchabitat range-8,300 mileshas declined to 5.400 miles. 3.000 of which are damaged. Tim
PALMER, THE SNAKE RvER WINDOW TO THE WEST 221 (1991). Not surprisingly. returns of wild Snake River spring chinook to their
spawning grounds has nose-dived from approximately 21.000 in
the early 1990s to 3.116 in 1994. while the number of wild Snake
River summer chinook fell from an average of 3000-7000 to 799
over the same penod. Kathenne P. Ransel. The Last Salmon Run?.
NEw YORK TiMEs. Feb. 18. 1995. at 21 (editorial).
9. Before large-scale dam construction began In the
Columbia River Basin during the 1930s. excessive fishing was the
leading cause of declining salmon populations. See Wilkinson &
Conner. supra note 2. at 30-35. Other principal adverse influences
on the salmon population include timber production, livestock
grazing, mining, chemical contamination of streams and rivers,
and water withdrawals associated primarily with Irrigation.
NoRTHwEST

POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COMPILATION
OF INroRM, ol ON
SALMON AND STEEL.HEAD
LOSSES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER
BA IN121-72

(1987) Ihereinafter LossES STUDY]. Daniel, supra note 8. at 65.
Timber production harms all salmon, but coho are especially
affected because high mountain streams carry the resulting high
loads of sediments downstream to coastal spawning beds. Ste
Paul Koberstein, The Decline and Fall of Salmon. HIGH CouNTY NEvs,

Nov. 15. 1993. at 1. 11.

fishers and to recommend steps"to attain the full conservation of
such fish. 1.
12. Pub, L No. 96-501.94 Stat 2697 (codified at 16 US.C.
839-839h (1935 &Supp. 1992)).
13. Hcuss CvmITTE cu Inv=m A.N,,D
Fonz Com E.RcE.
H.R. RER No, 976,. 96th Cong.. 2d Sess. 49. 56. reipnnted in 1930
U.S.C.CAN. 5939. 6015 Ihereinafter Com:.,i.cE Cov.i='r
REoRTl. Sue al Natl Wildlife Fed'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n. E01 F2d 1505. 1514-15 (9th Cir 1936); Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n. 746 F2d 466,473 (9th Cir. 1934).
14. The Northwest Power Act mandated the establishment
Northwest Power Planning Council. 16 USC § 839b(a).
Although a creature of federal law. the Council is not a federal
agency. 16 US.C. § 839bta)(21(Al(iv). Instead, the Council is a
multi-state agency, analogous to an interstate compact agency.
comprised of two members from Washington. Oregon. Idaho. and
Montana. The constitutionality of the Council was upheld in
Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northvest Efec. Power
and Conservation Planning Council. 786 E2d 1359 (9th Cir 1936).
cat. denie, 479 US. 1059 (19871. See gmera,!;r Dale D. Goble. T&
Council and the CciLstitutimn. An Artid. on I&hCnstitutionality of tk.
Northwest Perit Plannng Council. I 1. Enri.L L & Lr. 11 (1936);
Symposium. StIle MastrBu2lzs and CreatikeCcr'erat e Federartm,
17 En.vm. L 767(1937).
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Program (Program) failed to achieve the Act's goal
of a renewed salmon fishery in the Pacific
Northwest." At the core of this tragic failure to
reverse the salmon's continued decline has been
the Council's unwillingness to adhere to the role
Congress created for it. The Council has generally
subjugated state fish and wildlife agency and tribal
views on the needs of salmon to a commitment to
achieve consensus in the management of the
Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS).
Although Congress warned the Council that it
should not assume the role of a "superfish and
wildlife agency," 16 the Council has frequently
refused to adopt measures thought by fish arid
wildlife agencies and tribes to be necessary to
restore healthy salmon runs. Nor has the Council
traditionally provided written explanations of its
reasons for failing to defer to the mission, expertise,
and unique roles of the fish and wildlife agencies
7
and tribes.

Recently, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit made clear the error of
the Council's ways. In September 1994, the court
invalidated the Council's 1992 Strategy for Salmon
because the process that led to its creation violated
several provisions of the Northwest Power Act. 8 The
court ruled that the Council unlawfully failed to provide a statutorily required written explanation of its
relection of fish and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations and omitted mandatory biological
objectives from the Strategy. 19 The court also indicated a strong belief that the Council failed to give
appropriate deference to the region's fish and
wildlife agencies and tribes in developing the
Strategy for Salmon. 0
15. A senes of articles by Professor Michael Blumm persuasively lays out the history of the Council's ineffective attempts to
restore a healthy salmon fishery to the Columbia River Basin during the 1980s. See Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 11;
Michael C. Blumm &Brad L.Johnson, Promisinga Processfor Parity:
The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act and
Anadromous Fish Protection, II ENV'rL. L. 497 (1981) Ihereinafter
Blumm, Parity II; Michael C. Blumm. Fulfilling the Parity Promise: A
Perspective on Scientific Proof, Economic Cost, and Indian Treaty Rights in
the Approval of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 13 ENVrL.
L. 103 (1982l Ihereinafter Blumm. Parity I11;Michael C. Blumm,
Implementing the Parity Promise:An Evaluation of the Columbia Basin Fish
and Wildlife Program, 14 ENVrL. L. 277, 283 (1984) [hereinafter
Blumm. Parity 1111;
Michael C. Blumm, Reexamining the Parity
Promise; More Challenges than Successes to the Implementation of the
Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENvrL, L. 461 (1986)
Ihereinafter Blumm, Parity IVI; Blumm, Parity V. supra note 8;
Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 2, at 682-87, 689-96.
16. The Northwest Power Act commands the Council to
base the Program on fish and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations and to defer to the expertise of those agencies and
tribes. See infra notes 159-163 and accompanying text. The quotation is of Congressman John Dingell, chief sponsor of the Act's
fish and wildlife provisions and floor manager of the Act. 126

The immediate practical effect of the ruling In
Northwest Resource Information Center v. Northwest Power
Planning Council has been the adoption of 1994
Program amendments that incorporate many of the
recommendations of the region's fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes offered in 1991.11 Thus, the 1994
amendments may signal a shift away from the
Council's past pattern of failure to lead the region
toward resolution of the salmon crisis.2 Northwest
Resource Information Center therefore has the potential
to force a permanent solution to the Pacific
Northwest's salmon crisis. The case provides a
sweeping interpretation of the Northwest Power Act

that confirms Congress' intent to force a revolutionary change in the way the FCRPS is managed,
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's opinion induced the
Council, during its deliberations on the 1994
Program amendments, to afford significantly more
deference to the scientific judgments of the region's
fish and wildlife agencies and tribes than it had during the Program's first decade." That change has
been slow in coming, but the Council's recent decision to adopt recovery measures long advocated by
salmon advocates indicates that Northwest Resource
'Information Center may fundamentally alter the
weight traditionally accorded the Basin's fish and
wildlife in the management of the Columbia River
hydroelectric system. If the 1994 Program amendments are a reliable indicator, the Council has taken
to heart the court's warnings that the Northwest
Power Act's Program criteria impose substantive
obligations on it and that the public must be given
a complete explanation of the Council's decision to
adopt or reject Program recommendations."
The Northwest Power Act is not, however, the
CONG. REC. 29,810 (1980).

17. Blumm. ParityV, supra note 8. at 661,670, 675-76 & nn.
93-99. 683-85 & nn.147-56, 691 & nn,198-201. The Northwest
Power Act allows the council to relect fish and wildlife agency
and tribal recommendations only on very limited grounds, and if
the Council does relect such recommendations It must provide a
written explanation of its decision to do so. See Infra notes 159163 and accompanying text.
18. Northwest Resource Info. Center v, Northwest Power
Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1395 (9th CIr. 1994), cert. denied,
1995 U.S. LEXIS 5305 (1995).

19. Id.at 1385-86, 1391-92.
20. Id.at 1386-89.
2 1 See loan Laatz, Power Council OKIs Plan to Save Salmon,
OiEtGONIN, Dec. 15. 1994, at Al. A26; Northwest Power Planning
Council. News Release, Dec. 14, 1994 (on file with author).
22. See Blumm, Parity V. supra note 8, at 703, 711-13 (discussing Council's pattern of compromising the recommended
fish mitigation measures),
23. See infra notes 359-405 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 359-361 and accompanying text,
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only tool that can help bring back the salmon runs.
In the short run, it may not even be the most Important mechanism. 21 By the late 1980s. declines in
many of the Columbia River Basin's salmon stocks,
and the failure of the Northwest Power Act to bring
about their restoration, motivated concerned citizens of the region to seek protection of several runs
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 2' The
resulting listings2 7 may guarantee the end of a long
era in which federal dam operators downplayed the
needs of salmon.
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
acquired substantial power to protect the runs
against further declines in the aftermath of the
salmon listings. Unfortunately, since the listings
occurred, NMFS has not exhibited the willingness
to force fundamental, changes that would reduce
the hydropower system's awesomely destructive
impact on salmon. In 1992. 1993 and 1994. NMFS
concluded that the operation of the region's hydroelectric system would not jeopardize endangered
salmon. Judge Marsh. as well as the Ninth Circuit.
have clearly expressed impatience with NMFS' failure to challenge the status quo in the Columbia
River system. In Idaho Department of Fish & Game v.
National Marine Fisheries Service, Judge Malcom Marsh
warned all of the parties directly affected by the
operation of the FCRPS that the courts and the
region expect a "major overhaul" to rescue the
imperiled salmon stocks.3 Idaho Department of Fish &
Gamen
therefore amounted to an invitation for
NMFS to exercise bureaucratic courage in the continuing debate over the fate of salmon."
These expressions of judicial impatience
should ensure that Idaho Department of Fish & Game
will be a vital step toward restoration of the runs. If
NMFS. and especially irrigators and the operators of
the Columbia River hydropower system, respond

appropriately to the court's sentiments, Idaho
Department of Fish & Game will revolutionize the allocation of the region's water resources among power
interests, navigation needs, irrigators, and fish and
wildlife. Unfortunately, the decision has not had any
obvious positive impacts to date. In a revised 1994- 98 biological opinion on FCRPS operations and in a
proposed recovery plan for listed salmon stocks.
NMFS has acknowledged that salmon need more
and faster water to survive. However. NMFS has
failed to provide the tools necessary to provide such
water. The revised 1994-98 biological opinion on
FCRPS operations and the proposed recovery plan
also do not effectively confront other significant
impediments to salmon survival, including inadequate flows and excessive reliance on barge and
truck transportation.31
Sections 11,Ill. and IV of this article summarize
the events that led to the listing of several salmon
runs under the ESA. outline the fish and wildlife
provisions of the Northwest Power Act, discuss the
evolution of the Program during its first decade, and
outline the Council's 1992 Strategy for Salmon. 2
Sections V and VI describe the decisions in Northwest
Resource Information Center v. Northwt Po.'er Planning
Council and Idaho Departmentof Fish & Game v. National
Manne Fisheries Service and analyze the holdings in
each case." Section VII discusses and criticizes the
impacts produced by the two cases thus far, particularly the 1994 Program amendments and the
revised 1994-98 biological opinion on FCRPS operations. Section VIII concludes that Northwest Resource
Informalion Center and Idaho Department of Fish & Game
offer an avenue for overdue and essential changes
in the region's hydropower system. However. the
prospects for durable change rest on the willingness of the Council and NMFS to exert consistent
leadership and on the commitment of the federal

25. Indeed. there may be some sentiment among the
region's political leaders to re-examine the Northwest Power Act
in the wake of Northwest Resource information Center and the 1994
Program amendments. See Al Gibbs. Gorton Suggests Feteral Law to
Solve Region's Salmon Crisis. [TAcoMA] NEws TmBUF. Oct. 13. 1994. at
B6 (reporting Washington Senator Slade Gorton's view that a legislative "solution" to the salmon crisis may be necessary).

Pacific coast-wade status rev'ie-vw for coho. steelhead, pink
salmon, chum. sackeye. chinook. and sea-run cutthroat trout. 60
Fed, Reg 38.011 (1995). 59 Fed Re, 46.803 (1994).

26. Endangered Species Act of 1973. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544
(1985 & Supp. 1995).
27.56 Fed. Reg. 58.619 (1991); 57 Fed. Reg. 14.653-54 (1992);
59 Fed. Reg. 54.840 (1994) (proposing downlisting of Snake River
spnnglsummer and fall chinook to endangered). These requests
resulted in findings that the Snake River sockeye salmon and the
Snake River spnng and summer chinook salmon are endangered
species. More salmon listings are possible. NMFS recently proposed to list certain coho runs native to California and Oregon.
60 Fed. Reg. 38.011 (1995). Moreover. while NMFS recently rejected a petition to list the mid-Columbia summer chinook run. 59
Fed. Reg. 48.855 (1994). the agency is conducting comprehensive.

28. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Natl Manne Fisheries
Serv.. 850 F Supp, 82.6, 900 (D. Or,1994). reimand. 56 F3d 1071
(1995).
29. 11
30. Because NMFS used a methodology in its onginal 1994-98 biological opinion on FCRPS operations similar to that
employed in the 1993 biological opinion, ldiFo D'alment ciFsht &
Gamre cast equal doubt on its validity as well. NMFS responded to
Idaf Dparrmei c Fish & Game by revising the 1994-93 biological
opinion on the FCRPS. Sez Letter from Fred P Disheroon. Esq..
US, Department of lustice. to Hon. Malcolm E Marsh (Apr 7,
1994) (copy on file with author),
31. _Sz Irfra notes 406-419 and accompanying text.
32 Sre infra notes 35-121 and accompanying text.
33. Sm'r,rfranotes 122-353 and accompanying text.
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dam operators to abide by the Program and to
accept fundamental changes in the Basin's scheme
for allocating use of the rivers. Thus far, there is little assurance that these results will be forthcoming.
Northwest Resource Information Center and Idaho

Department of Fish & Game have not induced the necessary willingness to change the river's status quo.Y'
11. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN

AND ITS SALMON

From its headwaters high in the Selkirk
Mountains of central British Columbia, the
Columbia River drains nearly 259,000 square miles
and flows 1,450 miles to its mouth on the Pacific
34. See infra notes 3, 56-506 and accompanying text.
35. PALMER, supra note 8, at 228. The Columbia River drains
portions of Oregon, Washington. Idaho, western Montana, western Wyoming, northern Nevada. and northern Utah in the United
States and approximately 40.000 square miles of British
Columbia. See Michael C. Blumm, The Columbia River Basin, in
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 57 (Robert E. Beck ed. 1994) Ihereinafter
Blumm, Columbia River Basml.
36. The Snake River is 1,056 miles long and rises in
Yellowstone National Park. Wyoming. it is the tenth largest river
in the United States and drains 109.000 square miles of the
northern Rocky Mountains, an area larger than Colorado. PALMER,
supra note 8. at 5. Other tributaries of the Columbia nse from
headwaters in Montana, Idaho, and Nevada.
37. The Columbia River Basin is the second largest river
basin on the continent, after the Missouri-Mississippi River
Basin. The Columbia itself is North Amenca's sixth largest river
measured by annual runoff, ranking below the Mississippi,
MacKenzie, St. Lawrence, Nelson. and Yukon Rivers. Blumm,
Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 57. In an average year the
Columbia discharges into the Pacific Ocean more than twice the
water discharged by the Nile River into the Mediterranean. The
Columbia's average annual runoff of 198 million acre-feet (maf) is
prodigious, but its flows are neither predictable nor stable:
before the first dams were built in the basin, flows ranged from a
low of 14,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) to as high as 550,000 cfs.
The Columbia River is one of only two rivers in the American West
that flow from the interior all the way to the Pacific Ocean. The
other is the Klamath. in southern Oregon. Id.
38. Bob Devine, The Salmon Dammed, AUDUBON 82, 83, Jan.
1992.
39. Salmon were present in the rivers of the Columbia basin
at least one million years before humans first arrived in the
region. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 179-80:
40. Pacific salmon migrate over a range extending from the
Califomria coast to the Alaskan seas. See Wilkinson & Conner,
supra note 2.at 25.
41. One early account of Oregon's settlement declared that
salmon "literally fill the rivers
in their season. And at all the
falls and cascades in the vanous rivers of the country, the quantities taken and that might be taken, are beyond all calculation.
As they penetrate far into the interior, they afford almost inexhaustible supplies to the Indian tribes of the country, as well as
the whites
"Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 30 (quoting
G. Hines, OREGON: ITS HISTORY. CONDITION AND PROSPECTS 331 (1851).
See also STEwART HOLBROOK, THE COLUMBIA 234-50 (2d ed. 1974)
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coast at Astoria, Oregon." The Columbia's principal
tributary, the Snake River, flows westerly from its
headwaters in western Wyoming" before moving
north to form a confluence with the Columbia near
the city of Pasco, Washington."
These rivers have been the stage for one of
"nature's most engaging miracles."" Each year for
millions of years," salmon have migrated up the
region's rivers to their spawning grounds.'6 For most
of that millennia their numbers were huge.4 i Before2
Europeans discovered the Pacific Northwest'
natives of the Columbia and neighboring river
basins' 3 annually caught millions of pounds of
fish." After the Lewis and Clark expedition to the
region, mountain men, trappers, and settlers
(describing early years of Columbia River fisheries).
42. Natives populated the Columbia River Basin for thousands of years before the first European explorers arrived,
Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 27 (citing L. CRESSmAN,
PREHISTORY OF THE FAR WEST 1-2 (1977). See also Gus NoRwooD,
COLUMBIA RIVER
POWER FOR THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF POLICIES OF THE
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINIsTRATioN 7 (U.S. Dep't of Energy.

Bonneville Power Administration 1981) (noting presence of
humans in the Pacific Northwest for at least 15,000 years). The
arrival in the region by the explorers Meriwether Lewis and

William Clark was a "crackling, lightning-bolt event" for the 50,000
natives living in the Pacific Northwest in 1805 WILKINSON. supra
note 7,at 178. At that time the tribes constituted a strong society, and during the first fifty years after the Lewis and Clark expedition the native tribes felt relatively few adverse effects Of
course, large numbers of native Indians were killed off by diseases transmitted by the white settlers, and conflicts between the
natives and white settlers took additional lives Nevertheless,
tribal societies continued to function and "the lColumbia and Its
tributaries werel completely intact, and so were the great salmon
runs." Id.
43. Wilkinson &Conner. supra note 2, at 27.
44. The Pacific Northwest's tribes "relied on salmon more
than the Plains Indians depended on buffalo." WILKINSON, supra
note 7,at 184. Before the decline of the fishery began in the midnineteenth century, natives of the basin may have caught 42 million pounds of fish each year. Id.at 185 (discussing 1986 Council
estimate of pre-settlement annual fishing by region's tribes). See
also Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2,at 28 n.51 (natives caught
approximately 18 million pounds of salmon each year);
COURTLAND L. SMITH, FISH OR CUT BAIT 12 (Oregon State University
Sea Grant College Program, Publication No. ORESU-T-77-006)
(1977) (estimating the average annual catch at Celilo Falls on the
lower Columbia to be 4-5 million pounds). In contrast, during the
modem era the total commercial salmon catch in the Columbia
River Basin is 5-8 million fish per year. The principal native fishery was located at Celilo Falls, near the current location of the
city of The Dalles, Oregon. and two hundred miles Inland from
the Columbia's mouth. Wilkinson &Conner, supra note 2,at 26-29.
Other falls at which tribal fishers gathered for seasonal harvests
were the Cascades of the Columbia, 50 miles downrlver of Celilo

Falls; Salmon Falls on the Snake River; Kettle Falls on the upper
Columbia near the Canadian border; and Willamette Falls southeast of what is now Portland. Id.at 27 n.45. Celilo Falls was inundated when the gates of The Dalles Dam closed in April 1956. The
United States government later paid the tribes $15 million for
their fishing rights. See Whitefoot v. United States, 293 R2d 658
(Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 US. 818 (1962).
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arnved and began building the region's resourcebased economy.
The federal government began building the
dams that now form the FCRPS in the 1930s.43

During the following decades private parties built
hundreds more dams in the Basin. By 1964. the
hydroelectric system was integrated through a contract between Bonneville Power Administration
(BPA), the dam operators, and utility customers."
That same year, the United States entered into an
agreement with Canada under which the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation

Fcr Felt 5&-n?
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obtained the ability to store large portions of the
spring flows on the upper Columbia River behind
four large dams.a As a result, the dams now provide
seventy-five percent of the Pacific Northwvest's electric power" and help farmers irrigate seven million
acres east of the Cascades,' By the late 1970s. however. the cost of these benefits became apparent, as
a salmon population that once numbered in the
tens of millions each year dwindled to a few million
fish." The plight of the salmon became so severe
that NMFS considered listing several runs under the
ESA in 19 7 8 .Y The imminent listings convinced
thla Kn

45. The FCRPS is composed of thirty federal dams In the
east of the Cascades A significant amount of the region's agncultural land is watered by pumped ground-,aterand diversions from
Snake and Columbia basins. The major dams, and the dates of
undammed nvers and streams. Intervew with Reed D. Benson.
their completion. are: Bonneville (1938). The Dalles (1957). and
Staff Attorney. Wateffatch of Oregon (Noz. 18, 1994). See ao
John Day (1968) on the lower Columbia: and McNary (1953). Ice
PiER. supra note 8. at 118 (imrgation withdrawals from groundHarbor (1961). Lower Monumental (1969). Little Goose (1970).
and Lower Granite (1975) on the lower Snake. in addition, the
water totaled 8.5 maf in 1926, while surface water withdrawals for
imgation totaled 16 6 maf the same ye3r). Na-gation is also a sigFCRPS includes, on the upper Snake River and in the upper
nificant economic use of the Columbia and Snake Rivers.
Columbia Basin. Dworshak (1974). Hungry Horse (1952), Libby
Shipping in the Columbia River system transports more than SI 1
(1975). Chief Joseph (1955). Grand Coulee (1941). and Albeni
billion worth of goods each year. making it the nation's secondFalls (1955) dams. BONNEVILLE POER ADJNisTRATION. MULTIPURPOSE
largest inland waterway Marla Williams. WPit Cest to Sx;e Snake
D~ms OF THE PACiFic NORTHwEST (1993). For an excellent review of
the history of dam building in the Pacific Northwest, induding an
ir Sxkie7? Remas cJSalm on Re; r Plin Fams Stakes In Northwsest
analysis of Congress' purposes in authorizing construction of the
Fish War, SEAmTI. Tev.Es, Mar. 20, 1995, at Al.
region's many dams, see Blumm. Hydropowervs.
Salmon. supra note
50. See supra note 8; Lorraine Bodi, TP2 History and Legsfhi;e
11. at 223-49; Dm'IucH. supra note 10. at 249-322.
Background ci tfr Ncrti!st Pc-,rerAct. 25 E-'Ti_ L 365. 368 (1995).

Several hundred wild runs native to the region are also at risk of'
extinction. Stz %%filla Nehlsen et al.. PaziicSoafmn at tLe CrcssrcaL-:
Stc:ks al Risk frm Cat 'nta. Oreg:n. WiaF. and Washington. 16
OF THE PACFiC NORTHWEST (Contract No. 14-02-4822) (1964) (copy
on file with author). The Pacific Northwest Coordination
FISHEms 4 (1991) (conduding that more than 100 wild stocks are
Agreement of 1964 established system operating criteria and
extinct and that 89 more lace a high risk of extinction). The
power exchange guidelines and laid the basis for the system's
adverse effects of dams are numerous: the'j block access to
annual integrated plan. See KA N. LEE. DONNA LEE KLEI.KA &
upstream spawning habitats, flood spawning Grounds, change
MARION E. MARTs, ELEcrIc POWER ANDTHE FuTURE OF THE PAmc
water temperatures, incre3se water pollution, cause a reduction
NORTHWEsT 54-55 (1980).
in available oxygen, and eliminate much of the spnng and summer flows needed to transport Itnenile salmon to the ocean. Id.
47. COLuMBIA RIVER BASIN: COOPERATIVE DEVELOFMENT OF WATIR
at
664 (citing Lo=s Sruoy, supra note 9. at 140. 146 (discussing
REsouRcEs, Jan. 17. 1961. U.S.-Canada. 15 U.S.T. 1555. T.IAS. No.
flooding of spawning grounds and temperature effects); J aHD.
5538 (entered into force Sept. 16. 1964) lhereinafter Columbia
EcHEERwI.Ar AL, Rivs ATRim- THE Cc,ERNED C0T7E'S GUiDETo
RiverTreaty]. See generally Blumm. Hydropowervs. Salmon. supra note
HYDr.OFOWER 4-5 (1989), Notwithstanding their well-known
11, at 215-19. The treaty authorized Canada to build three storage
adverse effects, some continue to doubt that the dams are the
prolects and the United States to build a fourth that would inunprincipal culprit in the destruction of the runs. See Brief of the
date Canadian lands. In exchange, the U.S. paid Canada $64 milDSIs. at I1. Idaho Deprt of Fish & Game v. National Manne
lion and promised Canada a one-half share of the hydropower
Fisheries Sew,. No. 94-35524 (9th Cir. filed Sept. 16. 1994)
generated. The four treaty projects went on line in 1970. Blumm.
('Opponents of the FCRPS and self-styled fishery 'advocates"
Columbia River Basin. supra note 35. at 80.
46. See PACIFiC NORTHWEST COORDINATING AGREEMENT.
AGREE ENT FOR COORDINATION OF OPERATIONs AmONG POWER SY5TEs

48. PUBLIC POWER COUNCIL, Pusuc POWER EssiENTLs: AN
INTRODUCTION To NORTHWEST ENERGY IssuEs As PUBLIC POWER
APPROACHES THE 1990s 9 (1987). Over 40% of Amenca's hydropower is generated by the region's dams. Blumm. Parity V. supra note
8. at 662. The Pacific Northwest's cheap hydroelectricity has also
made the region Amenca's manufactunng mecca. Smelters In the
Columbia River Basin produce approximately 2 million tons of
aluminum each year, approximately 43% of the nation's total
annual supply. Jim Simon & Maria Williams. Liestyls. UrlFc:ds
Are At Stake Over Pending EndangeredSpecies Decision. SEATTLE vTES,
Mar. 31. 1991. atA5.
49. Blumm. HydropoAer vs. Salmon. supra note 1I. In Idaho
alone, more than 4 million acres are imgated. 3.8 million of those
acres are in the Snake River Basin. PAie.l, supra note 8. at 90. That
ranks Idaho second only to California among the states for total
irngated acreage. Id. at 103. Nevertheless. the reservoirs of the
Columbia River Basin are not the only sources of Irrigation water

have labored long and hard to create the myth that the FCRPS is

almost single-handedly responsible for the decline of salmon.
(citation omitted). Even the owner of the FCRPS agrees, however.
that the hydropower system has been the principal agent of
salmon destruction, See NMFS. N. o.:n Ocs:: A.;D ArsH"RImc
ADmINmmRAmOia B'm:c.c:.
0-;:ou o: 1993 O;"'Alo~n OF THE
FEDERAL COwLu!.- R.r'm Poam Siws. 51. 60 (1993) lhereinafter
1993 B:oL cALO;
). Not surpnsingly. calls for the removal of
some dams are growing louderand more frequent. See Michael T.

Pyle. Beyjnd FM Laldders: Dam Rem-al as a Strategy for Restonng
Amefca's RiMeu.14 ST'n. F.i.. LI. 97 (1995). Congress has even
authozed removal of one of the Pacific Northwest's dams. Sez
Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act of 1992.
Pub. L No. 102-495. 106 Stat. 3137.
5I. See 43 Fed. Re-, 45.622. 45,628-29 (Oct. 3. 1978) (notice
requesting public help in re ewing biological status of upriver
salmon populations). dir In Lorraine Bodi. Protecting Cturnbti
Rivir Salmon Undir LFte
Endangered Sp-zds Art. 10 E.rrL L 349, 349-
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Congress that previous legislative efforts to restore
the region's famed salmon runs had failed. 2 As a
result, Congress included in the Northwest Power
Act substantial protection for salmon in an effort to
ward off additional ESA listings." Originally conceived as a response to expected power shortages
in the Pacific Northwest," the Act became an
unprecedented fish and wildlife restoration law."
III. THE COUNcIL's

FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM AND

THE SALMON LISTINGS

A. The Evolution of the Program: 1981-90
As the required first step toward issuance of
the Program, the Act directed the Council to ask
state fish and wildlife agencies and tribes to recommend actions needed to ensure mitigation of fish
and wildlife losses and restoration of the runs. 6 In
1981, a coalition of state fish and wildlife agencies
50 (1980) [hereinafter Bodi, Protecting Salmon Under the ESA].
52. See COMMERCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 6015;

Blumm, Parily II,supra note 15, at 108-11. The most important of
those previous laws was the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
(FWCA), 16 U.S.C. § 661-666[c) (1988). For a discussion of the
flaws of FWCA. see infra note 148.
53. The U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report to
Congress highlighting the plight of the salmon in 1979. See GAO
STuDY. supra note 10.
54. See Central Lincoln People's Utility Dist. v. Johnson, 735
F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 1984); Ralph Cavanagh, The Pacific
Northwest Electnc Power Planning and Conservation (And Thermal Power
Plant Relief) Act, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 27, 30-31 (1980).
55. Blumm, Parity V. supra note 8, at 666. Of course, salmon
are not the only fish that have been gnevously harmed by the
region's huge hydroelectric network. The impacts of the dams are
also felt by numerous other anadromous and resident fish,
including Pacific lamprey, burbot, white sturgeon, and redband
trout. Each of these fish species is likewise at risk of extinction.
See John Harrison, The Forgotten Fish, 14 NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS 7
(Summer 1995).
56. Blumm. Parity Ifi, supra note 15, at 285.
57. This flow level was below an optimum salmon survival
flow level of 300-350 kcfs at The Dalles Dam. See NORTHWEST POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL, I RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FISH & WILDLIFE PROGRAM
UNDER THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST ELECTRIC POWER PLANNING AND

CONSERVATION ACT 167-69 (1981)

[hereinafter 1981 COAUTION

RECOMMENDATIONS].

58. The recommended flows at Lower Granite Dam were 85
kcfs. Id. at 180. Such a flow level would be below the biologically
optimum flow level for the lower Snake of 140 kcfs. See I.
LAWRENCE, K. LEE & N. PALMER. THE WATER BUDGET. A STEP TOWARDS
BALANCING FISH AND POWER IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 76 (U. of

Wash. Water Resources Technical Rep. No. 81) (1988) [hereinafter
THE WATER BUDGETI (discussing recommendations of Columbia
River Fisheries Committee made in 1979).
59. The "sliding scale" would have allowed dam operators to
reduce flows 25% in low flow years and increase flows by 15% at
Priest Rapids and by 60% at Lower Granite in high flow years. The
region's tribes opposed the "sliding scale" plan. See 1981
COAUTION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 57. at 170 (assertion of

and Columbia River Basin tribes (the "fishery coalition") urged the Council to adopt minimum average
weekly spring flows at The Dalles Dam on the lower
Columbia and recommended peak flows at The
Dalles, Priest Rapids and Lower Granite Dams. 8 The
fish and wildlife agencies also proposed a "sliding
scale" plan that would allow dam operators to
adjust flows in years with high or low runoff."
After unprecedented public involvement, the
Council issued the Program in 1982,1 but declined
to fully implement the fishery coalition's proposal
for a sliding scale of flows." Instead, the Council
adopted a 'Water Budget" designed to make available a given volume of water to salmon during their
annual downstream migration season 2 The
Council also required installation of mechanical
bypass systems to improve Juvenile passage" and,
to enhance the passage of adult fish migrating
upriver, called for improvement of fish ladders. 4
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission that treaties entitled tribes to optimum flows of 300 kcfs or greater).
60. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1982 COLUMBIA RIVER
BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM (1982) [hereinafter 1982
PROGRAMI.

61. Blumm. Parity Ill. supra note 15. at 294.
62. The Council adopted the "Water Budget" Instead of a
recommendation by a coalition of state fish and wildlife agencies
and tribes that it set minimum flows at several lower Columbia
and Snake River dams. The Council allocated 4.64 million acrefeet (maf) to the Water Budget and directed that It be made available for fish passage between April 15 and June 5 under the direction of managers selected by the fish and wildllf6 agencies and
tribes each year Blumm, Parity Ill, supra note 15, at 295-96. The
Water Budget reduces the amount of water made available for
power production at the dam operator's discretion and instead
allocates it to increased flows during salmon migration season,
Id. at 294 n.71.
63. 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 60, § 401. Bypass measures are
necessary to reduce salmon mortality caused by power turbines
built into the dams. As juvenile salmon attempt to pass through
the turbines, they are subjected to changes In water pressure,
impacts of the turbine blades, and increased water turbulence. In
addition to the adverse consequences of the turbines, the juvenile salmon become stunned and disoriented after passing
through the turbines. In such a condition they become Increasingly vulnerable to predators, especially squawflsh, which are
abundant at the base of each dam. See Blumm, Parity Ill, supra
note 15, at 302 n.106 (quoting 1982 PROGRA.M,
supra note 60, § 401).
The Council did not request biologically adequate interim flows
at five public utility district dams on the mid-Columbia pending
juvenile bypass improvements. Id. at 303-04 (quoting 1982
PROGRAM, supra note 60, § 401 (a)( 10). For dams on the Snake operated by the Corps, the Council did not order any minimum flows.
Instead the Council simply authorized the Corps to continue
transporting juvenile salmon from reservoirs above Lower
Granite and Little Goose Dams and asked for further studies and
proposals for further, undefined action, Id. at 309-10 (quoting
1982 PROGRAM. supra note 60, § 401(b)(6)-(7)).
64. The Council established, for all of the dams on the
mainstem Columbia and its tributaries, criteria for spills and
flows that would ensure the attraction of adult salmon to fish lad-
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Amendments during the early 1980s established
specific plans for implementing Program provi-
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and by 1991 six of thirteen mainstem Columbia and
Snake federal dams still lacked such facilities.' The

sions, 6' eliminated BP,'s role as a source of funds
for "goals" studies, and established a goal of doubling the size of existing salmon runs T
The Council intended the innovative conception of the Water Budget to replace lost spring
runoff and provide the flows necessary for juvenile
salmon to migrate downstream. 6' Nevertheless, by
mid-decade it became clear that the Water Budget
was not working. 6 Nor were the Council's laudable
efforts to encourage and accelerate mainstem passage improvements sufficient to materially increase
run sizes. The 1982 Program did not include deadlines for installation of bypass systems on the
Corps' dams on the lower Columbia and SnakeTh

Council also consistently failed to establish mini-

ders. The Council also ordered improved operation and maintenance of fish ladders and requested various studies of problems
related to adult passage. Id. 310-12. The Program also emphasized reduction of ocean harvests, consideration of habitat
improvements in the Yakima River basin, and establishment of
fish and. wildlife criteria for all new hydroelectric projects and
designation of stream reaches where such development would be
discouraged. Id.at 320-31. 338-43.

biological conditions reduce the possibility of restoring fish runs
to historic levels. Blumm. Parity V supra note 8. at 686.

65. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL. 1984 CoLumma
RivER BASIN FISH AND WILDUFE PROGRAM §§ 1503-04 (1984) [hereFor a discussion of the three interim
inafter 1984 PRooi.l.
Program goals established by the 1984 Amendments. see Blumm.
Parity ill. supra note 15. at 289-93; Blumm. Parity V. supra note 8. at
679 n.127. The 1984 Amendments also attempted to improve fish
passage survival-at mainstem Columbia dams. 'Effident fish passage is critical to the Program's success because investments In
habitat and fish flows cannot materially increase run sizes without significant reductions in fish mortality at mainstem dams."
Blumm. Parity V. supra note 8. at 680. To improve passage, the
Council relied primarily on the Water Budget. which would
increase flows and thereby allow fish to pass more efficiently
through reservoirs: installation of mechanical bypass systems
designed to keep juvenile salmon out of dam turbines; and barge
or truck transportation of juvenile salmon around dams. The
Council declined to adopt fish and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations to provide water-spills to allow fish to move
around the dams. Id.at 682. Unfortunately, these Initiatives were
doomed to fail once the Council decided not to require malnstem
passage improvements sufficient to noticeably increase run sizes.
Id.
66. The Program originally authorized BPA to fund such
supra note 65. § 201(1). However
'goals studies.' 1984 PROGRAw.i
some commentators expressed concern that BPA was not adequately committed to restoring the basin's fisheries. See Michael
C. Blumm, The Northwest Power Act's Institutional Innovations and
Unufilled Promises, 2 1. ENvr_ L & LnIG. 165. 173 n.53 (19871. As a
consequence, the Council amended the Program In 1985.
COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM. FiNm.
AMiENDMES. 50 Fed. Reg. 11.032, 11.033 (1985) (final amendments to Program § 201). Sie also Blumm. Parity V. supra note 8. at
682.
67. The Council concluded in 1986 that hydropower production was responsible for the loss of 5-I1 million of the 7-14 million salmon killed each year by activities that destroy Its habitat.
LossEs STuDY. supra note 9. at I. Nevertheless, the 1987 amendments sought only to achieve a total annual run size of five million fish. The Council asserted that current socioeconomic and

mum interim spill levels at the mainstem dams,
which are essential to reduce high levels of juvenile
mortality associated with passage through hydroelectric turbines. =
During the first decade after the enactment of
the Northwest Power Act, the Council showed little
willingness to directly confront these problems. The
Council rejected fishery coalition recommendations
that fish flows be increased and implementation of
the Water Budget be improved in 1987, and in 1990
the Council declined to tighten requirements for
future hydroelectric development in the basin." The
Council did act to improve fish flows in the basin in

63. The Water Budget allocated 43 million acre feet (mal
for replacement spring flows, and the Council created managers
to oversee Corps implementation of the Budgets requirements.
Blumm. ParityIV.supra note I5. at 470. The attraction of the Water
Budget from the Council's point of viewtlay in its potential for less
loss of hydropower revenues than would be the case in a minimum flow regime and also in its involvement of fishery advocates
in the day-to-day operational management of the FCRPS. Blumm.
ParityV. spira note 8. at 675.
69. Operators of the dams on the Snake and Lower
Columbia Rivers usually responded to the expiration of theWater
Budget period by reducing flows, This was done in order to store
water behind the dams for power generation during the fall and
winter, but its effect was 'a mar'ked reduction in flows during the
summer migration season.' Blumm, Parity V. supra note 8. at 638.
In addition, the Corps did not consistently grant Water Budget
requests, particularly in average or below-av;erage flo years. The
Corps' actions were often motivated by a desire to maxcimize
power generation or refill reservoirs rather than meet fish and
wildlife needs. Id.at 638-89. Sme a'WBlumm. Parity IV. supra note
15. at 494-501 (discussing Corps' evasion of Water Budget flow
priority over reservoir refill and secondary power considerations,
Inflexible application of Water Budget during late migration season. and BPA efforts to control activities of managers responsible
for assuring adequate Water Budget flows for fish).
70. 1982 P,.GA. supra note 60. § 404(b).
71. Installation schedules at the other seven dams are generally several years behind schedule. Blumm, Parity V supra note
8. at 694.
72. Blumm. Parity V. supra note 8. at 677. The Council
required spill plans that would achie;e survival rates comparable
to those associated with the best available bypass systems. LI.
The Council's reluctance to require spills adequate to improve
survival beyond that threshold might be a result of their high cost
In terms of the electric power that could otherwise be generated
with the water spilled.
73. in 198 the Council designated approximately 44.000
miles of basin streams as 'protected areas' which would be
unavailable for hydroelectric project construction. Blumm. Parity
V. supra note 8, at 696 (citing No nozsT POWER PErNNI:G- CouNO.,
PRoTEcTWD A'eAs S'uiAR'i AND.,Resro:zs To Ccm.umws (1938)).
However, In 1990. the Council declined to adopt a recommendatIon that the designation be applied to approved but unconstructed hydroelectric prolects. The fishery coalition had urged
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1989, but its behavior did not reflect leadership on
this issue. The Council merely ratified an agreement
among the fish and wildlife agencies, tribes, BPA,
and the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference
Committee (PNUCC) that resolved the long-running
argument over spill magnitude and timing at mainstem Columbia dams.7 The Council played no role
in negotiating the settlement."
By the end of its first decade, the Program
enjoyed success in some key respects. However,
many of the successes were evident only on paper
or fleeting in terms of improved run sizes. In 1987
the Council restructured the implementation of the
Program, creating a sub-basin planning process
aimed at avoiding unanticipated impacts on local
fish production and inconsistencies with overall
Program goals and policies; issued principles to
guide salmon research and production objectives;
directed that implementation of the Program give
priority to adequate genetic diversity, rapid
improvement of mainstem dam passage, and
restoration of fisheries existing above Bonneville
Dam; frequently reiterated its concern that salmon

production be increased and harvests reduced; and
institutionalized "roundtable" discussions among
all parties interested in fishery health.Y The 1988
creation of the "Protected Areas" list must also be
considered an accomplishment since it makes new
hydroelectric development in the basin less likely,
although not impossible.Y The Council also took
steps toward prioritizing the implementation of the
Program's wildlife mitigation provisions. 1 By 1988,
the Council's efforts apparently helped stocks In
some Columbia River subbasins, such as the
Yakima and the Hanford Reach, increase perceptibly."9 However, the improvement proved illusory By
1989, data indicated that runs throughout the
Pacific Northwest and California were again uniformly in a rapid decline." That decline continues to
the present day."'
Notwithstanding the Council's adoption of
these effective measures, the Council's refusal to
adopt fishery coalition recommendations for larger
flows effectively precluded significant reductions in
heavy smolt mortality caused by the hydropower
system.Y Without such improvements in juvenile

the Council to invoke protected area designation to prevent construction of hydroelectric projects which were issued a preliminary permit or awaiting a decision by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) on a pending license application
and to impose protected area status on all projects for which
"there had not been a substantial investment of resources." Id.at

75. Blumm, Parity V. supra note 8. at 700 n.255. In 1990, the
Council again failed to come to terms with the flow problem. That
year the Council reiected a comprehensive, biologically-based
flow regime proposed by a coalition of fish and wildlife agencies
and tribes and supported by a detailed scientific lustification, Id
at 671-72, 675-77. The recommendations would have required
that the flows be considered "hard restraints" on hydropower system operations, to be met under all conditions, reiterated the
1981 request for minimum flows on the lower Columbia; requested summer flows through August of each year; and Incorporated
the "sliding scale" concept originally proposed in 1981 Id. The
Council instead opted for flows still below the threshold thought
by biologists necessary to ensure juvenile salmon survival on the
lower Columbia and Snake. Id. at 675-76. Nor did the Council
improve flows in 1991. The 1991 Amendments established a "low
flow target" of 200 kcfs on the lower Columbia, Increased the
Water Budget allocation to 6.45 million acre feet (mafi, proposed
the lowering of John Day reservoir to minimum operating pool,
and removed a 140 kcfs "flow cap" on the mid-Columbia. See
Blumm. Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 2, at 691-92.

701-02 (citing NORTHWEST

POWER PLANNING COUNCIL. PROTECTED
AREA
SUMMARY AND REsPONSE TO COMMENTS 2, 4-15. 17-18 (1990)). In fact,

the Council's 1990 actions reflected a willingness to allow new
hydroelectric development to go forward. The Council removed
approximately 500 miles of basin streams from protected area
designation in response to thirty requests for exemptions by
FERC. Id.

74. Id.at 699 (citing NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL,
NOTICE OF FINAL ACTION ON SPILL AMENDMENTS (1989)). The "Fish
Spill Memorandum of Agreement" was a result of a settlement of
litigation alleging that proposed Pacific Intertie expansion violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321. It
provided for spills at Lower Monumental, Ice Harbor, John Day.
and The Dalles dams over a IO-year penod. Those dams lack adequate fish bypass systems. The agreement is designed to provide
spills sufficient to protect a significant percentage of salmon runs
migrating between April 15 and August 21 each year and requires
completion of an annual spill plan by November I of each year.
The spill plan governs during the following year's spill and summer migration seasons and must be integrated with annual smolt
monitoring programs maintained by the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes. Although the Corps of Engineers and the region's
utilities refused to sign the Agreement, its implementation was
.encouraging" in 1989 and 1990. Id. at 699-700. The Agreement
was achieved following a long period of negotiations commenced
after salmon advocates filed a complaint aimed at blocking
expansion of BPKs proposed Pacific Intertie. The Pacific Intertie
links power generating facilities in the Pacific Northwest to
California, thereby increasing power sales to that state and making spills less likely. PNUCC is a non-profit corporation that represents many of the Pacific Northwest's electricity customers.
Blumm, Columbia River Basin. supra note 35, at 134.

76. 1987 PROGRAM.,
supra note 8.

§§204(a)-(g) to 205, at 39-44.

77. Blumm. Parity V.supra note 8, at 697.
78. Id. at 702 (citing Letter from Northwest Power Planning
Council to Interested Parties (Oct. 24, 1990)).
79. John M. Volkman, Making Room In the Ark.-The Endangered
Species Act and the Columbia River Basin, 34 ENVIRONMENT 18, 38 (May
1992).
80. Id.
81. See loan Laatz, The New Order; The Endangered Species Act and
Political Reality Clash as New Leaders Look to Save Salmon, OREGONIAN,
Nov. 29. 1994, at Al (noting that "Imlany salmon runs are at
record lows").
82. The Water Budget for the lower Snake River was met In
1992, after a number of the basin's tribes and environmental
groups successfully petitioned NMFS to list several stocks of
salmon. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 2, at 689 n.127.
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passage survival, the health of many of the Pacific
Northwest's salmon runs precipitously declined."
By 1990, the continued deterioration of the resource
had induced several environmental groups and
tribes to successfully petition for the listing of several stocks under the ESA. In April 1990. the
Shoshone-Bannock tribe asked NMFS to list the
Snake River sockeye as endangered." Two months
later, a coalition of Pacific Northwest environmental
groups petitioned for the listing of the Snake River
spring, summer, and fall chinook and lower
Columbia coho runs." In 1991. NMFS responded by
listing the Snake River sockeye as endangered.o The
agency also listed the chinook runs as threatened in
1992!7
B. The Effects of the Salmon Listings
The listing of several salmon stocks triggered
the ESAs command that federal dam operators
consult with NMFS before continuing status quo
operations of FCRPS dams."3 In 1992. NMFS"
issued a biological opinion concluding that operation of the dams in the Columbia River Basin would
not jeopardize the listed salmon runs.9' This con83. According to a report issued by the American Fisheries
Society in 1991. 101 wild salmon stocks native to the region
between Califomia and the U.S.-Canada border are fadng a high
nsk of extinction, 58 are at moderate risk of extinction. and 54 others are considered to be of speoal concem." Sre Willa Nehlsen. et
al.. Pacific Salmon at tile Crossroads:Stocks at Risk from Caiornla.Oregn.
Idaho, and Washington. 16 FisHERIEs 4 (1991). BPA believes that thirteen wild runs native to the Columbia River Basin are in critical
condition. See Paul Koberstem. Balile Lines Form Over WiL Sabron's
Future. Os GONIAN. May 27. 1990. at Al. Some estimate that as

many as 200 stocks in Oregon and Washington alone face the
threat of extinction. See Volkman, supra note 79. at 19.
84. 55 Fed. Reg. 22.942 (1990).
85. 55 Fed. Reg. 37,342 (1990).
86. 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (1991)(codifled at 50 C.FR. § 17.11.)
87. 57 Fed. Reg. 14.653 (1992) (codified at 50 C.FR. 4 17.11.)
NMFS denied listing of the lower Columbia coho on grounds that
those runs were not distinguishable from hatchery coho.
Environmental groups have also requested listing of the midColumbia summer chinook runs. 58 Fed. Reg. 46.944 (1993).
NMFS denied listing of the mid-Columbia summer chinook. 59
Fed. Reg. 48,855 (1994). However, NMFS recently proposed to list
certain steelhead runs native to southwest Oregon and northern
California as threatened, 60 Fed. Reg. 14.253 (1995), and will consider listing numerous coho stocks native to California and
Oregon. 60 Fed. Reg. 38,011 (1995). NMFS is also considering
petitions to list other steelhead and coho runs in the Basin, as
well as a number'of pink salmon, chum, sockeye, chinook, and
sea-run cutthroat trout runs. 59 Fed. Reg. 46,808 (1994).
88. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a). See generally DANIEL 1. ROHU', THE
ENDANGERED

SpEciEs AcT:

A

GUIDE TO

nIs

PROTcTIONS AND

IMPLEMENTATION 12-35 (1989) Ihereinafter RoHLF. ESAI: lames C.
Kilboume. The EndangeredSpecies Act Under the Microscope:A Clbseup
Look from a UiIgator's Perspective. 21 ENvri.. L 499. 525-60 (1991)
(outlining the ESA § 7 process). Prior to 1986. agencies consid-

ered that an adverse effect did not have to be likely before the
consultation requirement of the ESA applied. See ROHi.? supra, at

clusion was surprising in light of NMFS notice to
BPA. the Corps and the Bureau that those agencies
would be asked to "make progress toward reversing
the decline of the listed salmonYi The 1992 biological opinion did, however, warn BPA, the Corps, and
the Bureau that "future standards Ilikelyl will
impose far more stringent requirements than are
necessary to achieve the 1992 interim goal."'2
Nevertheless, the 1993 biological opinion left the
FCRPS status quo undisturbed. Although the 1993
biological opinion ratified the improvements called
for in the Council's 1991-92 Program amendments,
NMFS again found no leopardy to the listed salmon
even though the Corps' and the Bureau's mitigation
measures were expected to result in only marginal
improvements in salmon survival.P
IV. THE STRATEGY FOR SALM,.ON

A.The Salmon Summit- No Regional Consensus
on Steps Needed to Save the Salmon
The imminent listing of several stocks prompted Oregon Senator Mark 0. Hatfield to convene a
"grand roundtable on salmon issues"' in the spring
114-16 (criticiung changes in regulations, issued that year. which
allowed federal agencies to make decisions without complete
biological information). Notvithstanding the 1936 regulation, the
Ninth Circuit recently ruled that consultation is required whenever a federal agency action 'may affect" a listed species. See
Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 39 F3d 1050, 1056 (9th CiE
1994). art. denird. 115 S,CL 1793 (1995).
89. NMFS and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service share junsdiction over salmon because they are species that survive in both
manne and freshwater habitats at vanous stages of their life
cycle. Bodi. Prcteting Saon Unler the ESN 5upra note 51. at 353.
See 16 US.C. § 1532(15) (defining the term "Secretary' as either
the Secretary of the Interior or Secretary of Commerce because
both are vested with responsibilities under the ESA). Howerver.
NMFS has assumed primary jurisdiction over anadlromous fish
because they spend the bulk of their lives in the ocean. Bodi.
ProtectingSalmcn Under the ESA. supra note 51. at 353. n.21 (citing
-Memorandum of Understanding Between the US. Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service
Regarding Jurisdictional Responsibilities and Listing Procedures
Under the Endangered Species Acr (August 28. 197411.
90.WAFS. NA=zL0--- A.;.:A ;D .,:Yaz A;,:;S
O.
B:oCLWCU. O;;,:0z o:z-HE OP.io:.' om
a
FEDML. COuM' pX;L-.
Pow'E. S"wts50 (1992 (hereinafter 1992 E.o!c,.-:zA. O;i:;:o:l.
91. Letter from William M Fox. Director. National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration. to Mal. Gen. Ernest 1. Harrell.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (April 10, 1992). at 2 (quoted in
Renewed Motion of Idaho Department of Fish & Game for
Summary ludgment. at 4. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nati
Manne Fisheries Se..850 F Supp. 825 (D. Or. 1994) (Dec. 28.
1993) (Idaho Motion))
92. 1992 &:acC'c:.

Ot.!.:i:). supra note 90,at 15-16.

93. 1993 B:LoC::A. O i::z. supra note 50, at 64-65.
94. Blumm. Siting Id-a*s Sa.,on. supra note 2, at 638.
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Lacey
of 1990. The participants included major users of
the Columbia River system, including power interests, fishing industry representatives, and farmers,
as well as representatives of environmental groups
and the region's tribes.9 Over a six-month period,
the participants sought to find ways to increase the
amount of water allocated by BPA, the Corps, and
the Idaho Power Company9 for fish flows.' The
group also persuaded federal land managers to
consider how best to protect salmon habitat under
their jurisdiction."
The attempt to build a regional consensus on
other steps needed to restore the runs failed, however. The participants could not agree on how much
to increase flows in the lower Columbia, the degree
to which salmon harvests should be reduced, or on
appropriate changes to the region's hatchery system.9 The failure of the "Salmon Summit" to resolve
these issues induced the governors of the four
Pacific Northwest states to turn to the Council for
solutions to them.' ® Thus, the Council again found
itself acting as the region's de facto salmon manager.
Unfortunately, the Council's subsequent attempt to
play this role did not result in a restoration program
likely to return healthy wild salmon runs to the
region.

B. The 1991-92 Program Amendments: The
Council's Strategy for Salmon
In May 1991, the Council requested recommendations for 1991 amendments to the Program. The
fish and wildlife agencies of Idaho and Oregon, the
Columbia River Inter-tribal Fish Commission (CRITFC),iY' and the Columbia River Basin Fish and
Wildlife Authority (CBFWA)0 2 were among the parties that responded to the Council's request. - At
the core of the recommendations offered by these
agencies and tribes were two concepts: (1) significant increases in spring and summer flows on the
Columbia and Snake Rivers, as well as minimum
flows on the lower Columbia and extension of summer flow requirements through August of each year;
and (2) establishment of tangible biological objectives, which would make it easier to evaluate the
restoration effort.'1'
The Basin's fish and wildlife agencies and tribes
recommended flows of 140 thousand cubic feet per
second (kcfs) on the lower Snake and 300 kcfs on
the lower Columbia.i °0 In addition, the agencies and
tribes asked the Council to adopt specific water particle travel time objectives that would serve as an
effective measure of the impact of increased spring
and summer flows on juvenile survival. " , BPA and
several of its industrial customers argued against
the adoption of a travel-time objective and ques-

95. Volkman, supra note 79, at 39.
96. Id.The Idaho Power Company owns the Hells Canyon
Dam complex on the Snake River.
97. Id.at 39.

between July i6-August 31. At Priest Rapids Dam, CBFWA proposed
minimum flows of 70 kcfs between January I-May 31,36 kcfs between
June I-October 15, and 50 kds between October 16-November 30, At
Ice Harbor Dam, CBFWA recommended minimum flows of 10 kcts
between january i-March 31 and 30 kds between April-December 31.
CBFWA also advocated daily average flows of 140 kds at Priest
Rapids between April I and June 15 and at Ice Harbor Dams between
April 16 and June 15. Blumm, Parily V.supra note 8,at 708 (table).
105. See, e.g., 6 1991 RECOMmENDATIONS, supra note 103, at
1437-39.
106. Most biologists believe that juvenile salmon survival Is
related to the velocity of river flows. See generally THE BIOLOGICAL

98. Id.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. CRITFC is a coordinating fishenes agency representing
four tribes that possess treaty nghts to harvest salmon in the basin.
CRITFC's participants are the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Warm Springs, Umatilla, and Yakama Indian Nations, and the Nez
Perce Tribe. Blumm, Columbia River Basin. supra note 35. at 133.
102. CBFWA is a coalition of Pacific Northwest fishery agencies and Indian tribes and was formed to enhance the coordination of fish and wildlife policies of regional importance. The coalition members include NMFS, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
the fish and wildlife agencies of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho,
and CRITFC. Blumm, Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 133.
POWER
PLANNING
103.
See
NORTHWEST
COUNCIL,RECOMMENDAIONS

FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE SALMON AND

WILDUFE
STEELHEAD PROVISIONS OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER BAsIN FiSH AND
PROGRAM (1991) Ihereafter 1991 REcOMMENDATIONSI.
104. See6 1991 RECOMENDATIONS. supra note 103. at 1437-45
(Idaho Department of Fish and Game recommendations); 4 1991
RECOMMENDATIONS, at 662-63 (Oregon Department of Fish and
Wildlife recommendations); 5 1991 RcOmmENDAMONs, at 889-92
(CRITFC recommendations); 4 1991 RECOMMENDAMONS, at 693-94
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recommendations). CBFWA recommended minimum instantaneous flows all year at The Dalles Dam.
with average daily flows of 80 kds between January-March and
September-December, 250 kds between April i-I5. 300 kds between
April 16-june 15, 200 kcfs between June 16-july 15. and 160 kds

FORTHE FLOW PROPOSAL OF THE COLUMBIA
AND TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION
BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE AuTHORm'Y 8-30 (citing numerous scientific

studies and academic articles), attachedas appendix to Comments of
Northwest Environmental Defense Center (1991), reprinted in 3
1991 REcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 103. at 582 A consensus exists
among the Pacific Northwest's fish and wildlife agencies and
tribes that the Council should adopt a juvenile travel time objective. The recommendation for travel time objectives submitted by
the Idaho Department of Fish and Game (IDFG) Is representative
of that view. IDFG recommended that the Council;
establishll a biological objective of decreasing fish travel time from the point of origin to below Bonneville Dam
to as near the pre-dam condition as practicable. This
biological objective is measured by the physical parameter of water particle travel time, which Is directly
related to fish travel time.
6 1991 RECOMMENDATIONS. supra note 103. at 1437 (Text of Proposed
Program Amendment). Fora non-scientific overview of the importance of smolt travel-time objectives, see John Ogan. The Need for
aSmolt Travel Time Objective in the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife
Programto Protectand Restore the Northwest's Imperiled Salmon Runs, 24
ENVTL. L. 673 (1994).

Sdrran?
Ila-a
fte Fer Ft6c
ccScn?
lwIeFr

F 11995

Rd~ 1995

tioned the increased biological benefits of flows
above 85 kcfs on the lower Snake River and above
200 kcfs on the lower Columbia.w
=
In phase two of the 1991 amendments,' the
Council improved flows in the mainstem Columbia
and on the Snake for the first time since the adoption of the Program nearly a decade before. The
Council called upon FCRPS operators to provide, as
an "immediate action," a minimum monthly average
flow equivalent of 85 kcfs at Lower Granite Dam
between mid-April and mid-lune"' and to achieve a
"low flow target" of 200 kcfs on the lower
Columbia."10 The adoption of even these status quo
flow targets was not reassuring, however, because
phases one and two did not include specific measures guaranteed to achieve them."' Moreover, the

Council postponed consideration of long-term biological objectives, escapement goals, and run
rebuilding schedules until phase three.iz
Phase three incorporated the first two phases
of the 1991 amendments and was adopted by the
Council as its "Strategy for Salmon' in September
1992. ' The Strategy did not adopt the smolt travel
time objectives advocated by the fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes."' and it did not alter the lower
Columbia and lower Snake flow levels to those levels decided upon during phase one."' The Strategy
did include numerous measures designed to
improve juvenile salmon passage at federal and privately owned hydroelectric projects throughout the
Basin," 6 called for various measures to reduce pre-

107. BPA urged the Council to retain a 1:5 maf Water Budget
for the Snake and a 3.45 maf Water Budget for the lower
Columbia. 5 1991 RECOMFNDATIONS. supra note 103. at 1187. 1189.
Interestingly. BPA admitted that it did not support even these
modest flow targets. BPA acknowledged that its Snake River
Water Budget recommendation would achieve a minimum flow of
50 kcfs for 46 days of the April 15-lune 15 migration period, with
'pulses" to achieve flows of 85-100 kcls onas many of the 46 days
as possible.- Id. at 1271. The Pacific Northwest Utilities
Conference Committee (PNUCC) recommended even less, adoption of Water Budgets of 1.2-1.5 maf for the Snake and 3.45 maf
for the mid-Columbia. 4 1991 REco!ENoDATIONS, supra note 103, at
793-95.

(citing PHAs Two Awsan._wrs, supra note 109). The Council did

108. The Council completed phase one of the 1991 amendments on September 10. 1991. The phase two amendments were
adopted on December 11. 1991. See 57 Fed. Reg. 3.077 (1992).
109. NoRTHwEsr POwER PLANNING COUNCIL. MENDMEM TO'HE
Wnoun- PsioiA (PHAsE Two) 34
COLuMBiA RivE BASIN FiSH ANiD
(1992) Ihereinafter PAsE Two AmENI)MEinTs. A'flow equivalent" Is
"the flow level required to achieve the same particle travel time
as 85.000 cfs at average normal pool elevations at all prolects.' Id.
at 34 n.9. To achieve the desired minimum monthly flow equivalent on the lower Snake. the Council asked the Corps to lower the
four mainstem Snake River dams to -near minimum operating
pools," which would cause the release of 900.000 acre-feet from
Dworshak Dam for fish flows in low water years: shifted flood control storage space away from Snake basin reservoirs: requested
use of uncontracted storage water at several Bureau of
Reclamation reservoirs and at Idaho Power Company's Brownlee
proiect to enhance fish flows. and called for efficiency Improvements, marketing, conservation, option-leasing, and storage buybacks that would produce excess water to be made available for
juvenile migration. Blumm. Saving Idaho's Salmon. supra note 2. at
690-91. To accomplish the "low flow target" on the lower
Columbia. the Council called for lowering John Day reservoir to
minimum operating pool during the summer, id. at 39. removed a
-flow cap" on the mid-Columbia. Id. at 42; and asked BPA to
release an unspecified amount of water from its non-treaty storage allocation, so that studies of greater summer flows on the
lower Columbia could be performed, ld. at 43.
-110.

PHASE Two AMENDMENTS, supra note 109. at 34.

111. See Blumm. Saving Idaho's Salmon. supra note 2. at 692
(noting that provisions for summer flows depend on cooperation
by actions by the Bureau and Idaho Power Company that may be
considered "uncertain propositionsr).
112. See Blumm. Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 2. at 693-94

ask the Corps to study the impacts of draving down reservoirs
and to begin planning to implement them. PHASE Two
AENow.,s, supra note 109. at 43-48. The Council also emphasized continued mechanical bypass installation, harvest management. U. at 63. and predator control measures, 11. at 27. Earlier in
1991 the Council requested certain high pnority habitat projects:
a program to insert screens in water diversion canals. and that
measures to protect wild salmon from hatchery stocks proceed.

Noa mmms Poan Pmu*,!.,a Ccou. AmE.mas To THE Cor~umart%
PriER Bmmi FISH mo W\inurm P¢cFAA (P.-As- 1) (1991) [hereinafter PHASE O:;E AM.Lr:o,-.Asl.

113 Courvor Rr.rEn BAsnz FISH AND WILD=
AmEDo!,EwNTs. 57 Fed. Reg, 56,935 (1992).

P c'.A.i. Fiat.

114. The Council adopted a goal of doubling the basin's
salmon from 2.5 million fish returning to the mouth of the
Columbia each year to 5 million fish iwthno appreciable nsk to
the biological diversity of fish populations:" 2 tNo'mwimr Po-z
PLrCNIONG Cou:cat. STRTEG roa SALoz 1-2 (1992) Ihereinafter
STRrAY FRo S.mol.. The Council also announced that it would
seek to achieve 'rebuilding targets" for naturally spawning Snake
River salmon. and to apply six pnnciples to the evaluation of
planning activities. !I. at 20, These pnnciples indude- (13 giving
priority to rebuilding weak. uprier populations. (23 avoiding
appreciable risk to biological diversity among or within fish populations: (3) approaching habitat and production activities from
a total-watershed perspective- (4) fulfilling obligations under
Indian treaties and providing fish for harvesters: (5) engaging in
activities that are designed as experiments to increase understanding of salmon; and (6) avoiding hatchery construction
unless existing hatchenes cannot meet fishery resource needs or
a new hatchery would better achieve Program objectives. Y1.at
18-19.
115. See S'.mwi roa S.LO:I. supra note 114. at 2.
116. The speci ic measures include studying and installing
screens and other turbine byrpass systems. The Council called for
turbine screen installation to be completed at Lower Monumental
Dam by March 1992. Ice Harbor Dam by March 1996, and The
Dalles Dam by March 1993. and also requested that the Corps spill
sufficient water over the tops of those dams to aid juvenile migration In the interim. The Council also asked the Corps to design
and test extended-length turbine screens at McNary Dam by
March 1995; Lower Granite Dam by March 1996. Little Goose Dam
by March 1996; John Day Dam by March 1993. and The Dalles Dam
by March 1998. and to immediately commence improvements to
the both powerhouses at Bonneville Dam. The Council asked
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dation of juvenile salmon"' and improve adult passage at federal and non-federal dams,"8 recommended that fishery regulators effectively monitor
and control salmon harvests," 9 and required actions
to improve habitat enhancement and mitigation,
weakened wild stock populations, and hatchery
operations.'1° However, the Council never attempted to explain its reasons for failing to adopt the recommendations of the region's fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes.'2'
V. NORTHWEST RESOURCE INFORMATION CENTER V.
NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL THE NINTH
CIRCUIT REJECTS THE STRATEGY FOR SALMON

A. The Arguments
Few parties interested in the management of

the Columbia River system found the Strategy for
Salmon satisfactory. Consequently, in February
1993, Northwest Resource Information Center
(NRIC), 22 the Yakama Indian Nation,' and a group
of BPA industrial customers petitioned the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for
24
review of the 199 1-92 Program amendments.
NRIC's principal concern with the Strategy was
that it did not guarantee adequate flows.12'
Accordingly, NRIC argued that the Strategy was
invalid because the-Council violated the Northwest
Power Act by (1) failing to establish biological
Eugene Water and Electric Board to improve the screening and
bypass systems its Leaburg Canal and Walterville Canal projects
and requested testing, evaluation, and installation of appropriate
screening and bypass systems at the public utility district dams:
Wells Dam, Rocky Reach Dam, Rock Island Dam, Wanapum Dam,
and Priest Rapids Dam. STRATEGY
FOR
SALMON, supra note 114, at 3638.
117. Id.at 38-39.
118. Id.at 41-43.
1i19. Id.at 45-51.
120. Id. at 53-78. Among the specific steps the Council
requested were studies to determine the impacts of hatchery production on wild spawning salmon populations. Id.at 63.
121. See STRATEGY
FOR
SALMON, supra note I14, at 8-9. 15 (noting "intense debate" over "relationship of increased flows to fish
survival"), 17-22 (establishing "Program Framework and Goal"
without discussion or mention of fishery coalition recommendations), 23-26 (discussing mitigation measures without mention of
fishery coalition recommendations).
122. NRIC, the brainchild of Idaho consultant Ed Chaney,
has consistently maintained that changes in the dams and reservoirs are needed to restore wild salmon to the region. Hathorn,
supra, note 10, at 16 (quoting Ed Chaney as criticizing barge and
truck transportation of juvenile salmon in the Basin and harvest
reductions as tools to restore the runs; "Once they stop fishing.
you can't blame lhem. Then you figure it has to be something else.
It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out what that something
else is.).

objectives for the operation of FCRPS and for provision of instream flows;2 6 (2) failing to adopt flow
targets deemed beneficial by fish and wildlife agencies, tribes, and its own staff and instead instituting
measures that would not ensure the attainment of
the adopted flow targets;17 (3) rejecting fish and
wildlife agency and tribal recommendations without adequate written explanation and failing to give
the "due weight" to those recommendations
required by the Act;2 and (4) improperly subjecting
the biological opinions of the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes to a standard of proof higher than
'
"best available scientific knowledge.' 1
The Yakama Indian Nation shared NRIC's belief
that the Council established flows on the lower
Columbia and lower Snake at levels too low to protect migrating smolts. However, the Yakamas' motivation for participating in the process of formulating the Program, and its reason for contesting the
Strategy for Salmon, lay in its obligation to protect
its treaty rights to harvest Snake River chinook.'
Thus, the Yakamas' principal oblections to the 199192 amendments centered around the Council's failure to adopt measures likely to restore those runs
to stable sizes. The Yakamas were concerned that
the 1991-92 amendments did not include measures
designed to assess progress toward harvestable
wild runs and argued forcefully that the Council had
not adequately deferred to the scientific expertise
123. After the tribal council agreed to change the spelling of
the tribe's name to its original form, Congress recognized the
change of the Yakima Indian Nation's name to "Yakama" in the
Yakima River Basin Water Enhancement Project Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-434, Tit. XI, § 1204(g), 108 Stat. 4526, 4557. The name
change does not affect the city, river, or ski rack of the same name.
124. NRIC and the Yakama Indian Nation filed petitions for
review of the Councirs phases one and two rules on March 27,
1992. Briefing on these petitions for review were stayed until after
the Council issued its phase three amendments, and ultimately
the petitions were consolidated with those challenging the
Council's adoption of the entire Strategy for Salmon.
125. See Adam Berger, An Insider's Perspective on Northwesl
Resource Info. Center v.Northwest Power Planning Council, 25 ENvrL, L
369, 372-73 (1995) Ihereinafter An Insider's Perspectivel.
126. Brief for Northwest Resource Information Center, Inc.,
at 30-31. 39-42, Northwest Resource Info. Center, Inc. v.
Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F3d 1371 (9th Cir, 1994)
(Nos. 92-70190, 70064) (Sept. 10, 1993) (NRIC Brief) (relying on 16
U.S.C. § 839b(h)(2)(B), (6(E)Jil)).
127. Id.at 31-32, 43-47.
128. Id.at 32, 47.
129. Id.at 33-34, 48.
130. Brief for Petitioner Yakama Indian Nation, at 7-42, -45,
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation v.
Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Nos. 92-70191-92, -70055) (Sept. 10, 1993) (Yakama Brief).
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of the region's state and tribal fish and wildlife managers.
The Direct Service Industries (DSIs)."' as largescale purchasers of federal hydropower, believed
that the Council had adopted recommendations
that would dramatically increase power costs while
offering very little benefit for salmon. Thus, while
agreeing with NRIC and the Yakamas that the
Council had not adequately explained the basis for
its adoption of the measures contained in the
Strategy for Salmon,'32 the DSIs complained that the
Council impr6perly had failed to compare the biological benefit of each adopted measure to its
expected cost in terms of power losses and increases in BPA power rates. 3'
The Councils response to the petitions for
review rested on a claim that its decisions were, for
all practical purposes, beyond ludiclal scrutiny.'
The Council also argued that the Northwest Power
Act did not obligate it to provide any more of a written explanation of its decisions regarding particular
recommendations than it had.' Thus, the argumenfs of all of the parties revolved around two
basic questions: (1) which regional interests or parties determine the scientific soundness of proposed
salmon mitigation and restoration measures? and
(2) to what extent must the Council explain publicly
the reasons for its refusal to adopt such proposals?
B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision
On September 9, 1994, the Ninth Circuit granted review and remanded the Strategy for Salmon to
the Council for reconsideration.'" The court did not
determine the measures that the Council should
131. The DSls are aluminum and other electro-process
industries. including one pulp and paper plant, many of which
were drawn to the Padfic Northwest during the 1940s and 1950s
by an abundance of low-cost federal hydroelectric power. Hous
AFriRs. H.R. Rep. No. 976, pt. 11.
Co.. ON INTEMOR AND INSULAR
96th Cong.. 2d sess. 27. repnnted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. 6023, 6025.
There are fifteen such industries operating 51 plants in the
region. They account for approximately one-third of BPs energy
sales. Id.at 27-28.
12. Brief for Petitioners Aluminum Co. of America,
Columbia Aluminum Corp., Columbia Falls Aluminum Co.. Elf
Atachem North America. Inc.. Intalco Aluminum Co.. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp.. Northwest Aluminum Co.. Oregon
Metallurgical Corp., Reynolds Metals Co., and Vanalco, Inc, at
11-12. 22-26. Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative v. Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Council. 35
E3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-70070) (Sept. 10. 1993) (DSI
Brief).
133. DSI Brief. supra note 132, at II. 12-20; Reply Brief of
DSIs, at 7-11. Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative v.
Northwest Power Planning Council. 35 E3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994)
(No. 93-70070) (Mar. 16. 1994).
134. See Brief for Respondent Northwest Power Planning
Council, at 20-22. Northwest Resource Info. Center, Inc., et al. v.
Northwest Power Planning Council. 35 F3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994)
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have included in the Strategy for Salmon. Instead,
the court held that the Council (1) improperly
declined to explain its reasons for failing to adopt
fish and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations," and (2) unlawfully omitted biological objectives from the 1991-92 amendments.' While important as mandatory constraints on the Council's procedure for developing future Program amendments,
these two rulings were not the only noteworthy findings of the court. The court also provided the
Council with a detailed explanation of its obligations under the Fish and Wildlife Program provisions of the Northwest Power Act. including: (1) the
Council must afford significant deference to the
expertise and mission of state and tribal fish and
wildlife agencies, and (2) the Council is not obligated to compare, before including a recommended
measure in the Program, its biological benefits to
the costs it imposes on the power system.'"
Moreover. the Ninth Circuit determined that each of
the Program criteria contained in section 4(h)(6) of
the Act' 1 are mandatory and function as judiciallyenforceable constraints on the Council's discretion."' The judges also provided the Council and
the public with its interpretation of each of those
criteria., Each of these findings strongly reinforced
Congress' intent that the Northwest Power Act elevate fish and wildlife considerations in regional
river planning. They also substantially increased the
likelihood that the Council would take more aggressive action to restore the runs.'"
This subsection will first provide an overview of
the Northwest Power Act's fish and wildlife provisions.'" The following subsection will then explain
(Nos. 92-70190.92-70064) (Council Bnef! (asserting that Strategy
cannot be iudicially reviewed for compliance with 16 U.S.C. §
839b[h)(6) because that statutory section "setlsl the agenda but
does not dictate the substance of measures7 that must be included in Program and that Congress intended for court to review
only whether Council -considered' the measures specified in that
statutory section and arguing that court should not review
Strategy because issues are too 'factually complen.
135. Id.at 63.
136. North.rest Reure Inf3. Center, 35 E3d at 1395.
137. Id.at 1386-"9.
138. IL at 1389
139. Id. at 1394-95. However, the Council can reject a recommendation on the ground that it is inconsistent with the Acts
mandate to ensure an economical and reliable power system. Sez
16 U.S.C § 839b(h)(5). (7)
140. 16 U.S.C § 839b(hl(6),
141. Nart .st

Rsurce Inf. Center. 35 F3d at 1389.

142. 1l at 1390-93,
143. Stz Infra notes 354-419 and accompanying text fora discussion of the Council's response to the Ninth Circuit's decision.
144, See Infra notes 147-168 and accompanying text.
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the court's resolution of (1) the Council's argument
that it was not obligated to afford"more than nominal deference to state fish and wildlife agencies and
tribes, and (2)the DSIs' claim that no Program measure can be adopted unless the benefit it produces
for fish and wildlife is likely to outweigh the costs it
imposes on the power system."' Finally, the subsection summarizes the court's interpretation of
each of the Act's mandatory Program criteia."
1.The Northwest Power Act's Fish and Wildlife
Provisions
The Northwest Power Act is an unprecedented
law. Congress' primary reason for enacting it was a
desire to avoid then-predicted power shortages in
the region."' 4 However, Congress also wanted to
return healthy and harvestable salmon fisheries to
the Pacific Northwest. Previous legislative efforts to
assure the conservation of the region's salmon populations were not successful, in part because they
did not afford fish and wildlife protection and
enhancement significant priority in the management of the FCRPS.14 Congress therefore specified
that one purpose of the Northwest Power Act is to
ensure the "protectlionl, mitigat[ionl and
enhance[ment lofi fish and wildlife" native to the
Columbia River Basin."19 To accomplish this pur145. See infra notes 194-200. 239-241 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 208-237 and accompanying text.
147. Devine, supra note 38, at 83.
148. Before the Northwest Power Act was created, the Fish
and Wildlife Conservation Act (FWCA) was the principal federal
law protecting fish and wildlife in the region not listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA. FWCA aimed to assure "equal
consideration" of wildlife and "other features of water-resource
development programs. 16 U.S.C. § 661. However, the consultation process created by FWCA to achieve this obiective failed fora
number of reasons. While Congress intended that fish and wildlife
agency recommendations for mitigation be given "full consideration," water proiect managers were given the discretion to reiect
mitigation measures if they determined that they did not maximize "overall proiect benefits." 16 U.S.C. § 662(b). See Blumm,
Parity II, supra note 15. at 110-11. Second, because the extent of
water project impacts on fish and wildlife frequently could not be
determined until after operation of the prolect commenced, water
prolect managers were able to reiect proposed mitigation measures on grounds that they were not tied to losses proven at the
time the project was approved. Id. A third reason for FWC~s failure was that the mitigation measures most often adopted were
hatchenes concentrated in the lower Columbia Basin, thus depriving upnver fishers, recreationalists. and native Americans the
benefits of restored salmon runs. Id. Finally, FW cA does not allow
citizens to judicially enforce any particular substantive level of
wildlife protection. See Enos v. Marsh, 616 F. Supp. 32, 64 (D. Haw.
1984). affd. 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 356 (8th Cir. 1972). For a general
overview of FWCAs ineffectiveness, see MICHAEL I. BEAN, THE
EvoLUTION OF NiaIONAL WILDUFE LAw 181-95 (1983).
149. 16 U.S.C. § 839(6).

pose, Congress directed the Council to create and
implement the Program. Congress specified that
the Program's aim should be to "protect, mitigate,
and enhance" the Basin's fish and wildlife "to the
extent affected by the development and operation"
of the FCRPS and other hydroelectric prolects in the
region.'" The Program provisions of the Act sharply
limit the Council's discretion in designing the
Program by including a number of procedural and
substantive constraints.'
Five basic principles form the statutory boundaries of the Council's freedom in developing the
Program. First, protection and enhancement of fish
and wildlife is to be afforded management consideration equivalent to that given power production
and other economic uses of the Columbia River system. This provision, also known as the equitable
treatment mandate, was added to the regional
power bill by the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce after fishery advocates complained to
then-chairman John Dingell that federal managers
of the FCRPS "ignored or treated with disdain" their
concerns.' 2 The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the
equitable treatment mandate constitutes a judicially enforceable restraint on the Council's discretion
to adopt or relect the policies, plans and priorities
contained in the Program.'"
150. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A).
151. 16 U.S.C. § 839B(d)-(f). See Seattle Master Builders
Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning
Council. 786 F.2d 1359. 1367 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The preparation and
consideration of the 11983 Northwest Conservation and Electric
Powerl IPlIan is a matter within Council authority over which the
Act accords the Council considerable flexibility."), cerl, denied, 479
U.S. 1059 (1987).
152. H.R. Rep. No. 976, Pt. 1,96th Cong. 2d Sess. 45, 46
(1980). repnnted in1980 U.S.C.C.A.N,5989.
153. See Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n. 746 F.2d 466,
473 (9th Cir. 1984). Some commentators have argued that the
equitable treatment mandate obligates the Council and federal
dam operators only to consider hydropower production Impacts
on fish and wildlife, Michael B. Early & Egil Krogh, BalancingPower
Costs and Fisheries Values Under theNorthwest Power Act, 13 U, Pucur
SOUND L. REv. 281, 311 (1990) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 976, Pt, I1,
96th
Cong.. 2d Sess. 37 (1980), repnnted In 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 6023).
Under this view, the clause does not require any Increased protection of the region's salmon runs if such an effort would cause
losses of power production, increases in BPA's costs, or higher
regional electricity rates. Id.at 295. Aside from the Ninth Circuit's
apparent disagreement with this view, see infra note 264, this
interpretation of the Act's equitable treatment mandate does not
make sense in light of the Act's other fish and wildlife provisions,
For example, Congress explicitly contemplated that changes In
dam operations would be necessary. See 16 U.S.C. § 839(h)12)(B)
Moreover, the Act specifies that the Program must require flows
,sufficient to allow "improveldl production, migration and survival" of salmon. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(fl).
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Second, the Act requires the Council to set
appropriate objectives by which the success or failure of the Program can be measured."' Congress
intended that these biological objectives remedy
the tendency of hydropower system managers to
focus only on power production and other economic goals." 1 Thus, the Council must determine which
species must be protected, recovered, or restored
and then incorporate into the Program appropriate
biological methods by which such goals will be
achieved.16 The biological objectives in turn help
hydrosystem managers to focus on the impacts of
power production on fish and wildlife. The Council
must establish the Program's biological objectives
with the guidance of the region's fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes.rT7
The Act's public participation requirements
constitute the third significant limit to the Council's
authority. The Council is to obtain the benefits of
the fish and wildlife agencies' and tribes' biological
expertise by 'requesting recommendations for
Program measures, including appropriate biological objectives.s" In addition to complying with
Congress' command that interested parties be
given a voice in the creation and modification of the
Program, the Council must explain in writing its reasons for failing to adopt those recommendations
not incorporated into the Program."9
Fourth, the Council is forbidden to act as a scientific free agent. All recommendations accompanied by scientific justification that are submitted by
fish and wildlife agencies or tribes must be presumed to be scientifically meritorious. 'w In the
event that fish and wildlife agency or tribal recom154. 16 U.S.C. § 839b~h[2)(B) (directing the Council to establish -objectives for the development and operation of Ihydroelectric] projects on the Columbia River and its tributaries In a manner
designed to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife").
155. See, e.g.. 126 Cong. Rec. 29.808 (Nov. 17. 1980) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (-[The biological objective requirementi Is
dearly intended that no longer will fish and wildlife be given a
secondary status by IBPAI or other federal agences.).
156. 16 U.S.C. § 839b~h1(2)(B).
157. id.
158. Id.
159. 16 U.S.C. § 839blh)(7).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Blumm. Parity V. supra note 8. at 737.
163. 16 U.S.C. § 839b~h)(7).
164. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(h)(l)(A). (h)(2)(B). (h)15).
(h)(6)(Ej(i); Blumm. Parity V.supranote 8, at 667.
165. 16 U.S.C. § 839blh)(6)(E)(ii). Congress specified that the
Program must establish adequate flows because the legislators
were convinced that the absence of this essential characteristic of
salmon habitat has been the main cause of the salmon's decline.
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mendations conflict with those submitted by other
interested parties, the Council must resolve the differences by giving "due weight" to the 'expertise" of
the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes, as well as
to their 'legal rights and responsibilities."di The
Northwest Power Act permits the Council to reject
recommendations submitted by fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes only if they are economically or
technically infeasible. The Council may not reject
such recommendations on grounds that "it knows
more biology."ra Indeed, the Act specifies the particular types of technical or economic infeasibility
adequate to support rejection of fish and wildlife
agency or tribal recommendations. Such recommendations may be rejected only if: (1) they are
inconsistent with the Act's goal of ensuring an
'adequate and economical power supply" for the
region; (2) they would be "less effective" than other
fish and wildlife protection, mitigation, and
enhancement measures to be included in the
Program; or (3) they will not complement the existing or future structure of the region's fish and
wildlife management system, are not supported by
the "best available scientific knowledge." or would
achieve the same biological objectives as other
measures but at a higher cost.'1
The fifth constraint on the Council's discretion
exists in Congress' desire to achieve biological
objectives through changes in dam operations.1 In
addition to requiring the Program to mandate flows
sufficient to recover the regions salmon runs.-S the
Act commands that the Program be based on the
"best available scientific knowledge." The Council
must, as is the case with biological objectives, priSte H.R. REP.No 976, supra note 152. at 46 (quoting GAO STuov.

supra note 10) (-The river no longer has the strong, swift current
needed to carry the smolts rapidly downstream and out to sea. It
now takes young fish more than twice as long to migrate downstream as it did before the dams were built.. it is the cumulative effects of hydro facilities which is so destructive... River
waste Is released from upstream reservoirs when needed to best
serve flood control, power production, and imgation purposes.
This may or may not proide enough water at the nght time to aid
the downstream migration of young salmon and steelhead.: 126
Coixo. Rmc. 29.814 (Nov. 17. 1920) (letter from U.S. Comptroller
General) (recommending that Power Act bill "establish minimum
stream flows on the main-stream Columbia River system adequate to protect and enhance the anadromous salmon and steelhead fisheries'); L. at 29.814 (statement of Rep. Dingell) (expressIng view that Congress expected Council to adopt'inareased flo;,s
at opportune times to enhance fish migration7).
166. 16 US.C. § 839bth(6)(B). Sez H.R. REP. No. 976. supra
note 152 (The quality or quantity of the data should not serve as
a basis for turning down any recommendation.-) See Blumm.
Parity V.supra note 8. at 667-63 n.47 (Northweft Power Act essentially places Council in circumscribed role as a regional biological policy analyst) (citing Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence. Ada pt.,e
Management: Learning [rcm tfx Cc.urEl Basin Fish and Wild[e
Program. 16 Er.r.. L 431. 435 (1936)).
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marily rely on the region's fish and wildlife agencies
and tribes for a determination whether Program
measures meet this standard. 67 Moreover, Congress
intended that the Council build the Program upon a
foundation of today's scientific knowledge, not on a
concern that biologists may change their minds in
the future. The Council must act without waiting for
certainty and may not delay efforts to restore the
wild runs while endless study proceeds. The Act
therefore effectively forbids the Council from
imposing upon fish and wildlife advocates the burden of proving that the region's dams cause harm to
salmon or that appropriate modifications to them
will produce ecological benefits for the region.'
2. The Ninth Circuit'sInterpretationsof the
Northwest Power Act
a. The Council Must Provide a Written
Explanation of its Decision to Reject
Program Recommendations
Section 4(h)(7) of the Northwest Power Act provides:
[ilf the Council does not adopt any recommendation of the fish and wildlife agencies
and tribes as part of the program or any
other recommendation, it shall explain in
writing, as part of the program, the basis
for its finding that the adoption of such
recommendation would be (A) inconsistent with paragraph (5) of this subsection;
(B) inconsistent with paragraph (6) of this
subsection; or (C) less effective than the
adopted recommendations for the protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish
and wildlife.'1
,
In Northwest Resource Information Center the Ninth
Circuit ruled, unsurprisingly, that this clear language requires the Council to explain in writing its
reasons for rejecting Program recommendations.' 0
The court also confirmed that the written justification must be supported by specific constraints contained in section 4(h)(7) of the Act and that the
explanation must be made a part of the Program
7

itself.' '

The Council acknowledged that it had failed to
167. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(h)(51, requiring Council to develop
Program, on the basis of. interalia,consultation with the Ifish and
wildlife] agencies landl tribes'); 839b(h)(6)(B) (Program must be
"based on. and supported by, the best available scentific knowledge").
168. See Blumm. Parity V. supra note 8. at 667-68 n.46;
Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon. supra note I1, at 298.
169. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7).

include in the Strategy for Salmon itself a response to
recommendations not incorporated into the Program.
However, the Council argued that it complied with the
Act's written explanation requirement by providing a
separate official response to comments during the
phase one and two rulemakings. The Council, In
effect, urged the court to find that those responses
applied to comments received during phase three.'"
The Ninth Circuit did not find the Council's position
persuasive because the Council had previously
announced its intent that phase three supersede
phases one and two. The judges thought the Council's
argument "somewhat analogous to a court's reference
to a judicial decision it previously vacated."'"
Accordingly, the court noted that its agreement with
the Council on this point would cause "the validity
and authoritativeness of final decisions" to be undermined." Alternatively, the Council maintained that
its official response to the comments received during
phase three satisfied the Act's explanation requirement. The court rejected this argument because the
,Council had not based its written responses on the
factors allowable under section 4(h)(7).1"
The Ninth Circuit's ruling that the Council
failed to comply with the Act's written explanation
requirement is significant for two reasons, First, it
confirms Congress' intent that the public be given
an opportunity to participate in the creation and
evolution of the Program. Future Program amendments will also be subject to effective judicial
review. The Council will be less able to insulate
itself from popular pressure to restore the salmon
runs. Consequently, Council decisions may more
clearly reflect the importance Congress assigned to
protection and enhancement of the Columbia River
Basin's fish and wildlife. In the past the Council has
often failed to give appropriate weight to this aspect
of its mandate, preferring instead to consider the
economic concerns of BPA, utilities, and industrial
energy consumers the most significant restraints on
its power.' 76 The Council may also take more care to
assure that its actions are supported by the statutory constraints on its authority, since its actions will
be more easily scrutinized by the public and the
region's fish and wildlife managers.
The second benefit of the court's ruling will be
its reinforcement of the Act's deference principle.
170. Northwest Resource Info, Center, 35 F3d at 1384-85,
171. Id.

172. Id.at 1385.
173. Id.
174. Id.at 1385-86.
175. Id.at 1386.
176. Blumm, Parity V,supra note 8, at 711-12.
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The court apparently found the Council's failure to
explain in writing its reasons for rejecting fish and
wildlife agency and tribal recommendations more
troubling than the Council's omission of appropriate responses to other recommendations." The
public can expect less second-guessing of the scientific foundations supporting fish and wildlife
agency recommendations if the Council heeds the
Ninth Circuit's warning on this point in the future.
Moreover, the Council will face increased pressure
to provide scientifically and legally adequate explanations for its decisions. As a result, the Council
will find it difficult to continue its practice of summarily announcing that recommendations beneficial to salmon are not supported by "good science"
or enough information178
b. Biological Objectives
The Northwest Power Act contains several references to "biological oblectives."'" However.
Congress failed to explain how the Council should
proceed to establish them or to define the term.""
In Northwest Resource Information Center the Ninth
Circuit confirmed that Congress nevertheless
intended that clear benchmarks by which the
Program's success could be measured should guide
the Council's administrative discretion."' The court
also limited the Council's ability to fashion such
measurement tools by requiring the Council to give
177. Northwest Resource Info. Center 35 E3d at 1386 (Thlej
[written explanation] mandate is particularly forceful with respect
to the recommendations of those to whom the statute gives deference-fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes:).
178. The Council often rejected fish and wildlife agency and
tribal recommendations dunng the first decade of the Program
without providing reasons consistent with the Acts equitable
treatment mandate or deference pnnciple. See supra notes 79, 86,
112-119 and accompanying text.
179. See 16 U.S.C. § 839bth)(2)(B) ("The Council shall
request ... recommendations for...establishing oblectives for the
development and operation of such lhydroelectncl projects...ina
manner designed to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and
wildlife.'); 839b(h)(6)(C) (.The Council shall include in the
Program measures which it determines...will...utilize. where
equally effective alternative measures of achieving the same
sound biological objective exist, the alternative with the minimum economic cost.); 839B(h)(6)(E)(ii) (1The Council shall
include in the Program measures which it determlnes...will...in
the case of anadromous fish .... provide flows of sufficient quality
and quantity between such Ihydroelectncl facilities to Improve
production, migration, and survival of such fish as necessary to
meet sound biological objectives.').
180. See Blumm. Parity II,supra note 15. at 131.
181. Northwest Resource Info. Center.35 F.3d at 1392.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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"due weight" to fish and wildlife agency and tribal
opinions as to appropriate biological objectives}"
Moreover, the judges explained that the Act
requires biological objectives to be "specific" and
"discrete."' Although the court did not find that the
Council failed to adhere to these principles, the
court instructed the Council to assure, on remand,
that the Strategy for Salmon incorporated adequate
biological oblectives.'u
The genesis of the dispute over this issue was
the Council's refusal to establish smolt travel-time
objectives. A number of state fish and wildlife agencies and tribes had unsuccessfully urged the
Council to adopt them as the Program's primary
tool of measuring salmon survival.'15 NRIC and the
Yakamas aigued that their omission from the
Program would render it impossible to evaluate the
success of flow requirements aimed at achieving the
ultimate goal of increased juvenile survivalira The
Council maintained that the Strategy for Salmon's
goal of doubled salmon populations, rebuilding targets and performance standards were adequate biological objectives.'" The court did not find the
Council's position persuasive, explaining that the
Council's expressed desire that the Strategy for
Salmon result in doubled salmon populations was
no more than a "policy statement" and not a
"sound," "specific" and "discrete" biological objective.'1 The judges pointed out that the Council
185. Siz supra notes 106-107. 114 and accompanying text.
186, NcrtAit Reoirce In',, Center 35 E3d at 1391: Berger. An
Instr's Penrataf;,. supa note 125. at 375. Some commentators
oppose travel.time objectives as an ineffective and costly burden
on the hydropower system. Sz. e._ lames L Buchal. Sorme Fa2=.5
A:uit Sal.mn Resralln. 25 E,.-.7L L 375. 380 (1995) (dlscussuing
-gross fallacies"in argument that salmon survial will increase with
greater instream flo-,s; "[Tihe correlation between flaw and travel
time is weak. nonexistent for some stocs, a little stronger for others. But the correlation is nowhere near one to one.7). Harvey
Splgal. Tl Ien'F uiins ci Safm:n Rerfcry f:r tF, Eonnevi& Poczr
Admnlistratln and t r Rejn. 25 Em'.'L L 407. 403- 9 (1995 ('iWle
do not know whether there is a causal relationship between the
types of measures which we have been taking and propose to tak-e,
linduding smolt travel-time obiectivesI and the survival and
recovery of these speaes....lAllchemy cannot turn lead into gold.
and the law cannot turn politics Into mence.': Al Wnght. ScuU L&
Ccu'ts Run tFhPiwvr?. 25 ED'.L L 403,405 (1995) (*iThe courts have
apparently conduded. and a lot of the socially correct rhetonc is,
that we do not need a balanced, comprehensive fishery management plan. Apparently all we need is an adequate water particle
travel time.. JIll we follow that particular quest I urge that there
be at least consideration to the costs of losing a 12.000 megawatt
firm hydrosystem....'}. Notwithstanding the skepticism of these
utility and industrial powerconsumer representatives. there is substantial reason to believe that smolt travel-time objectives are
highly likely to provide a reltable d ice for assunnrg increased
juvenile survivaL Sm gzr, lA OL,an. supra note 106.
187. Nort&wes Reurce Inf,. Center. 35 F3d at 1392.
188. Id.

Locey

Volume 3,Number 1

failed to establish a deadline by which the salmon
populations were to reach this hoped-for threshold.
The same flaw contaminated the Strategy for
Salmon's rebuilding targets and performance standards. All three "framework elements" of the
Program were therefore deemed insufficient as
measuring tools because the Council did not specify a way to determine the Strategy for Salmon's
progress in achieving them.'8 9
The significance of the Ninth Circuit's finding
that the Strategy for Salmon may not have incorporated appropriate biological objectives lies in the
central importance of these devices to the success
of the Program. Without biological objectives, the
public cannot know the return on its investment in
fish and wildlife restoration.'9 ' But biological objectives provide more than measurement capability. 9'
They also facilitate application of the Act's command that fish and wildlife needs be given more
consideration than the costs of fulfilling them. 192
Congress specified that the Council must first distinguish between Program recommendations on
the basis of their effectiveness at achieving the Act's
fish and wildlife mitigation, protection, and
enhancement criteria. The costs of the recommendations are properly taken into account only after
the Council determines that they are equally likely
to achieve the same fish and wildlife-related objectives.' 9 Biological objectives must exist in order for

this analytical process to take place.

189. Id.The Ninth Circuit also noted the Council's failure to
use the population goals, rebuilding targets, or performance
standards as guides in evaluating Program recommendations
submitted dunng the 1991-92 amendment process. Accordingly,
the court pointedly remarked that the Council may have intended these devices to serve as substitutes for biological objectives.
Id.

expertise of the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes. Id.('Thls
failure of the Council is disturbing given that it adopted, for the
most part, the flows and measures recommended by power interests and DSIs. despite the overwhelming consensus among agencies and tribes in favor of significantly higher flows and more sclentifically-based biological objectives,").
196. Id.at 1389-93.
197. Id.at 1388.
198. Id.at 1387. The court explained that the Act's fish and
wildlife provisions "requirell the Council to develop the
[Pirogram from sources outside the Council," and that the
Council "must adopt IP]rogram measures that are consistent with
...the protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and
wildlife, while assuring the region an adequate, efficlent. economical, and reliable power supply," Id. Accordingly, Congress
specified, in section 4 of the Northwest Power Act. detailed rules
governing the Council's responsibility for creating the Program. In
contrast, the power conservation plan requirements contained In
section 3 of the Act are significantly less confining, See Seattle
Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Council, 786 E2d 1359, 1367 (9th Cir.
1986) (noting that the Council has "considerable flexibility" under
the Act's power conservation planning provisions), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1059 (1987). In preparing the power conservation plan, the
Council is directed only to "set forth a general scheme for Implementing conservation measures and developing resources," and
must give "due consideration" to environmental quality, the limitations of the existing hydropower system, and conservation and
enhancement of fish and wildlife. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(e)(2),
Congress also required the Council to give priority to alternative
energy resources determined to be "cost effective," and mandat-

190. See Ogan, supra note 106, at 706-11 (explaining necessity of biological obiectives as tools to measure Program success).
191. The measurement function is particularly vital in light
of the Act's mandate that the Program ensure "improved survival
of lanadromousl fish at hydroelectric facilities located on the
Columbia river system- and 'flows of sufficient quality and quantity between such facilities to improve production, migration, and
survival of lanadromousl fish." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E).
192. See Blumm, Parity ii, supra note 15, at 131-39. Section
4(h)(6)(C) implies that the Council must create a mechanism for
determining the effectiveness of Program measures: -rhe Council
shall include in the Program measures which it determines...will
... utilize, where equally effective alternative means of achieving the same
sound biological objective exist, the alternative with the minimum economic cost." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(C) (emphasis added).
193. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)f6j(C).
194. Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1386. See also id.
at 1389 (discussing Council's argument that 16 U.S.C. § 839b
"grants it virtually unfettered discretion in creating a fish and
wildlife program') (emphasis omitted).
195. Id. at 1389. The court did, however, express its "concern" that the Council had not appropriately deferred to the

c. The Council Must Defer to the
Expertise of Fish and Wildlife Agencies

and Tribes
All of the parties agreed that fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes were entitled to deference,
although the Council asserted that it was obligated
to afford only "minimal" deference.14 NRIC and the
Yakamas maintained that the Council had not adequately deferred to the fishery managers. Although
the court declined to rule on this point because the
Council had failed to provide a written explanation
of its decisions, 91 the opinion nevertheless provides
guidance on the question of how much deference is
due the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes.19 The
court's conclusion is another important legacy of Its
decision because it will force the Council to include
in the Program, subject only to the Council's
authority to ensure that other specific requirements
of the Act are not violated, fish and wildlife agency
and tribal recommendations for appropriate mitigation measures.
The Ninth Circuit found that the Act's fish and
wildlife provisions "bind[ I,more than unleashl I,the
Council's discretion."'' 7 This conclusion followed
from the "stark contrast" between the fish and
wildlife provisions and the rest of the Northwest
Power Act.'19 In particular, the court's comparison of
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the Act's fish and wildlife provisions to its power
planning requirements proved persuasive. Quoting
Congressman Dingell's admonition that the Council
should "not try to become a superfish and wildlife
entity;" the court concluded that "Congress Intended that the Council not simply tap this resource of
information and advice, but that it heavily rely upon
it."' 99Thus, the court found that the Act "requirelsl
that a high degree of deference be given to fishery
managers' interpretations of such provisions and
their recommendations for [Pirogram measures."
d. Fish and Wildlife Program Critena
(i) The Act's Section 4(h)(6) Criteria
are "Mandatory"and "Substantive"
The court rejected the Council's argument that
the criteria for the Program contained in section
4(h)(6) of the Act"'I are advisory only, and declared
that the criteria are "mandatory."2 The court
thought the matter was resolved by reference to
Congress' choice of the word "shall" in that statutory section.210 Nevertheless, the court also explained
that a construction of section 4(h)(6) that circumscribes the Council's ability to evade the Program
criteria was consistent with Congress' intent to limit
the Council's discretion in creating the Program."'
The Council's position that the section 4(h)(6)
criteria "merely set the agenda but do not dictate
the substance of measures" failed to satisfy the
court.20 The court reiterated that the Northwest
Power Act "significantly circumscribelsl the
Council's discretion with respect to fish and
wildlife" and invoked precedent holding other provisions of section 4(h) "substantive" to conclude that
ed that the power conservation plan include: (I) an energy conservation program; (2) recommendations for research and development; (3) a method for determining environmental costs and
benefits: (4)an energy demand forecast; (5) data on the region's
energy reserve and power reliability needs and ways of providing
for them at minimum cost- and (6) a method for calculating any
surcharges imposed pursuant to the Act. Id.§ 839ble)[3). The
Council must also incorporate the Program into its power conservation plan. Id.§ 839(e)(3)(F).
199. Norhwest Resource Info. Center. 35 E3d at 1388 (quoting
126 CONG. Rc. EI0.683) (1980). Three paragraphs later, the court
gave an additional hint about the degree of deference due fishery
managers and implied that it is substantial Indeed: the court
declared that the Acts fish and wildlife provisions "signifianly idrcuniscribethe Council's discretion. Id.at 1389 (emphasis added).
200. Id.at 1388. The court did not limit the applicability of
the Acts deference requirement to Program recommendations.
The court also declared that the Council must defer to fish and
wildlife agency and tribal interpretations of the Acts fish and
wildlife program provisions: \Ve find it inherently reasonable to
give agencies and tribes, those charged with the responsibility of
managing our fish and wildlife, a high degree of deference in the
creation of a program and in the interpretation of the Acts fish
and wildlife provisions." Id.at 1389.
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the fish and wildlife program criteria should be
treated similarly.

(ii)Interpretationof the Section 4(h)(6)
Criteria
The court did not limit its opinion to the procedural questions at the heart of the case. It also
focused on the five specific Program criteria contained in section 4(h)(6) of the Act. and provided its
interpretation of each. The court's discussion of
many of these criteria may be dictum because the
application of only a few of them was contested by
the parties. Nevertheless, the court's interpretation
of the Act's detailed Program mandate will no doubt
influence the Council's future actionsP0 Moreover.
the court's interpretation will undoubtedly be
invoked by the Ninth Circuit itself should the
Program again be challenged in the future.
(a) Section 4(h)(6)(A)
This provision "requires that measures complement the existing and future activities of the Federal
and the region's state fish and wildlife agencies and
appropriate Indian tribes," The court quoted at
length from Judge Marsh's ruling in Idaho Department
of Fish & Garde and pointed out that that case
"involveldl .. what to do about preserving and
restoring the salmon landl urgeldl policy and operation in a direction away from the status quo
towards affirmative action. " " The court also
expressed concern that "the Council's rejection of
the agencies' and tribes' consensus as to increased
flows and biological objectives does not appear to
square well with those efforts."10 The significance of
201. 16 US.C. § 839blh)(6),
202. Nor fesl Rtmiurce lnfo. Center. 35 F3d at 1389. Standards
specified by 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h](6) are 'substantive criteria that
each program measure must meet. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.The court also took the opportunity to warn against
Inclusion In the Program of measures unaccompanied by specific
completion dates and commitments to meet the Act's specified
Program criteria: "jVel construe the Program as the Council's
binding commitment to the timely implementation of all measures. if they satisfy the substantive criteria"of the Act. U. at 1389.
205. Id.at 1389.
206. Id.(citing Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n. 746 F2d
466.473 (9th Cir. 1984) (interpretingequitable treatment" clause
of 16 U.S.C. § 839blhl(l llIA)Il))o
207. Stz Infra notes 362-419 and accompanying text fora discussion of the Council's December 1994 Program amendments.
which were issued after the Ninth Circuit's decision.
208. NortFlizst Rurce In!.. Center. 35 F3d at 1390.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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this portion of the opinion is easy to overlook, but
it underscores Judge Marsh's warning six months
earlier that the courts would not long remain satisfied with the status quo on the river."'
(b) Section 4(h)(6)(B)
The court pointed out that the "best available
scientific knowledge" standard "ensures action in
the promulgation and implementation of a
[Program]."21 2 Importantly, however, the court

explained that the Council must defer to the fish
and wildlife agencies' and tribes' view as to what is
"best available scientific knowledge. ' 213 The stan-

dard does not require the "best available data", decisions may be based on "reasonable inferences and
predictions" extracted from the "best available scientific knowledge. 1 '4The court did not rule on the

question whether the Strategy for Salmon was
based on the "best available scientific knowledge"
because the Council did not provide the required
written explanation of its decisions to reject fish
21
and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations. '

The court's interpretation of section 4(h)(6)(B)
may be the most significant portion of the opinion.
During the first decade of the Program, the Council
frequently rejected recommendations for mitigation
measures submitted by fish and wildlife agencies
and Indian tribes. The Council frequently justified
these decisions by professing doubt about the sci211. See Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game. 850 F Supp. at 900.
212. Northwest Resource Info. Center. 35 F.3d at 1391.
213. Id.
214. Id.("ITlhe standard requires only the best available scientific knowledge, not data.").
215. Id.
216. See supra notes 60, 72, 103-112 and accompanying text.
217. Indeed, the Council's response to Northwest Resource
Information Center indicates that the Council intends to be more
aggressive in leading the region's effort to restore wild salmon
runs. See infra notes 354-419 and accompanying text.
218. Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1391.
219. Id.at 1392.
220. Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26. 1854, 10 Stat. 1132,
1133. Similar language was included in other treaties protecting
tribal fishing nghts. See, e.g.. Treaty of Point No Point, Jan. 26,
1855, 12 Stat. 933, 934. The treaties protecting tribal fishing
rights, known as the "Stevens Treaties" in honor of Washington
territonal Governor and federal Indian Affairs Superintendent
Isaac Stevens. also secured for America 64 million acres of land.
Comment, Empty Victories: Indian Treaty Fishing Rights in the Pacific
Northwest, 10 ENvrL L. 413, 416-17 (1980). Goveror Stevens negotiated the Treaty of Medicine Creek; the Treaty of Point Elliot, Jan.
22, 1855. 12 Stat. 927; the Treaty of Point No Point; the Treaty of
Neah Bay, lan. 31. 1855, 12 Stat. 939; the Treaty with the Walla
Walla, June 9, 1855. 12 Stat. 945; the Treaty with the Yakimas. June
9,1855, 12 Stat. 951; the Treaty with the Nez Perce, June 1, 1855,
12 Stat. 957; the Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon. June 25,

entific support for such recommendations.216
Requiring the Council to defer to the scientific
expertise of fish and wildlife managers will foreclose
that mechanism for avoiding decisions likely to be
unpopular with parties primarily interested in economic uses of the Columbia River system. The
Council may therefore find itself somewhat less
able to continue its traditional cautious approach
17
to salmon recovery.
(c) Section 4(h)(6)(C)
This standard requires the Council to evaluate
alternative Program measures "for effectivelnessl in
achieving sound biological objectives.""' The court
instructed the Council to determine the extent to
which recommended measures achieve "specific"
biological objectives and ordered the Council to
give "due weight" to agency and tribal recommendations as to what biological objectives to
employ.' 9
(d) Section 4(h)(6)(D)
This provision makes clear that the Northwest
Power Act does not affect either treaties which guarantee Pacific Northwest Indian tribes the right to
take fish at "accustomed grounds and stations"2 or
tribal rights to adequate water supplies."' Because
the Northwest Power Act does not authorize the
Council or any federal agency to infringe on the
1855, 12 Stat. 963; the Treaty with the Ouinaielts, July 1, 1855 and
jan. 25. 1856, 12 Stat. 971; and the Treaty with the Flathead, July
16. 1855. 12 Stat. 975. The Shoshone-Bannock tribe does not have
a Stevens Treaty - guaranteed right to a tribal fishery, However,
their treaty hunting rights have been interpreted to Include fishing nghts. See State v. Tinne, 94 Idaho 759, 497 P.2d 1386 (1972)
(implying fishing nght from Article IVof the Treaty of Fort Bridger,
July 3. 1868, 15 Stat. 1020-21),
221. Under the rule of Winters v, United States, 207 U.S, 564
(1908). the establishment of an Indian reservation implies reservation of water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.
Thus, the Winters doctnne protects tribal water rights utilized for
agncultural production or maintenance of fisheries. Id. (enjoining
construction of off-reservation dams and reservoirs that would
have deprived the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation of water needed for irngation); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S 128 (1976)
(fishery needs may be basis of reserved water right under Winters
doctrine); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F2d 42 (9th
Cir) (reaching similar holding), cert, denied. 454 US, 1092 (1981),
But cf., e.g. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 866 F Supp 520 (D,
Wyo. 1994) (tribe is not guaranteed right to hunt or fish on national forest lands by applicable treaties, notwithstanding Winters doctrine or United States v. Winans, 198 U.S, 371 (1905) and Tulee v,
Washington Dep't of Game, 315 U.S, 681 (1942)). For a good
overview and critique of the federal government's handling of its
trust obligations to the treaty tribes, see Mary Christina Wood,
Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty The Trust Doctrine
Revisited. 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471 (1994), and Mary Christina Wood,
Fulfilling the Executives Trust Responsibility Towards the Native Nations on
Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Adminlstralion's
Promise and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733 (1995),
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tribes' treaty fishing rights, the Program must protect such rights.m Accordingly. the Ninth Circuit
expressed sympathy with the Yakamas' argument
that the Strategy for Salmon violated section
4(h)(6)(D).
The court found it "reasonable" to conclude,
based on the administrative record before the
Council which demonstrated that the Program
would allow the extinction of Snake River fall chinook, that the Strategy for Salmon "may very well"
have violated the Yakama Indian Nation's treatyreserved fishing rights.Y3 There is no reason to
assume that this warning does not also apply to
other salmon stocks and other tribes. This aspect of
the Ninth Circuit's opinion is therefore likely to
induce the Council to adopt only those Program
recommendations not likely to allow any stocks to
slide closer to extinction. 2 '
(e) Section 4(h)(6)(E)
This provision specifies Program criteria
unique to anadromous fish. The Council must: (i)
provide for improved survival of such fish at hydroelectric facilities located on the Columbia River system; and (ii) provide flows of sufficient quality and
quantity between such facilities to improve production, migration, and survival of such fish as necessary to meet sound biological, obiectives.m
The court explained that the criteria in this subsection "accenti[ the importance of the Council
strictly complying with the Act's mandates with
regard to fish and wildlife, especially that requiring
222. Tribal treaty rights are reserved rights, subject to
infringement only if Congress explicitly abrogates them. See generally Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel As'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). Courts are generally
extremely reluctant to find that Congress has exercised its power
to negate treaty-guaranteed rights. Id.at 690. Thus. unlike other
policy priorities that federal agencies may balance In an effort to
implement Congress" will. tribal treaty nghts are property. Unless
purchased by agreement or through subsequent treaty, or extinguished in a -just war,- they must be left undiminished by the
United States and its political subdivisions. See FEu' S. COHEN.
HANDBOOK OF FEDEP. INAN I.Aw 50-58 (1982). Treaty tribes have an
"absolute right" to maintain their historic fisheries in the
Columbia River Basin and are entitled to a "fairshare" of the fish
present in the river system. See Sohappy v. Smith. 302 F. Supp. 899
(D. Or. 1969), affd as modified sub nor.. United States v. Oregon. 529
F2d 570 (9th Cir. 1976). Later judicial decisions have clarified that
treaty tribes must be allocated fifty percent of each fish run destined for or passing through traditional tribal fishing areas. See
United States v. washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
a)fd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nor., Northwest
Steelheaders Council v. United States. 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). The
Supreme Court upheld this allocation in Washington State
Commercial PassengerFishing Vessel Association. Tribal treaty rights also
require federal, state and local governments to Impose "environmental restraints on activities" that may adversely affect treaty
fishing or water rights. United States v. Washington, 694 E2d 1374.
1375. 1381-82, 1389 (9th Cir. 1982). vacated. op. replaced. on rehearing

that a high degree of deference be given to fishery
managers."- While the court did not decide
whether the Council had failed to afford adequate
deference to the fish and wildlife agencies and
tribes, it expressed concern that the Council has
been more concerned with avoiding economic
duress than in improving salmon survival: "The
record evokes in us .. a strong sense of skepticism;
without explanation, the Council rejected the consensus of most fishery managers on the issues of
flows and biological objectives in favor of the recommendations of power interests and DSIs."m
The court declined to address the argument
that the Council did not, as the Act requires, defer
to the expertise of fish and wildlife agencies and
tribes and therefore afford a presumption of scientific correctness to their recommendations. The
judges could not do so because the Council's failure
to explain its decisions rendered it impossible to
determine how much deference was actually
given,!" But the court made it clear that the Council
had provided very weak support for its decision not
to increase fish flows. Rejecting the Council's
reliance on NMFS' 1992 biological opinion on
FCRPS operations, the court pointed out that NMFS
had warned the Council that the status quo would
not sustain the runs.? The court also noted that the
Council's own staff had concluded that the Strategy
for Salmon would -probably- push low productivity
stocks to extinction and stabilize, but not rebuild,
medium productivity stocks.?"
en Eanc. 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir). ceeL d'u:zd1. 474 US. 994 (1935). But
see Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co. 847 F Supp. 791 (D. Id.
1994) (adopting magistrate's report that concluded that Stevens
treaties do not provide tribes v ith right to protection of ecosystems). See GerrraUy Michael C. Blumm. 111Py Study Pacific Salmon
Lair?. 22 Imo L Rnv. 629. 637 mi94 (1936) (asserting that all
appellate Judges who have considered the issue on the merits
have concluded that an implied environmental right exists). The
Pacific Northwest's treaty tribes estimate that volations of their
fishing rights caused by reductions in har'est quotas entitles
them to S4 billion in damages. See Trizes Decd re Air.itibus Safrrr
Rew
con Prc;eal,
,
.'.eas
cz PomcAL. NEra'ow GFE~r;.wE. June 19.
1995 (available on Westlaw. APN-GR Database).
223. Ncrt-rst Re urce In,. Center.35 F3d at 1392.
224. But se Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co.. 847 E Supp.
791 (D. Idaho 1994) (treaty tribe cannot pursue claim for damages
based on adverse impacts of FCRPS on salmon runs under Federal
Power Act. 16 US.C. § 803(c). or federal or state common li).
225. 16 U.S.C. § 839b1h(611EI(). (ii).
226. Ncrtfirzst Rtrurce Inf!, Center,35 F.3d at 1392.
227 Id.at 1392-93.
228. Id. at 1389.
229. Id.at 1393,
230. Id.
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e. Balancing the Biological Benefit of a
Program Recommendation Against its
Cost is Not Required
The court rejected the DSIs' argument that each
Program measure must be subjected to a comparison of its biological benefit to the costs it imposes
on the hydropower system. Because Congress did
not intend for cost considerations to preclude
restoration of the basin's salmon runs as long as the
Act's baseline condition of an "adequate, efficient,
economical, and reliable power supply" remains in
place, the court found that such comparisons are
not permitted.23' The court's dismissal of the DSIs'
argument on this point eliminates an obstacle often
invoked by commentators as a basis for blocking
ecologically beneficial reform of the Basin's
hydropower system. 2 This aspect of the Ninth
Circuit's decision is therefore another important
legacy of the case.
The court offered a summary of the role of cost
calculations in the adoption of a Program that confirms academic opinion that measures are acceptable even if they impose substantial costs on the
33
hydropower system:
We conclude from our study of § 839b(h)(5)
and the legislative history that. (I)
Congress did not say the Council should
perform a critical cost-benefit analysis of
each measure; (2) a fish and wildlife measure cannot be rejected solely because it
will result in power losses and economic
costs; and (3) the Council must assess
overall power and economic impacts so
that the Program does not cause an inadequate, inefficient, uneconomic, and unreli3
able power supply. 1
231. Id. at 1394. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6(c) "emphasizes the
achievement of predetermined biological objectives in a least cost
manner... .lClost effectiveness, in this context, prevents cost considerations from precluding the biologically sound restoration of
anadromous fish in the Columbia River Basin to the extent affected
by hydropower development and operations so longas an adequate,
efficient, economical, and reliable power supply is assured." Id.Note
the use of the word "power." As the court explained. 'the statute
assures a 'power supply,' not a 'hydropower supply.'" Id.at 1378. n. 13.
232. See, e.g., Early & Krogh, supra note 153, at 300 (arguing
that the intent behind the Northwest Power Act was to require
the Council to balance 'the incremental cost to power as measured from current power costs, against the incremental value to
the fishery of the proposed mitigation measure.").
233. See Blumm. Parity II. supra note 15. at 122-38 (biologically sound measure must be adopted unless it would cause
"large scale power outages," a "demonstrated BPA inability to fulfill litsl self-financing requirement," or "an entire class of power
customers Ibeing forcedl out of business.-).

The court's handling of this issue turned on the
state of the administrative record before the
Council. The judges found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the "minimum cost"
requirement imposed by section 4(h)(5) was violat"
ed.23
' Nevertheless, the court also explained that it
could not apply section 4(h)(5) of the Act unless a
biological objective was first established."- The
court also noted that the DSIs had not proved that
the Program's "overall economic impact"
on the
237
hydropower system was "unreasonable.
C. Summary: How Must the Council Change its Ways?
The Ninth Circuit's decision ensures several
important changes in the way the Council has traditionally crafted the Program. First, the court's opinion left the Council no choice but to establish clear
biological objectives. Moreover, the Council must
not dismiss as scientifically unsupportable, without
adequate explanation, the fish and wildlife aCencies' and tribes' view that smolt survival can best be
improved by anchoring the Program to water particle travel times. The Program may therefore include
smolt travel time objectives in the future.2" The
Council must also heed the court's warnings that it
should give substantial deference to the scientific
views and recommendations of state fish and
wildlife agencies and tribes.2" The court did not say,
or even imply, that the recommendations of the fish
and wildlife agencies and tribes are conclusive.
However, the court left the Council very little room
to ignore these recommendations, going so far as to
say that deference is due even the interpretation of
the Act by the fish and wildlife agencies and
tribes.""
Northwest Resource Information Center eliminates
the possibility that future Program amendments
will be so weak as to allow the extinction of listed
234. Northwest Resource Info. Center,35 F.3d at 1394,
235. Id.at 1395.
236. See id. at 1394-95.
237. Id. The court also rejected the DSls' argument that
reservoir drawdowns would violate the Act because the Council
had included in the Strategy qualifying language to the effect that
drawdowns would not proceed if they are not consistent with sections 4(b)(5)-(7) of the Act. Id.at 1395.
238. See Ogan, supra note 106,
239. The Council apparently is finally convinced, Although
speaking as an individual and not in his role as the Council's chief
counsel, John Volkman has indicated that the Council reads the
Ninth Circuit's opinion as a warning that the Council should
avoid substituting its own view of biology for that of the fish and
wildlife agencies and tribes. John M.Volkman, Steering By Dicta, 25
ENVTL. L. 385 (1995).
240. Northwest Resource Info. Center.35 F3d at 1388.
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salmon stocks.24' The court strongly suggested in its

discussion of section 4(h)(6)(D) that protection of
tribal treaty rights to a salmon harvest must be protected, and in any event a failure to provide this protection raises questions of potential liability that
counsel against risking the loss of any runs.2 1 Thus.
the Program is likely to include measures more protective of the most imperiled runs, particularly
Snake River fall chinook.
The Council must justify. in writing, any decision not to adopt recommendations submitted by
fish and wildlife agencies or tribes. The Council
must also avoid the temptation to act as the
region's scientific arbitrator. One immediate consequence of these two limitations on the Council's
authority should be the adoption of higher minimum 'instream flows on the lower Columbia and
lower Snake Rivers, since such measures have been
advocated and scientifically lustified
by the fishery
23
coalition for more than a decade. '

Northwest Resource Information Center does not
erase all of the Council's discretion. The Act gives
the Council authority to make an independent evaluation of Program recommendations for consistency with the section 4(h)(6) criteria and also authorizes the Council to reject any recommendation that
241. See supranotes 220-224 and accompanying text.
242. Although the Council is an interstate compact agency,
and not a part of the federal government, It Is obligated to
respect Indian tribal treaty rights. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)[6)(d).
Moreover, the region's tribes might well have a substantial claim
for compensation under the takings dause of the Constitution If
a government agency allows the tribes' treaty-guaranteed property night to a productive fishery to be destroyed. Lorraine Bodi,
Panel Discussion, in Colloquium: Who Runs the River?., 25 EtvrL L
417. 421 (1995).
243. In the past the council has asserted authority to determine whether fishery coalition flow recommendations are justified by its own view of correct biology. Kal N. Lee, RebuI tling

Confidence: Salmon. Science. and Law inthe Columbla Basin. 21 Envr. L
745. 750. 795 n.190 (1991) (maintaining that Council has engaged
ina "science-dnven planning process" and that requests for higher flows on lower Columbia and lower Snake Rivers do not 'represent any biology). Of course. if the Council adheres to
Professor Lee's views on the flow issue. it will be at risk of violating the Ninth Circuit's admonition that the Council's task is to
find out from the state fish and wildlife agencies and tribes the
nature and extent of management actions justified by scientific
knowledge. See Blumm, ParityV.supra note 8.at 737 n.442.
244. 16 U.S.C_ § 839b(h)(7)(B), (C).
245. Thus. future Program amendments may incorporate
additional scientific information aimed at reinforcing application
of section 4(h)(7) critena. In addition, the Ninth Circuit's opinion
does not affect the Council's authority to require scientific support for all submitted recommendations. Nevertheless. rejection
of fish and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations on the
grounds that biological knowledge does not support them entails
the risk that the Council will cross the line between permissible
independence and necessary deference to fishery managers'
expertise.
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is "less effective than the adopted recommendation
for the protection, mitigation, and enhancement of
fish and wildlife."I" These provisions of the Act
allow the Council to reject recommendations on the
grounds that they are insufficiently supported by
current scientific knowledge, so long as the Council
affords fish and wildlife agencies and tribes the deference to which they are entitled. 5
During future proceedings to amend the
Program the Council may invoke the Act's power
supply assurance clause as an excuse for avoiding
fishery coalition or environmentalist recommendations "* The Ninth Circuit has not defined the scope
of this constraint on the Program3. 7 However
Northwest Resource Information Center indicates that
Congress' desire to preserve for the region a reliable
and affordable source of electricity may not be a significant barrier to an aggressive salmon restoration
effort. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the Act's
drafters sought only to prevent the creation of an
"inadequate. inefficient, uneconomical, and unreliable power supply.Y13
While BPA may legitimately fear intense price
competition from other electric wholesalers if
salmon restoration costs rise."" the Northwest
Power Act does not permit BPA to disregard the
246. SrZ 16 U.S.C. § 839blh)(71A). (B).
247. Nrodrt t Rurce lnf:rmalt:n Centerdoes not include any
detailed discussion of the power supply assurance. Cf. P, cC
NosnwvEsr UltuiEs CC.c;FE.-:E CorTr. DEGEE oFr POwER
COUNCIL FLminiuTv in REs-onv:o;
To FtsHE.v AOEnvy
Rrcc!4.m.mo;s ron Daioc.r AND A=7110:; OF A FISH AND

\ViiourE Pzc;%A 5 (no date) (arguing that phrase should be read
as a qualifying Ingredient of the Act's specific requirements to
"complementill existing and future agency and tribal obiectives:
achlevlel sound biological objectives: and be "consistent with
treaty nghtsri. qu:fe in Blumm. Payiay II.supra note 15. at 120 n-71.
But see Early & Krogh, supra note 153. at 295 (arguing that
Congress did not intend for electrcity consumers to pay a higher

pnce for power inorder to pay for fish and wildlife restoration and
protection measures: power costs "must be considered before
large scale power shortages occur before the BPA is unable to
pay its bills, and before customers are driven from the region due
to high power costs'). The Krogh and Early view of Congress"
Intent is not supported by the language of the Act. Section
41h1[81(B) explicitly contemplates that power users must 'bear
the cost of measures designed to deal with adverse impacts
caused by the development and operation of electric power facilities and programs." 16 USoC § 839b(h(8(B).
248. NortFw'tI Recurce Info. center. 35 F3d at 1394. BPA has
hinted that it would invoke this clause to avoid implementing

Program measures it deems too expensive. See Bill Mackenzie &
loan Laatz. Plbnners Vie-ji CF!ip Po'--r.Sab'm:n. O; onie. Dec 7.
1994. at CI, C7 (quoting BPA Administrator Randy Hardy) (BPA

considers costs of saving salmon nskjyl...from a reliability and
financial standpoint" and would "rather not be in the position of
having the IClouncdl say to do something and we say. 'No. we
won't.., ").

249, Increased costs associated with salmon recovery are
hardly the most significant drain on BPKs bank account, since
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Program. BPA must implement the Program unless
the Administrator can provide specific reasons why

doing so would be inconsistent with either the
power conservation plan, into which the Program is
incorporated, or other legal obligations facing that
agency25 In fact, Congress clearly explained that
BPA must "coordinate," "to the greatest extent practicable," its actions under the Program with federal

and state fish and wildlife managers and tribes.25'
Refusal to do so solely on the grounds that the

agency fears losing customers does not appear to fit
within the statutory authority for such a decision.
Section 4(h) of the Act does not contemplate resistance to the Program simply because it will increase

power production costs or reduce BPAs revenues.2 '2
The structure of the Act also indicates that the

Program cannot be evaded on financial grounds.
The Act mandates that the hydropower system pay

the costs of fish and wildlife losses for which it is
responsible. 2 1 Moreover, section 4(h)(8)(D) of the

Act indicates that Congress contemplated that the
Program would cause a loss of electric power and
that BPA should allocate those costs and power
losses "consistent with individual project impacts

and system wide objectives." 25" Thus, Northwest
Resource Information Center unsurprisingly confirms

that the Council may not reject recommended measures just because they impose power losses and
economic costs on the region. 25 'The Northwest
Power Act does not guarantee an effective, efficient,
economic, and reliable hydropower supply.5 6 Thus,
they amount to a very small fraction of the amount BPA allocates
toward payment on bonds issued to build Washington Public
Power Supply System IWPPSS) nuclear plants. Blumm, Parity
V.
supra note 8. at 741. BPA owes approximately $7billion to the
lenders who financed the one remaining and three discontinued
plants. Nuke Debt: Hole That May Become a Grave, 14 NORTHWEST
CONSERVATION ACT REPORT 1, 3 (Mar. 17. 1995). Maintenance of
BPA's WPPSS debt costs the agency approximately one-fourth its
entire annual budget. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISrRION,
SERVING THE NORTHWEST: 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 26 (reporting FY1994
WPPSS debt service of approximately $469 million) Ihereinafter
BPA 1994 REPORTI.
250. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(j)(2)(B).
251. Id.§ 839bh)(I 1)(B).
252. See Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1394
(Northwest Power Act guarantees only that an -inadequate, inefficient, uneconomical, and unreliable power supply" should not
be the consequence of Program implementation).
253. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(8)(B). Section 2(4) of the Act
declares that this allocation of the burdens of salmon restoration
follows from the Act's purpose to ensure that users of electncity
"pay all costs necessary to produce, transmit, and conserve
resources to meet the region's electnc power requirements." 16
U.S.C. § 839(4) (emphasis added).
254. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(8)(D). See also COMMERCE COMMrTEE
REPORT. supra note 13. at 57 ('JClost should not be a deterrent if a
fish and wildlife need might be sacrificed to save dollars.").

while the Council theoretically possesses the ability to reject biologically beneficial measures thought
by the region's power interests and DSis to be too
onerous, its discretion to do so does not appear to
be wide enough to accommodate the status quo.
Of course, the Council's future course of action
implies that the Council members will continue to
agree on one. The Council, however, faces a risk that
its members will deadlock and be unable to maintain majority support for a more aggressive
Program. The Act requires that Program amendments be' approved by either a majority of the
Council's members, "including the vote of at least
one member from each State" represented on the
Council, or at least six members." The Council's
recent decision to pursue a more effective salmon
restoration effort will not prove durable unless a
consensus of each state's Council representatives
can be maintained. That may prove elusive. The
Washington representatives object, in general, to
measures that would require drawdowns of lower
Snake reservoirs."' The newly-appointed Idaho
members have made clear their unwillingness to
support allocation of upper Columbia River Basin
water currently used by that state's irrigated agriculture sector for salmon recovery. 2" Montana can be
expected to continue its resistance to bold salmon
recovery efforts, since it has little incentive to surrender storage water or hydroelectric generating
capacity to sustain anadromous fish that do not
reach its rivers, streams and lakes."" The Montana
255. Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1395.
256. See id.at 1379, n.13. There Is some doubt as to how
large a power cost increase has to be before being considered
.uneconomic." However, the Council has indicated that this standard is not violated where power rate increases "constitute a burden for specific consumers and relatively electricity-intensive
industries." NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING
COUNCIL,
DoC. No. 94-56,
AssuPJNG AN EFFECTIVE,
EmcENT, ECONOMICAL AND RELIABLE POWER
SUPPLY AND THEArIuTY TOCARRY
OUT OTHER PURPOSES OF THE POWER

ACT 26 (Dec. 1994) Ihereinafter ASSURING POWER SUPPLYI.

257. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(cj(2).
258. Interview with Laird Lucas, Esq., Land and Water Fund
of the Rockies (Nov. 4. 1994).
259. Northwest Power Planning Council, UPD.NTE,
vol. 12, no.
2 (Feb. 1995). at 1: Idaho Power Attacks Salmon Recovery Plan,
OREGONIAN. Feb. 25, 1995, at F3; interview with Tim Weaver, Esq,:
counsel for Yakama Indian Nation (Nov. 4. 1994). That attitude
will likely be strengthened as a consequence of Idaho voters'
election of Republican onion farmer Phil Batt as Governor. Batt
has said that he believes reservoir drawdowns are unnecessary
and too costly for Idaho's agriculture and navigation Interests,
Bill Loftus. Salmon Plan: Power Council's Idaho Members Have Doubts,
Republican Governor Also Has His Own Ideas. LEMWSTON
MORNING

17.1995, at AS.
260. See John Etchert & Stan Grace, Salmon Plan Disregards
Evidence, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER. Jan, 12. 1995, at Al 5 (editorial).

TRIBUNE, Jan.

FO 1995

Fafl 1995

representatives to the Council have also expressed
concern about the possible impacts of drawdowns
and increased flows on resident fish indigenous to
reservoirs in that state.26 These conflicts among
Pacific Northwest states may render it impossible
for the Council to achieve the necessary degree of
agreement on the kinds of steps needed to restore
the salmon runs.
Even if the Council maintains the consensus
necessary to sustain support for a stronger Program
that includes higher flow levels and reservoir drawdowns, the Ninth Circuit's decision does not guar261. Id. Additional water needed to provide fishery coalition-recommended flows for salmon may be sought from
Montana reservoirs that provide habitat for kokanee, white sturgeon, and bull trout. Montana may find it difficult in any event to
surrender water stored in that state's reservoirs, since the bull
trout may be listed under the ESA in the near future and therefore conservation requirements affecting the availability of stored
water may be imposed. See Groups Sue for Proration of Bull Trout.
OREGONIAN, Nov. 1. 1994, at B8: Alliance for the Wild Rockies v.
U.S. Fish &Wildlife Serv., No. CV 94-1318-10 (D. Or.. filed Oct. 31.
1994). Indeed, Montana has threatened to sue In an effort to prevent use of water stored in that state for salmon recovery. Lynn
Francisco. Doubts over Spill and Salmon Flo's Plague Idaho and
Montana,CLEANING Up. NoRmwEsr ENERGY MARKETS. May 8, 1995. at
7.
262. That prospect has already led the Council to reconsider the scientific rationale for its December 1994 Program amendments. See infra note 426 and accompanying text
263. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b~h)l 1)(A). BPRs general counsel has
hinted that SPA may not consider the Program enforceable
against it because it constitutes "state law." He also has stated
his personal belief that section 4(h)( 1)I(A)(i) of the Act grants
BPA the authority to reject Program measures if they are not
-consistent with" the Acts other purposes, particularly the assurance of an "adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable power
supply" for the region. Spigal. supra, note 186. at 412. See Infra
notes 265-267 and accompanying text for this writers view of the
validity of those arguments.
264. 16 U.S.C. § 839blh)ll)(A) provides that SPA. the
Corps, the Bureau, "and other Iflederal agencies...responsible
for...regulating Federal or non-Federal' dams in the basin must
(i) exercise such responsibilities consistent with the
applicable purposes of this chapter and other applicable
laws, to adequately protect, mitigate, and enhance fish
and wildlife, including related spawning grounds and
habitat, affected by such projects or facilities in a manner
that provides equitable treatment for such fish and wildlife
with the other purposes for which such system and facilities are managed and operated: landl
(ii) exercise such responsibilities, taking into accountat each
relevantstage of deastonmakingprocesses to the full extent practicable. the program adopted by the Council...."
(emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has not Interpreted the
extent to which this provision gives federal agencies the authority to ignore the Program or its particular requirements.
Nevertheless, it is dear that the agencies retain "a great deal of
discretion." Blumm. Columbia River Basin. supra note 35. at 129.
265. In making decisions that affect FCRPS operations. SPA,
the Corps. and the Bureau must take the Program Into account
"to the fullest extent practicable." 16 U.S.C. § 839blh)(I I)(A)(li).

lls-u ft-te For Fcc cSc!ircii?
Ilaw flc~e For Pcdft Sg~iT.ofl?
antee that the dam operators will follow the
Program. Although BPA must abide by the
Program,. the Northwest PowerAct gives the Corps
and the Bureau discretion in deciding how much of
the Program to incorporate into their activities. '
The question is how much that discretion is confined. " ' Ninth Circuit case law and Council evidence
conflict on that issue. Several cases have indicated
that BPA. the Corps, the Bureau, and FERC are
obligated only to consider the Program as one factor controlling their actions, not as a restraint.'6
The Council has interpreted this to mean that these
The Council apparently believes that the Northwest Power Act
essentially places it in the position of an "advocate" with respect
to the federal agencies, rather than as a basin manager with
authority o-.er their decision making. Blumm. ParityV. supranote
8. at 712 BPA. on the other hand, may doubt that the Program is
enforceable against it According to BPAs general counsel. BPA is
concerned that Congress has not dearly subjected that agency to
the authonty of an interstate compact agency. Spigal. supra note
186, at 412. The courts will defer to BPAs interpretation of the
Northwest Power Act. See California Energy Resources
Conservation & De. Comm'n v. Bonneville Power Admin.. 831
F.2d 1467. 1472 (9th Ciri 1937) (citingAluminum Co. of Amencav.
Central Uncoln People's Utility Dist. 467 U.S. 380. 389 (1934)).
Nevertheless, this objection is difficult to take seriously in light
of the Acts dear reflection of Congress intent to create a regional mechanism for solving the basins salmon crisis. To be effective. Congress must authorize state regulation of a federalagency
in language that is "dear and unambiguous." Hancock v. Train.
426 U.S. 164. 179 (1976). Sez aW United States Environmental
Protection Agency v. California e rd. State Water Resources
Control Board. 426 US. 200. 211 (1976). The foundation for this
rule is the supremacy dause of the Constitution. Because the
Constitution and federal law take priority over state law. 'the
activities of the Federal Government are free from regulation by
any state" unless Congress declares otherwise. Hanxck. 426 U.S.
at 178 (quoting Mayo v. United States. 319 US. 441.445 (1943)).
This principle does not apply to the Council. however. The
Council is an agency of an interstate compact and has received
Congress' express sanction. See Seattle Master Builders. 786 F2d
at 1363, Thus. the Program. which is issued by the Council pursuant to Congress' command. is enforceable as a matter of federal. not state, law Sez Cuyler v. Adams. 449 U.S. 433. 440 (1981).
Moreover the language of the Act leaves little doubt that
Congress has dearly subjected SPA to the authority of the
Council. Sez 16 US C. § 839b~h)(! llfAlli). (ii), Cf Flint Ridge Dev.
Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n-426 U.S. 776. 787-88 (1976) (finding
that federal agencies must comply with the similar requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act unless doing so would
conflict with other statutory obligations). As to the obligations of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). which licenses privately built hydroelectric projects, to comply with the
Program. see Blumm. Parity IV supra note 15, at 503-10.
266. Siz Public Utility Dist No. I of Douglas County v.
Bonneville PoverAdman, 947 E2d 385,392 (9th Cir. 1991) (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 839(h)(I I)fA) to mean not that BPA and other
agencies "are fimitt to the program in exercising their responsibilities under the Act." but only that "a measure be something
that results from a federal agency taking the Program into consideration at each relevant state of the decision-making processes. In exercising their responsibilities consistent with the Act and
other applicable law:. ert.denmed, 503 US. 1004 (1992); Na t'
Wildlife Fed'n v Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n. 801 E2d 1505. 151415 19th Cir. 1926). lterprc,,=zing.870 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1939).
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agencies must either implement the measures
included in the Program or provide a written explanation of the physical, legal, or other 26reason
that
'
would make compliance impracticable.
On the other hand, the broad language of the
Northwest Power Act and the lack of clear judicial
guidance does not necessarily mean that no constraints exist. Whatever amount of discretion is conferred on federal dam operators and regulators by
the broad language of the Act is constrained by two
more specific factors. First, the Act includes an
explicit recognition of Indian treaty rights to harvest
salmon. 26 Thus, to the extent that a Program measure is necessary to protect treaty rights, a federal
dam operating or regulatory agency is obliged to
follow it. 20 Second, the Act specifically requires federal agencies to "exercise Itheirl responsibilities
20
consistent with.. .other applicable laws."
While the Council has never tested the extent
of its authority to require the Corps and the Bureau
to comply with the Program2 7' the question is, for
the present, academic. The ESA unquestionably
removes a substantial amount of the federal dam
operators' freedom to ignore some of the measures
contained in the Program because similar mandates may be imposed as a result of consultation or
in a recovery plan. Thus, the importance of the
recent decision in Idaho Department of Fish & Game v.
NationalMarine FisheriesService is clear: the case could
prove to be a strong boost of the Council's ability to
enforce the Program, at least if NMFS requires dam
operators to undertake similar measures. NMFS'
reaction to the holding in Idaho Department of Fish &
Game also may have the effect of severely reducing
the ability of the Corps, the Bureau, and FERC to
avoid taking actions that would effectively restore
and mitigate salmon populations at the expense of
power generation.

VI. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH

267. See Blumm, Parity Ill, supra note 15, at 296. n.80, 336-37.
268. See 16 U.S.C. 839b(h)(b)(A) (Program measures must
"complement the existing and future activities" of region's tribes),
(D)(Program must "be consistent with the legal rights of appropriate Indian tribes in the region.").
269. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(D); Washington v.
Washington State Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
695 (1979).
270. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(ll)(A)(i). See also 16 U.S.C. § 839
(Purposes of Act "are
intended to be construed in a manner
consistent with applicable environmental laws.").
271. Blumm, Parity V,supra note 8,at 738.
272. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06.
273. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'i Manne Fisheries
Sew., 850 F.Supp. 886 (D.Or. 1994). remanded, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th

Cir. 1995).
274. Idaho Department of Fish &Game may have already affected the Council's actions in the wake of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Northwest Resource Information Center. See infra notes 354-405

NATIONAL

MARINE FiSHERIES SERVICE: THE END OF COMPROMISE?

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Northwest Resource
Information Center was not the first occasion for judicial scrutiny of the Pacific Northwest's response to
the continuing decline of the salmon runs. In March
1994, Judge Malcolm Marsh of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Oregon ruled that NMFS
violated the ESA and the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)2" when it decided that operation of the
FCRPS would not jeopardize the continued existence of listed salmon stocks.2" Idaho Department of
Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Service should
produce, in the short run, a greater impact than will
Northwest Resource Information Center. The ESA, and
thus Idaho Department of Fish & Game, will govern the
actions of BPA and the region's federal dam operators until the listed stocks are no longer at risk of
extinction. Idaho Department of Fish & Game should
also motivate NMFS and the Council
to coordinate
7 4
their salmon recovery actions.
This section first outlines NMFS' power, under
section 7 of the ESA, to force changes in federal
agency activities.2" It next provides an overview of
the 1993 biological opinion on FCRPS operations,
which concluded that status quo management of
the region's hydropower system would not cause an
increased threat to the survival of listed stocks,2 6
After summarizing the arguments of the parties in
the case, this section analyzes Judge Marsh's opinion in Idaho Department of Fish & Game.2" The section
concludes with a brief discussion of the decision's
likely impacts on other Basin-wide river management efforts and other activities affecting the
salmon's vitality."
A. The Nature of NMFS' Power: ESA Section 7
The ESA allows NMFS to exercise substantial
control over the actions of federal dam operators
insofar as they affect listed species. The foundation
of this power lies in section 7 of the ESA.2'" Under

and accompanying text. Both the Council and NMFS have
expressed a desire to coordinate their actions in an effort to avoid

judicial control of the region's salmon recovery process. See Laatz,
Power Council OK's Plan to Save Salmon, supra note 21, at Al, A26;
Volkman, supra note 79, at 41-43.
275. See infra notes 279-287 and accompanying text.
276. See infra notes 288-302 and accompanying text.
277. See infra notes 303-326 and accompanying text,
278. See infra notes 328-353 and accompanying text.
279. 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
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the ESA. BPA, the Corps and the Bureau are
required to "insure" that "any action" that they
"authonzell, fundil, or carrly] out...is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species."" The relevant
federal agency must therefore first determine
whether its proposed action will affect a listed
species.2' If so, then the action agency must evaluate the effects of the proposed action in a biological
assessment.m
If the biological assessment demonstrates that
listed species will be adversely affected, then the
action agency .must consult with NMFS before
engaging in the action. 8 3 NMFS then issues a biological opinion' which evaluates the nature and
extent of the impacts to a listed species posed by
the action agency's proposed undertaking.' During
the pendency of this required consultation, the
action agency is forbidden to make "any irreversible
or irretrievable commitment of resources with
respect to the
action which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of any
reasonable and prudent alternatives." ' The action
agency is also prohibited from "taking" a listed
species without first obtaining the "incidental take
statement" that ordinarily accompanies a biological
opinion. 2 7
B. The 1993 Biological Opinion
After the listings of chinook and sockeye
occurred, NMFS had its first opportunity to compel
280. 16 U.S.C. 4 1536(a)(2),
281. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(i); 50 CFIR 44 402.02,402.12. Ste
generally ROHLF. ESA, supra note 88. at 107-10.
282. 16 U.S.C. § 1536[c)(1). The implementing regulations
for the ESA limit an agency's obligation to prepare a biological
assessment to major construction activities.' 50 C.FR. 4
402.12(b).
283. 16 U.S.C. 4 1536(a)-(b); 50 C.FR. 4 402.13.
284. 16 U.S.C. 4 1536(b).
285. Id.
286. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d). Ste Pacific Rivers Council v.
Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050. 1057 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. CL
1793 (1995); Conner v.Burford, 848 F.2d 1441. 1455 n.34 (9th Cir.
1988). cert. denied sub nom.. Sun Exploration &Prod. Co. v. Lulan.
489 U.S. 1012 (1989); North Slope Borough v. Andrus. 486 F.Supp.
332, 356 (D.D.C.), affd in part. reVd in part on other grounds, 642 F.2d
589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
287. 16 U.S.C. 4§ 1536(b)(4), (o); 1538(a)(1)(B). See gmnerally
Forest Conservation Council v. Roseboro Lumber Co.. 50 F.3d 781
(9th Cir. 1995). in theory, BPA. the Corps, and the Bureau could
reject an NMFS opinion that their actions in operating the dams
jeopardize salmon. 50 C.F.R. 4 402.15. See Pyramid Lake Palute
Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep't of Navy. 898 F.2d 1410. 1418 (9th Cir.
1990). Such a response is unlikely, however, because failing to
abide by the reasonable and prudent alternatives suggested by
NMFS would place the agenaes at nsk of violating the prohibitions against jeopardizing and taking species contained In ESA

changes in FCRPS operations, but NMFS declined
to issue a jeopardy opinionPa That unwillingness to
compel ecologically beneficial change on the river
persisted in 1993. The biological opinions on FCRPS
operations issued during 1992 and 1993 were limited in scope to a nine and one-half month period
and did not require any immediate changes in
FCRPS operations.8 NMFS issued a "no jeopardy'
opinion in 1992, but the agency also put BPA. the
Corps, and the Bureau on notice that it would
require changes in dam operations in future yearsYm
Notwithstanding its own warning, NMFS was
unwilling to challenge the FCRPS status quo in
1993.71 NMFS first concluded in a draft 1993 biological opinion that FCRPS operations -ould jeopardize
listed salmon.m but came to a different conclusion

after receiving rainfall projections from the Corps
that predicted "slightly increased river flows."9 In
the final 1993 biological opinion, NMFS stated that
slower river velocity caused by the dams delays

juvenile migration and increases smolt mortality. In
addition. NMFS confirmed that large numbers of
young salmon are killed when they pass through
hydroelectric turbines.P NMFS also determined

that dams delay upriver adult passage, causing significant adult mortality." Thus, the 1993 biological
opinion seemed to reiterate the bleak predictions
about the fate of the Snake River runs issued by
NMFS two years earlier in a status report on spring
and summer chinook. These stocks were "likely to
become endangered in the near future if corrective
sections 7(a112) and 9. 16 UoS,C 44 1536(a)(2), 1538 (al(I)(B). See.
e.g.. Tribal Village of Akutan v, Hodel, 859 F2d 651 (9th Cicj,
ar.endd, 869 F2d 1185 (9th Or.1938). cert. dtnfzd sub nom.. Covper
v. Secretary of Interior. 493 US. 873 (1989; Roosevelt
Campobello InCl Park Comm'n v. US. EPA. 634 F2d 1041 (ist Cir:
1982); Narl Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 E2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976),
"t. denied sub rir. Boteler v. Natrl Wildlife Fed'n. 429 US. 979
(1976),
288. 1992 B:o.'a .A1Oi:;:o:. supranote 90. at 50.
289. 1992 B:co!:,.L Oc: zou.supra note 90. at 2; 1993
B:oLcA OatzouL.supranote 50. at 1.
290. 1992 BoLCc&.1, Oa';:o:. supranote 90, at 15-16.
291. Se 1993 B: c,,,..
292.

Awiwu

NMFS.

O

NAoD:uI

:wn. supra note 50.
OEAntc
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1993 DA r E:oawcAs Oim.= on1mz O~zn~w:~s

CF iNE FMEAL CLm. v Rrm Pcri Svsm. (May 5. 1993) Ihereinafter 1993 DI'r B:o ,nc:z. OL;:ozl. cited in Idaho Department
of Fish &Games Reneixed Motion for Summaiy ludgment. Idaho
Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'I Manne Fisheries Serv,. 850 F Supp.
886 (D. Or. 1994) (Dec. 28. 1993) Ihereinafter Idaho Motionl.
293. Crpa're Dwrr 1993 B:oi.o..A, Oawu, quoted in Idaho
Motion. supra note 292. at 5, ith 1993 B:o c-:cA Oni.o:n, supra
note 50.
294. 1993 B:oio:wcu Omu;:ou. supra note 50. at 18. Sez afro 57
Fed. Reg. 14.653. 14.660 (1992).
295. 57 Fed. Reg. at 14.660. See afro 57 Fed. Reg. 14.65314.654. 14660.
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actions are not taken";2 ' fall chinook "face a substantial risk of extinction if present conditions continue; 20' and sockeye have "declined dramatically in
298
recent years."
Notwithstanding its conclusion that the FCRPS
is the largest single human-induced cause of
salmon mortality,2" NMFS issued a no jeopardy
opinion. This result was particularly surprising in
light of computer modeling results that showed
continued substantial mortality rates for all of the
listed runs. °0' However, these models did not sway
NMFS from its resolve not to issue a jeopardy opinion. NMFS decided not to consider "low case" test
results that demonstrated a likelihood of only a 4142% chance that stable populations of the listed
species would be achieved." ' NMFS also declined
to factor into its jeopardy decision certain biological risks - the "extinction vortex" and "demographic
risk" - unique to very small species populations.0 2
C. The Arguments
The Idaho Department of Fish and Game (IDFG)
challenged the 1993 biological opinion, arguing
that it violated the ESA because NMFS had failed to
consider all scientific information, including the
"low case" test results, the extinction vortex and
296.

See NMFS,

ADMINISTRATION,

NATIONAL

OCEANIC

AND

ATMOSPHERIC

STATUS REVIEW FOR SNAKE RIVER FALL CHINOOK 50

(1991 [hereinafter FALL CHINOOK REiEWI. NMFS downlisted Snake
River spring and summer chinook to endangered in summer
1994.59 Fed. Reg. 54.840 (1994).

297.

FALL CHINOOK REVIEW.

supra note 296, at 50.

298. 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,622 (1991).
299. 1993 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 50, at 51. 60 ("mortality of Snake River chinook salmon associated with passage
through the FCRPS is much higher than other sources of humaninduced mortality").
300. NMFS concluded that 55-77% of iuvenile spring and
summer chinook, 81-92% of juvenile fall chinook, 33-41% of adult
spring-summer chinook, and 41% of adult fall chinook would be
killed while attempting to pass through FCRPS dams. 1993
BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 50. at 46, 48. 51 (table 7).
301. 1993 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 50, at 56, 64. NMFS
used three tests to calculate the probabilities of achieving a
desired spring/summer chinook goal in 2008: the System
Planning Model (SPM). developed by the Council: the Stochastic
Life-Cycle Planning Model (SLCM), developed for BPA; and the
Empirical Life-Cycle Model (ELCM). developed for state fish and
wildlife agencies and tribes. In 17 of 18 results under low-, mid-,
and high-range assumptions, the likelihood of continued decline
for spring and summer Snake River chinook was greater than onethird. Id. at 18-20. NMFS also failed to consider corrected ELCM
results, prepared several months prior to the release of the 1993
biological opinion, that demonstrated no scenano under which
Snake River fall chinook would return to levels equivalent to the
"base period" employed in the biological opinion's jeopardy
analysis. Idaho Motion, supra note 292, at 19.
302. 1993 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 50, Attachment,
Appendix I, at 13 ("lilt appears that the target population size is

demographic risk. 3 IDFG also argued that a "no
Jeopardy" conclusion was unjustified because the
FCRPS is responsible for the destruction of too
many salmon. ' IDFG also argued that NMFS had
arbitrarily and capriciously used the years 1986-90
as the base period against which future salmon survival would be measured.'
A coalition of DSIs and utility interests intervened in the case. 0' They argued that (1) the existence of the dams could not be considered as a
potential cause of jeopardy; and (2) NMFS was
legally barred from finding jeopardy once the
agency had concluded that survival of juvenile listed salmon would improve in 1993 over the chosen
base period. 0 7 The DSIs, as well as NMFS and the
other federal defendants, also asserted that NMFS
properly took into account qualitative judgments
about the likely impacts of future regulatory and
other activities that would reduce ecological
impacts on listed salmon."" In addition, the government and the DSIs maintained that the disputes
over which test results to consider in crafting the
biological opinion and the proper interpretation of
the various test results were questions of scientific
dispute beyond the reach of judicial review2. "

large enough that no significant problems from inbreeding would
be expected if the population behaved as a single, randomly mating unit"). NMFS had earlier expressed its view that adult salmon
generally mate with fish from the same spawning stream and
therefore that no significant likelihood of a particular stock acting
as a single mating unit exists. See Idaho Motion, supra note 292,
at 26 (quoting NMFS. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION.

STATUs

REVIEW

FOR SNAKE RIVER

SPRING/SUMMER

CHINOOK SALMON 23-24 (1991) [hereinafter SPRINc/SUMMER CHINOOK
STATUS
REwI). These risks, called the "extinction vortex," Include

increased in-breeding between individual fish of the same run
and random events such as drought or fire. Id. (citing
SPRING/SuMMER CHINOOK STATUS
REVIEW,

supra, at 22).

303. The States of Oregon and Alaska joined Idaho In challenging the 1993 biological opinion. Several of the region's Indian
tribes, including the Warm Springs Tribe, the Yakama Nation, the
Nez Perce Tribe, and the Umatilla Tribe, participated as amid and
generally supported the states' arguments, Idaho Dep't of Fish &
Game. 850 F.Supp. at 890-91 & nn.10-11 .
304. Idaho Motion, supra note 292, at 10-24,
305. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 850 F. Supp, at 892-93.
306. Id. at 891.
307. See Joint Memorandum of DSIs, PPC & PNGC In
Opposition to IDFG's Motion for Summary Judgment, Pacific
Northwest Generating Coop. v. Brown, 850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Id,
1994) (No. CIV 92-973-MA) (Feb. 9, 1994), at 15-18 [hereinafter
DSI Memorandum].
308. Federal Defendants' Reply to IDFG on Summary
judgment, Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries
Sew. (Mar. 1I,1994), at 7-20; DSI Memorandum, supra note 307,
at 19-30.
309. Id.
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D. The Marsh Decision
NMFS' struggle to avoid confronting the
impacts of hydropower production on salmon produced a court ruling that should encourage the
region's river users to find the consensus and commitment needed to reverse the decline of the runs.
in March 1994, Judge Malcolm Marsh of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Oregon ruled that
NMFS' issuance of a 'no jeopardy" opinion in 1993
violated the ESA and the APA. Just as the Ninth
Circuit later invoked procedural flaws in the process
to reject the Strategy for Salmon 10 Judge Marsh
rejected NMFS' 1993 biological opinion on FCRPS
operations because NMFS had not adhered to procedural requirements mandated by those two
3
laws. 1
The court first ruled that NMFS improperly
selected 1986-90 as the "base period," or period
against which salmon survival would be measured.
to determine whether population stability targets
would be reached."' NMFS had used this four year
period without explanation of why the longer base
period used in the 1992 biological opinion was no
longer adequate."' Judge Marsh concluded that the
base period selected did not accurately reflect average numbers of listed species in the region or
reflect the region's ordinary annual rainfall and
runoff.31' The court also found reason to reject the
biological opinion in NMFS' failure to consider the
"low case" test results and "extinction vortex"
risks315 The court also rejected the government's
(and the DSIs') attempt to prevent NMFS from considering the impact of the dams' existence on
salmon.3 16 Judge Marsh found that the administrative record indicated that no effort had been made
to distinguish between salmon mortality caused by
dam existence and salmon mortality caused by dam
310. See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
311. Idaho Dp't of Fish and Game. 850 E Supp. 886.

operations. 17 Moreover, the court found that the relevance of the 'environmental baseline" dispute was
limited only to the question of consultation
requirements, not to the permissible scope of alternatives to actions that would cause jeopardy.31 3
Nor did the DSIs' other arguments fair well.
Although the DSls protested that NMFS lacked
authority to require changes in FCRPS operations as
a condition of a no jeopardy opinion,"'7 the court
refused to draw a bright line between preventing
injury to the survival of listed salmon and increasing
the likelihood of their survival.y The court explained
that Congress intended the focus of the ESA to
remain on the needs of the listed species, as opposed
to requiring NMFS actions to fall strictly in categories
of permissible 'alternatives," "measures," "conservation requirements.' or "recovery plans."n' In other
words, the court declared that NMFS may require
agencies to take mitigation actions with one goal in
mind: jeopardy to the species.m Because NMFS concluded that measures to increase salmon survival are
needed to reduce the likelihood of extinction, the
court found that NMFS was within its discretion.m
Idalio Department of Fish & Game is important in
two fundamental respects. First. Judge Marsh's decision will drive NMFS' handling of the consultation
process on a revised 1994-98 biological opinion;
and second, the decision is one of the first ESA
cases in the nation to rule on the legality of a no
jeopardy opinion."' But the more lasting impact of
the ruling may lie in Judge Marsh's rejection of the
government's argument that NMFS could not consider modifications to dam structures, as opposed
to their operation, in determining whether agency
action would jeopardize listed salmon stocks and in
considering alternatives available for avoiding jeopardy."' Moreover, although the decision does not
hydropower system's 'existence vs. 'operatrons" or the terms 'survival' vs. 'recorery' ").

312. Id.at 892-93.

321. Id. at 895.

313. Id.at 893.

322. Id. at 895-96.

314. Id.at 893 & n.21. Ifyears characterized by more rainfall
and runoff were included in the base, then improvements in survival of salmon dunng years where runoff improves cannot with
certainty be attributed to FCRPS operation improvements.
315. Id.at 896-99.
316. Id. at 893-95. The DSIs and the federal government
argued that 50 C.FR. § 402.02 precluded NMFS from considering
the fact of the dam's existence in determining whether the FCRPS
jeopardized salmon.
317. Id.at 894.
318. Id.
319. DSI Memorandum. supra note 307. at 14.
320. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game. 850 F.Supp. at 895 (1 expressly reject any attempt to impose bright-line definitions upon the

323. Id.at 896
324. But it is not the first in Conner v. Burford. 836 F2d 1521
(9th Cir. 1938). red. dni. sub mrLm.
Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v.
Lulan, 489 U.S. 1012 (1995). the court Invalidated a biological
opinion that did not evaluate all of the phases of a proposed sale
of oil and gas leases on two National Forests. In Conservation Law
Foundation v. Watt. 560 F Suppo 561 (D. Mass.). &d. 715 F.2d 946
(5th Cir. 1983). the court rejected a biological opinion that failed
to consider recent research results. For examples of decisions
rejecting challenges to biological opinions. see. eg.. Greenpeace
Action v. Franklin. 932 F2d 1342 (9th Cirj. ampne d, 14 Fl3d 1324
(9th Cir. 1992): Village of False Pass v. Clark 733 F2d 605 (9th Cir
1984): Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v, lantzen. 589 F Supp.
113 (N.D. Cal. 1934), affd. 760 F2d 976(9th r.C 1935): Swan Vie'
Coalition. Inc. v. 'umer 824 E Supp. 923 (D. MIont 1992).
325. ldab Di'I cl Fih & Game. 850 F Supp. at 894-95.
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immediately compel any specific changes in the
FCRPS operations, Judge Marsh indicated that the
court will not tolerate indefinitely the delays that
have thus far blocked serious efforts to restore the
salmon runs:
NMFS has clearly made an effort-to create
a rational, reasoned process for determining how the action agencies are doing in
their efforts to save the listed salmon
species. But the process is seriously, "significantly," flawed because it is too heavily
geared towards a status quo that has
allowed all forms of river activity to proceed in a deficit situation-that is, relatively small steps, minor improvements and
adjustments-when the situation literally
cries out for a major overhaul. Instead of
looking for what can be done to protect the
species from jeopardy, NMFS and the
action agencies have narrowly focused Isicl
their attention on what the establishment
is capable of handling with minimal disruption. 2 6
E. Implications of the Marsh Decision
Just as the Ninth Circuit did in Northwest Resource
Information Center.'27 Judge Marsh put NMFS and the
federal dam operating agencies on notice that substantial changes from the river's status quo are
326. Id. at 900.
327. Northwest Resource Info. Center v. Northwest Power
Planning Council, 35 F3d 1371, 1395 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The
Council's approach seems largely to have been from the premise
that only small steps are possible, in light of entrenched nver
user claims of economic hardship. Rather than asserting its role
as a regional leader, the Council has assumed the role of consensus builder, sometimes sacrificing the Act's fish and wildlife
goals for what is, in essence, the lowest common denominator
acceptable to power interests and DSis.").
328. Although the judgement in Idaho Department of Fish &
Game was vacated by the Ninth Circuit on mootness grounds, the
court hinted that it approves of Judge Marsh's warning. In
Northwest Resource Information Center. Judge Tang's opinion for the
court favorably discussed and quoted the language cited in the
text. Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1390-91. The
Ninth Circuit also concluded its opinion in that case with language quite similar in its meaning:
ITihe Council's approach seems largely to have been
from the premise that only small steps are possible, in
light of entrenched nver user claims of economic hardship. Rather than asserting its role as a regional leader,
the Council has assumed the role of consensus builder,
sometimes sacrificing the Act's fish and wildlife goals for
what Is, in essence, the lowest common denominator
acceptable to power interests and DSis.
Id.at 1395. Moreover. in Idaho Department of Fish & Game the Ninth
Circuit did not vacate or reverse Judge Marsh's opinion containing his criticism of NMFS' actions. Interestingly. the Council's cur-

required."" That warning prompted NMFS to issue a
jeopardy opinion for 1994-98711 However, the 199498 biological opinion may represent only "Isimall
steps, minor adjustments and improvements," and
accordingly may be subject to future ESA challenges.
Little improvement in the river's suitability for
salmon has occurred since 1993, and Judge Marsh's
decision required NMFS to consider pessimistic
test results and demographic risks associated with
the small populations of some of the basin's endangered salmon stocks. The court's expression of
impatience with current conditions on the river suggests that NMFS must require more than marginally improved smolt survival in order to fulfill its
statutory obligation to assure the "survival" and
"recovery" of listed salmon runs.
The revised 1994-98 biological opinion is not,
however, the only forum in which Idaho Department of
Fish &Game will be noticed. NMFS' plan for recovering the listed salmon was also affected by the decision. Although the recovery team's recommendations, issued in October 1993,11 recognized the
importance of many of the measures long urged
upon the Council by the fishery coalition, ' NMFS'
draft recovery plan did not ask for the needed fundamental changes in FCRPS operations, Instead,
the draft recovery plan included only two major
alternatives for increasing smolt survival through
the FCRPS gauntlet: drawdown of several Snake
rent chairman has publicly warned that consensus on the merits
of recovery measures is virtually impossible to achieve, SeeAngus
Duncan, Biology, Politics, and Salmon Recovery, WILD FISH (Nov.-Dec,
1992) 4 ("There is no such creature as unanimous conclusive scientific opinion when it comes to divisive questions of how much
water the fish need, what kind of travel times (fish needl...,
329. See infra notes 458-464 and accompanying text. NMFS
first issued a 1994-98 biological opinion on FCRPS operations In
March 1994 and again reached a "no jeopardy" opinion, See
Blumm, Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 84, However, that
biological opinion adopted a similar methodology as the 1993
biological opinion overturned in Idaho Department of Fish & Game, Id.
Accordingly, in the aftermath of Judge Marsh's ruling, NMFS
asked the parties to recommend mutually acceptable alternatives
to be considered for incorporation into the amended 1994-98
biological opinion. Interview with Fred R Disheroon, Esq.,
Special Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice (Nov, I,
1994).
330. SNAKE RIVER SALMON RECOVERY TE' . DRAFr SNAKE RIVER
SALMON RECOVERY
PLAN RECOMMENDATIONS (1993), cited In Blumm,
Columbia River Basin. supra note 35, at 86 (hereinafter DRm
RECOVERY RncOmMENDATIONSI.
331. The recovery team recommended Improved fish ladders for adult salmon, Di-rr RECOVERY REcOMMENDAnONS at XI-3;
augmentation of flows during migration seasons, Id. at VIlI-6;
reduction of salmon harvests, Id,at IX-12, Improvement of hatchery practices, Id.at VI-il, VII-i.' restoration of spawning and rearing habitat, seegenerally Id.ch. V; and control of salmon predators,
see generally Id.ch. X; Blumm, Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at
87.
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River reservoirs to enhance flowsYm and increased
reliance on transportation of smolts past lower
Snake and Columbia River dams."'
Judge Marsh's ruling also aggrandizes NMFS'
recent designation of critical habitat for Snake River
sockeye and chinook?' For Snake River sockeye,
NMFS designated the Columbia and Snake Rivers.
historical spawning lakes, and certain inlet creeksnh
For chinook, NMFS designated the Columbia and
Snake Rivers and all tributaries presently or histori-

cally accessible to the stock except the Clearwater
River in Idaho.n In addition, as NMFS lists more
salmon stocks,m additional critical habitat designations are likely and each of those may affect FCRPS
operations?'
While acknowledging that adequate river velocity is an essential component of migratory salmon
habitat, neither critical habitat designation includes
designated flow levels.' In addition, consultation
should, but does not, address temperature changes

332. See S1XA3EGY
iOR SAL.ON. supranote 114. at 30-32. The proposal to drawdown several Snake River reservoirs dunng the spring
as a device to improve flows and juvenile passage is controversial.
Opponents argue that lowenng reservoirs will not speed luvenile
migration or reduce smolt mortality, and navigation and agriculture
interests are concerned that drawdowns would have a seriously
adverse effect on use of the nver forshipping and irrigation. In addition, drawdowns would cause a decline in hydropower production.
which in turn would cause a reduction in BPs revenues derived
from the sale of surplus power to California utilities. Blumm.
Columbia River Basn. supra note 35. at 103. On the other hand, the
agnculture communitys share of drawdown consequences could be
reduced by modifying the pumps that remove Irgation water from
the reservoirs and the adverse effects on navigation would be limited to a two-month penod each spnng. dunng which time only five
percent of the tonnage shipped downnver would be affected.
Blumm, Saving Idahos Salmn, supra note 2, at 638 n.123. The Corps
tested the drawdown proposal by lowenng Lower Granite and Little
Goose reservoirs in March 1992. Initial results Indicate that the economic consequences of lowenng reservoirs in the region are not as
high as was previously feared. Andrew S. Noonan. lust Water Owr te
Dam? A Look at the Endangered Spees Act and tFe
Impact of Hyblwr.enc
Facilities on the Anadromous Fish Runs of the NortI iwt. 28 IDoO L REv.
781. 799 (1992). Businesses and highways suffered damages of
approximately Si.i million dunng a 1992 test. See House Panel
Approves Aid for River Drawdwn Damage, OpmoONm, June I. 1992, at
B6. A more recent analysis concluded that drawdown of Lower
Granite. Little Goose, Uttle Monumental, and ice Harbor dams to
spillway crest (approximately 33 feet) may cost approximately $9.5
million per year. plus approximately $259 million for construction
costs. Daniel D. Huppert & David L Fluharty, Eco,o.%jcs oF SNAKE
RiR SAI2moN REcovRmY: A REPORT To THF NAnoxoAL MARINE FiSHEmS

forced to use 184. Daniel I. Rohlf. L gilIssues Saping Smon's
Future. 25 E.ivnL L 415.416(1995).
334. Set 58 Fed, Reg. 63.543 (1993). NMFS must designate
critical habitat in order to effectuate the ESAs goal of conserving
ecosystems. Se 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3). "Critical habitat is loose-

SERVIcE 3-71 (Feb.
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333. The recovery team advocated increased reliance on
transportation on the basis of social and economic factors. DRAr
REcovERY Rco uI. AMONS, supra note 330, at VIII-3

(explaining

that the team used social factors for want of sufficient Information to make a wholly biology-based decision). Unfortunately,
state, federal, and tribal fishery scientists generally oppose continued transportation because its benefits for fish are unclearand
because there is some evidence that transported fish suffer
adverse stress effects upon release back into the nver. Blumm,
supra note 35. at 104-05. The Corps' transportation program has
been in full operation since 1981. Juvenile salmon are captured
above upper Snake River dams and are transported by barge or
truck to the lower Columbia below Bonneville Dam. where they
are released. For a thorough discussion of the Corps' collection
and transportation program, see U.S. ARMY ComRs oF E=N,
'ps.
ET
AL..,INTERIM CoLuMB
FOR SALMON

AND SNAKE RivERs FLow iMPRoveMiENT MEASUREs

DRAF AND

SUPPLFMENTAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT

STATaMEr 244 (1992). Federal water managers favor transporta-

tion because, unlike modifications to dam operations, it does not
require a decline in hydropower production. Blumm. Columbia
River Basin. supranote 35. at 104. One might find it ironic that the
Corps' transportation program often results in a situation In
which what is afforded the use of the nver is grain while fish are

ly defined as areas with physical and biological features that are
essential to the conservation of a given species and that require
special management considerations or protection. 16 US.C. §
1532(5)(A); 50 CFR. § 424.12
335. 58 Fed. Reg. at 63.543.
336, Id.
337. &zsurra notes 30, 87. 91. Although the language of the
statute le.res the question open to some doubt. NMFS may be prohibited from listingadditional imperiled salmonstodns underthe ESA
until October 1.1995 bythe EmergenrySup!emental Appropriations
and Rescissons forthe Department of Defense to Preserve and
Enhance Military Re3diness Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-6, Tit. I. ch.
IV,109 Stat. 73,86 (1995) lprohlb~ing Fish and Wildlife Service from
listing species under the ESA until afterSept 30.1995).
338. Federal dam operators are also prepanng a plan for
FCRPS operations. See Urmw STATEs Du,.mi:.-rc oF ENRGY.

Bo.v.E Pon Avx4L, .m:.

Coumst%R=~Ssmi.O=3o,%s

Rsvr
D rET,w r'.rrrw. Lupr SvE.lar (1994) [hereinafter
SORI. The SOR is intended to help BPA.the Corps, and the Bureau
coordinate the management of the hydropower system and was
commenced in order to facilitate renegotiation of the Pacific
Northwest Coordinating Agreement (PNCA) and the Canadian
Entitlement Allocation Agreements (CEAA). UNrE STATEs
DrAtrE.T oF F;NERy., ft:;u-,1.l
Po.w- n Ac:!;,srp"oI.
M:GNIY
CoWN..'

DEsMNY o$A Girr. DJAr

o

L'c,
xm','k.t'.
T SmV'4.ar

(Portland. OR., July 1994), at 1.The three federal dam operators
have announced that SOR viill select a management plan for the
FCRPS that accommodates salmon, t. but the SOR does not
include a preferred management alternative. The Columbia River
Alliance. a coalition of utilities and navigation. imeation. and
reservoir recreation interests, have asked the federal dam operators to choose a management plan that would increase transportation of luvenile salmon and reduce the quantity of water dedIcated to fish flmois. Se Rec;zrl:An OQpinforS2!mnanl Us.ALuvcE
BAcrau.*uER (Columbia River Alliance for Fish. Commerce. and
Communities. Portland, OR.Sept. 1994). The management option
selected dunng the SOR process is likely. howeer.to be consistent
with NMFS recovery plan for listed salmon stocs. PNCA Is a contract between the regions utilities and federal dam operators that
govems the power producton of the regon s hydroelectncsystemn.
PNCA, signed In 1964. Is due to expire In 2003. Negotiations to
rene it commenced in 1991. CEAA, which s no longer in effect,
was a U.S.-Canada agreement signed after ratification of the 1964
Columbia River Treaty that allowed a portion of hydropower generated by Canadian dams to be assigned to US. utilities. A new
agreement is necessary to allocate responsibility for returning

hydrosystem-generated pvaer to Canada.
339. Blumm. Cdfumnbia Rver Salmon. supranote 35. at 118.
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and sediment deposits, which negatively affect
salmon spawning and rearing habitatY4
Idaho Department of Fish & Game also reduces the
Council's salmon restoration efforts to a less important status in the short term. The listing of salmon
under the ESA empowered NMFS to require "reasonable and prudent alternatives" as a condition of
a "no jeopardy" opinion. The agency's recovery plan
is therefore likely to become the most significant
region-wide effort for salmon recovery. However, it
is not clear that the recovery plan binds the Corps,
the Bureau, BPA and FERC anymore than does the
Program."' However, these federal agencies are likely to comply with the recovery plan because they
have participated in its preparation, and the Clinton
Administration has stated that federal agencies will
speak with one voice on natural resource issues.342
The Northwest Power Act does not permit the
Council to focus exclusively on recovery, as that
term is defined under the ESA. The Council must
pursue harvestable runs, not simply the removal of

endangered stocks from the endangered species
list, and therefore the requirements of the Program
exceed the requirements imposed by NMFS as part
of the3 1994-98 biological opinion and recovery
34
plan.
The Corps, BPA or the Bureau could conceivably seek an exemption from ESA section 7 requirements if the impact of salmon listings and NMFS'
biological opinion and recovery plan are thought
too damaging to the FCRPS2" The Endangered
Species Committee' could grant an exemption for
the FCRPS only if (I) there is no reasonable and
prudent alternatives to continuing the status quo,
(2) the benefits of the FCRPS clearly outweigh the
benefits of agency actions taken pursuant to the
ESA, and (3) unchanged operation of the FCRPS is
of local or national importance14 , However, invocation of the ESA exemption process does not appear
to be a likely outcome of the Columbia River Basin's
salmon crisis. First, such exemptions are rarely
granted;4 7 second, the criteria may prove difficult to

340. In an unrelated case, the Ninth Circuit enioined ongoing Forest Service timber sale. range, and road-building activities
in the Wallowa-Whitman and Umatilla National Forests until the
Forest Service initiated consultation under ESA § 7 because such
activity may adversely affect listed Snake River chinook. Pacific
Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied.
115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995).

.guiding documents"). BPA. the Corps, the Bureau and FERC may
also be able to avoid implementing the Program, See supra notes
265-266 and accompanying text.

341. NMFS is required by the ESA to develop plans for the
'conservation and survival' of the listed salmon stocks. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(f)( I). The plan, prepared by a team of scientists employed
by federal and state governments and private employers, must
contain (I) site-specific management actions; (2) obiective criteria against which progress toward recovery can be measured; and
(3) estimates of the amount of time and resources needed to
achieve plan goals. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(i)(B). BPA, the Corps, and
the Bureau may not be obligated to comply with the salmon
recovery plan. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United
States Dep't of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1418 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Department of the Navy has discretion to decide whether to
implement conservation measures recommended by U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service as part of a recovery plan for listed fish
species); ROHLF. ESA, supra note 88, at 28 ("ITIhe legal weight and
enforceability of recovery plans are not well-defined."). But see
Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 35 F3d 1300. 1304 n.3 (9th Cir.
1994) (finding Forest Service adoption of plan that failed to incorporate grizzly bear recovery guidelines arbitrary and capricious
where Fish and Wildlife Service issued "no jeopardy" finding on
condition that grizzly plan is followed). Of course, since a recovery plan is aimed at preventing jeopardy to a listed species, failure to abide by it could result in a violation of the ESA. See 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(i). (2). The Fish and Wildlife Service apparently
believes that recovery plans serve as guidance to federal agencies. Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are. The Endangered Species
Act and Pnvate Property,24 ENvmL. L.369,377 n.48 (1994) (citing U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Memorandum in Support of Federal Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, submitted in Hawaii Audubon Soc'y v. Luian,
No. 91-00191 (D. Haw., filed Apr. 4, 1991) ("FWS consistently has
taken the position that recovery plans serve as guidance documents ., but are not in themselves specific proposals to undertake federal agency actions."). See also Endangered and
Threatened Species Listing and Recovery Priority Guidelines, 48
Fed. Reg. 43,098, 43.103 (1983) (describing recovery plans as

342. Remarks Announcing theForest Conservation Plan, WE KLY
COMP. OF PRFS. Doc. 1211 (June 30-July 6,1993) (explaining that
government "owelsl the people of the Pacific Northwest at least
a unified Federal position that would break the logjam.
")
343. Compare 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(h)(l)(A) (requiring Program
to "protect, mitigate, and enhance" fish and wildlife);
839b(h)(6)(E) (requiring increased flows to "Improve" "survival,"
"protection" and "migration" of salmon) with 16 U.S.C, 4§1533(f)
(requiring recovery plan only to "promote the conservation and
recovery" of listed species, 1532(3) (defining "conserve" and "conservation" as "methods and procedures which are necessary to
bnng Ilistedl species to the point at which Ithe EPAs protections
are no longer necessary").
344. See Noonan, just Water Over the Dam?, supra note 332, at
788; Blumm, Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 120-21.
345. The Endangered Species Committee is a seven-member, Cabinet-level committee empowered to determine that an
agency action may go forward even if It could cause the extinction
of a listed species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e). The Committee must
hold hearings on requested exemptions, and the exemption will
not be granted if it finds that the exemption applicant or agency
made any irretrievable commitment of resources before the
exemption was granted. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(4), (h)(i)(A)(v).
346. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A).
347. Only two exceptions from a jeopardy finding have been
granted since Congress created the Endangered Species
Committee in 1978. See Blumm, Columbia River Basin, supra note 35,
at 121 & n.510 (discussing exemption adopted for Nebraska
whooping cranes, granted on condition that comprehensive mitigation plan be adopted, and exemption granted the U.S. Bureau
of Land Management in 1992 for certain timber sales In northern
spotted owl habitat). The exemption granted BLM never took
effect. BLM withdrew its application to the Committee after the
Ninth Circuit found reason to believe that the White House
attempted to exert illegal influence over the Committee and the
Clinton Administration took office. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v,
Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1540 (9th CIr, 1993).
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such a capacity. In the past other federal judges in
the region have been forced to exert substantial
control over natural resource allocation where government agencies have refused to obey laws limiting their management discretion. During the 1970s,
the federal courts began acting as regional fisheries
manager after decades of state fish and wildlife
agency interference with tribal treaty fishing
rights. "' Similarly, during recent years federal
ludges in Oregon and Washington have sharply
restricted timber harvesting on the region's national forests as a consequence of federal foresters' violations of laws protecting wildlife?"
Nevertheless, those who seek judicial control
of the river may be disappointed. The challenges to
a judge who assumes the role of Columbia River
system manager would be much greater than the
problems confronted by the judges in the treaty
fishing rights and forest management cases. In the
treaty fishing and forest management cases the
plaintiffs generally sought an order dividing the natural resources available or injunctions to maintain
the status quo. A judge who chooses to manage the

348. Of course, such consensus is not necessary for the
Endangered Species Committee to act. The fact that Oregon's
representative on the Committee voted against the BLM exemption indicates that the citizens of the Pacific Northwest did not
cleariy support continued unsustainable timber harvesting in
northern spotted owl habitat. In any event, however, the Clinton
Administration is apparently committed to preventing the sort of
interagency dispute that caused the spotted owl crisis to reach
the Committee. See Spigal, supra note 186, at 413: loan Laatz. TI e
New Order:The Euidangered Speces Act and PoliticalReality Cash as Ncw
Leaders Look to Save Salmon. OREGonm, Nov. 29, 1994. at Ai. A7.
Moreover, these factors might make it difficult to convince
Congress to grant the FCRPS a legislative exemption from the
ESA. should the federal dam operating agencies or private utility.
irngation. navigation, or aluminum interests seek one. Of course,
if BPA is successful in convincing Congress and the citizens of the
region that the costs of recovenng the salmon runs threaten its
financial viability or the reliability of the hydropower system.
then increased political consensus to avoid those costs could
develop. See Spigal. supra note 186, at 414.
349. One prominent Pacific Northwest politician has Indicated that he believes the costs of recovery salmon are high
enough to justify allowing the listed runs to go extinct. See Scott
Sonner, Gorton: Salmon Might Hare to Go, SErnL TimEs. Jan. 20.
1995. at BI. Vice President Al Gore and NMFS" fishenes manager
for the Pacific Northwest have publicly promised that the Clinton
Administration will not adopt this attitude. See Jessica Maxwell,
How to Save a Salmon, AUDUBoN 28. 31, July-Aug. 1994 (quoting Vice
President Gore's comments at Northwest Watershed
RestorationfPartnershp Conference, Tacoma. VA, Feb. 16-17,
1994) (stating that Administration intends to "get the jump on
restorng the great salmon runs that are the heart and soul of the
Northwest.; Bill Mackenzie & loan Laatz. Planners Wtigh Cheap
Power Salmon. OREOONiN. Dec. 7. 1994, at CI. C7 (quoting NMFS
regional director Will Stelle) (-The administration Is committed
to . restonng the health of the entire basin and the financial
health of the energy system itself."). Of course, the Republican
takeover of Congress in lanuary 1995 may result in Increased
pressure on the Administration to avoid expending significant

federal resources on salmon restoration. Cf. loan Laatz, TPe New
Order.supra note 348, at Al. A7 (noting that NMFS and Fish and
wildlife Service are likely to experience budget cuts during 104th
Congress and that Republican malonty in Congress is likely to
weaken the Endangered Species Act); loan Laatz. NaturalResources
Face Cbudy FutureinCcrgrws. Ooo:;eie. Dec 15. 1994. at Al, Ai6
(noting that region's industrial leaders are planning to ask
Congress to force NMFS and federal dam operating agencies to
weigh costs of salmon restoration measures against their benefits). Cf. John H. Cushman. Jr.. Timfer! A New Idea is Crashfny. N.Y.
TenE, lan. 22. 1995. at E5 (reporting congressional Republicans'
hostility to ecosystem management approach for public natural
resources). Moreover, the four-state Pacific Northvest region lost
many Congressmen friendly to salmon restoration efforts in the
1994 elections. See Laatz T&New Or'rsupra atA7 (noting defeat
of five Washington state Incumbent Representatives considered
"salmon-fnendly. Thus, political support within the region for
costly restoration efforts is now significantly weaker than it was
when the Vice President committed the Administration to unified
efforts to rebuild the runs,
350. See United States v, Washington. 506 F Supp. 187 (W.D.
Wash 1980). affd inFart. rridin part. 694 F2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1932).
aff'd in part. 'aattd in part e Ear:.759 F2d 1353 (9th Cir.. cert. d-sed.
474 U.S. 994 (1985). United States v. Washington, 459 E Supp.
1020 (W.D. Wash. 1978), a!?d sub rm.. Puget Sound Gillnetters
Ass'n v. United States DisL Court. 573 F2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978).
aff'd In Fart. cald in Fart, and remanded sub nom.. Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n.
443 U.S. 658 (1979h. United States v Washington. 384 F Supp. 312
(\V.D. Wash. 1974). affd. 520 F2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). cert. donted, 423
U.S. 106 (1976); Sohappy v.Smith. 302 F Supp. 899 (D.Or. 1969),
o.fd as rnrifidsub r:m., United States v. Oregon. 529 F.2d 570 (9th
Cr. 1976).
351. Sm Allison C. Floumoy. Pev:rm tfz Spcted O4 PrcnrEr.rrL. L Rav. 261.
Leaming From Ie OU Grcwth Ccnt'. sy.,17 HRAtr
284-300 (1993) (outlining history of ancient forest management in
Pacific Northwest). VictorMi. Sher.Tra';r With Stn&TheSpolt.d Owl's
IJurnyjTfimu thr Fdera! Ccurts. 14 PUa. LaND L Rmv. 41 (1993).
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meet, since drawdowns, increased flows and other
salmon mitigation measures have either been
attempted or are the subject of studies that show
them to be economically feasible; and third, the
region almost certainly lacks the degree of political
consensus required to encourage the Committee to
grant such an exemption.
Nevertheless, NMFS and the federal dam operating agencies may not appropriately respond to
Judge Marsh's warning that the imminent disappearance of the region's wild salmon runs requires
more than tinkering with the current state of the
nver. Policy makers in Washington, D.C. may decide
that the economic costs of rebuilding. the stocks
justify sacrificing the salmon."' Even if Congress
does not intervene, and the Clinton Administration
maintains a public commitment to restoring the
runs, BPA, the Corps or the Bureau may nevertheless delay or otherwise resist taking actions mandated by NMFS. Under such circumstances, judge
Marsh may find himself asked to become the Pacific
Northwest's rivermaster.
Judge Marsh could find precedent for acting in
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economic uses of the Columbia River system would
face a much more difficult task, since the manipulation of a river to produce power, allow irrigation and
navigation, and protect the fish and wildlife that
depend on it requires day-to-day, and sometimes
even hour-to-hour, changes in dam operations.' 2
Because ludges are ordinarily reluctant to undertake tasks inconsistent with the traditional role of
courts in our society, Judge Marsh may resist any
invitations to become the judicial overseer of the
river.' Moreover, the public may suffer unfortunate
consequences if Judge Marsh, in spite of the complexity of the task, eventually assumes a more significant role in controlling the operations of the
hydropower system. Concerned citizens would no
longer have the opportunity to influence decisions
affecting a significant regional economic asset nor
participate in the public dialogue about how best to
save an important natural and cultural resource.
Thus, neither a decision to incur the costs necessary
to save the salmon runs, nor one that society's
interests are best served by sacrificing them, would
rest on a foundation of public awareness and support.
VII. Responses to Northwest Resource
Information Center and Idaho Department of
Fish & Game: Uttle Cause for Hope, Necessary
Steps Towards Recovery Not Forthcoming
A. The Council's December 1994 Program
Amendments and Their Aftermath
During the first decade of the Program, the
Council often rejected, on the basis of its own scientific views and in the interests of consensus, recommendations aimed at restoring sustainable and
3
harvestable runs to the Basin's rivers and streamsY.
But Northwest Resource Information Center ensured that
352. See Michael C. Blumm, Columbia Basin Salmon and the
Courts: Reviving the Parity Promise, 25 ENvn.. L. 353, 362 (1995)
('Courts have neither the institutional competency nor the interest to manage this system that has become such a headache for
so many.").
353. For this reason, Idaho did not seek an injunction in
Idaho Department of Fish & Game. Will Whelan. Idaho's Strategy in Idaho
Department of Fish & Game v. National Manne Fishenes Serv., 25 ENmr.
L. 401, 404 (1995). Moreover, Judge Marsh himself has previously
demonstrated an unwillingness to insert his court into controversies over the scientific merit of particular salmon conservation
activities. See Northwest Resource Info. Center, Inc. v. Nat'l
Marine Fishenes Serv., No. 93-870-MA (slip op.) (D. Or. 1993)
(denying plaintiff's request for injunction halting transportation
of juvenile salmon), aff'4d
in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 56
.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1995).
354. See supra notes 61-62, 72-73, 82, 108-121 and accompanying text.
355. But Cf. Volkman, supra note 239 (comments on Northwest
Resource Information Center by Council's general counsel) (stating
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the Council could not continue compromising the
biological needs of the region's salmon. The Ninth
Circuit emphasized that the region must begin the
process of returning river conditions to the rivers.
Northwest Resource Information Center therefore closed
the door on the accommodation of the utilities' and
DSIs' interests and delaying tactics the Council
used for so long to avoid confronting the imminent
disappearance of one of the Pacific Northwest's
defining characteristics."' The public waited only
thirteen weeks for the Council's response to the
Strategy for Salmon's demise. 16When it came, there
could be no doubt that the Council heard the
judges' message. On December 14, 1994, the
Council approved bold new measures to restore the
Columbia River Basin's disappearing salmon runs."'
In contrast to the Strategy for Salmon, the 1994
program amendments reflect the urgent necessity
for prompt and aggressive actions to stave off the
extinction of listed salmon stocks."" Finally, the
Council accepted that increased water velocity may
be essential if mortality during passage is to be significantly decreased, and acted to assure adequate
flows in the lower Columbia and Snake Rivers. Thus,
the Council demonstrated that it takes seriously the
Ninth Circuit's warnings that the judgments of fish
and wildlife managers are entitled to significant
deference and that sound biological objectives,
based on the knowledge existing today, must be
established.
1. Written Explanation
The Council responded to numerous comments submitted when the draft 1994 amendments
were released and included in the amended
Program itself a detailed discussion of the rationale
supporting adopted measures. The Council provided a useful summary of the current state of the scibelief that the Ninth Circuit's opinion precludes the Council from
doubting the biological justifications for recommendations submitted by fish and wildlife agencies and tribes).
356. Northwest Resource Information Center was decided on
September 9. 1994. The Council adopted amendments to the
Program on December 15, 1994.
357. Press reaction to the Council's December 1994 Program
amendments noted the unprecedented nature of the Council's
actions. See, e.g.. Northwest Power Council Unveils Sweeping Strategy,
AmEsicAN PoLrncAL NEiwoRK: GREENWIRE, Dec 15, 1994 (available
on Westlaw APN-GR Database) (characterizing 1994 Program
amendments as the beginning of "the biggest endangered
species bailout in history" and as a "bold plan"); loan Laatz, Power
Council OK's Plan to Save Salmon, OREGONIAN, Dec, 15, 1994, at Al
(labeling Program amendments "aggressive").
358. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1994 COLUMBIA
RIvER BASIN FISH AND WILDiurE PROGRAM i-1 (1994) Ihereinafter 1994
PRocRAm] (acknowledging that previous efforts to restore salmon
runs 'have not been enough to rescue some species"); 1-2 (urging
region to "redouble the efforts" to protect salmon).
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entific inquiry into the controversial question
whether juvenile salmon survival is directly related
to higher water velocity3 9 . Similarly, the Council
treated the question of whether smolt mortality is
significantly decreased through the use of barge
and truck transportation with a broad overview of
the current state of scientific support for that
Program.6 The Council's findings on Program recommendations were extensive and reflect substantially more deference to the expertise of fish and
wildlife agencies and tribes than was shown during
the 1991-92 amendment process. On the central
issues of flows, smolt travel times and hydroelectnc
project operations constraints, the Council largely
adopted the recommendations of fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes.1M
2. Biological Objectives
After providing a detailed analysis of the
Northwest Power Act's biological objective requirements, the Council established biologically-based
goals for the development and operation of the
hydroelectnc system. In determining the extent of the
biological objectives required by the Act, the Council
wisely dodged an attempt by power interests to slow
the amendment process and force the Council to shift
restoration responsibility away from the hydropower
system. Several power interests argued that the Act
required a comprehensive set of quantifiable objectives for the entire salmon life-cycle.P While disagreeing with the argument that biological objectives
must relate to all actions that cause salmon to die,
the Council acknowledged the central role of biological objectives in companng the cost of alternative
measures 3 and emphasized that such objectives
must be "sound," meaning "supported by data and
information," and "reflect the best available scientific
knowledge."1' The Council took pains to point out
that Congress considered biological objectives espe359. 1994

PROGRAm,supra

note 358, at 5-9 to 5-12.

360. Id.at 5-12 to 5-13.
361. See infra notes 374-405 and accompanying text.
362. 1994 PROGRM. supra note 358, at 15-16.
363. Id.at 15-18.
364. id.
365. Id.at 15-19.
366. Id. at 4-4. The council accepted with modifications
CRITFCs recommendation that all salmon losses caused by the
hydroelectnc system be fully mitigated. The Council believed Its
mandate to maintain an "adequate. efficient, economical and
reliable power supply" might be compromised IfIt established a
focus solely on fish restoration. The Council believed this modification was not inconsistent with CRITFC's recommendation
because its Program goals include a focus on avoiding any further
loss of biological diversity. Id.at 15-42. The doubling goal applies
to the whole Basin. not particular runs. Id.. § 4.IA. at 4-5.

cially important with respect to flows, specifically noting that the Act requires flow decisions to be "based
on biology and not other considerations. "
The Council reaffirmed a short-term Program
goal, set several years ago, of doubling the runs in
the interim and a long-term focus on protecting,
mitigating and enhancing fish and wildlife as much
as possible while also avoiding the loss of biological diversity. To accomplish these goals, the 1994
amendments establish four system-wide sub-goals:
(I) halt declines in the runs and rebuild populations
to sustainable levels by 2000; 7 (2) halt declines in
particular salmon runs and "rebuild Ithel population by 2030 to a level that will support commercial
and sports harvest" and contribute to the doubling
of all salmon in the Basin;'" (3) rebuild by 2194 all
populations to a level that goes beyond the first two
sub-goals and allows the protection, mitigation and
enhancement of all fish and wildlife affected by the
hydropower system; and (4) accomplish the populations without loss of biological diversityf'
The Council further broke down the sub-goals
into a series of planning principles aimed at restoring
the long-term health of the runs. These include. (1)
give priority to actions that aim to rebuild the weakest stocks, particularly the listed Snake River runs; (2)
generally avoid Program activities that create an
"appreciable risk7 to biological diversity; (3) approach
habitat and production activities 'from a total-vatershed perspective," which means that such activities
should include comprehensive actions and local
involvement (4) provide harvest opportunities in tributaries and weak-stock areas to meet treaty obligations; (5) give priority to actions that examine "critical
uncertainties" or 'test important hypotheses7 about
salmon; and (6) avoid construction of new hatcheries
.unless it is clear that the need for fish cannot be met
with existing facilities or a new facility would be a better way to achieve the [Plrogram's goals." i
367. Id.at 4-4.
368. Id.at 4-4.
369. Id.
370, U The regulation goals are not set as numenc targets
because the Council was concerned that doing so wou!d lead to
Insufficient protection agwinstad-,evse genetic impacts. t at 4-4.4-5.
371. Id.at 4-5 to 4-6. The Council noted that its focus on

weak stocks should receive the bulk of the funds for the Program
for at least five years, but also declared that listed runs are not
the only stocks to be considered weak and therefore subiect to
priority rebuilding efforts. The Council ackno;uledged that many
Imperiled runs are not listed under the ESA and pointed out that
failure to focus on them immediately would surely lead to more
listed runs. Id.at 4-6. But the Council also emphasized the impor-

tance of investing toward the goal of restored tribal harvests:
"Upriver fishers are entitled to salmon populations that are more
than museum specimens" Id at 4-6,
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To achieve the Program goals and rebuilding
targets, the Council set one central biological
objective: increased water velocity.1" After thirteen
years of failing to confront or even frankly to
acknowledge the conflict between adequate fish
flows and power generation, the Council finally
agreed with the opinion of fish and wildlife agencies
and tribes that increased water velocity was the
most reliable method for improving smolt survival . "
3. Other Provisions
The Council acknowledged that the Water
Budget, as modified by the Strategy for Salmon,
would fail to provide the flows needed to rebuild
the Snake River stocks.Y4 The Council also admitted
that it did not fully understand the exact relationship between flows, water velocity and salmon survival.3 7 But the Council recognized that the salmon

runs are affected by numerous human and natural
impacts and that the runs had thrived before largescale hydroelectric development because they had
not been subjected to the lethal impacts of dams
and slackwater reservoirs 7 6 Therefore, the Council
took seriously the Northwest Power Act's command
not to wait for scientific certainty before acting."7 To
achieve juvenile travel time objectives, the Council
372. Id. at 5-9 to 5-12.
373. Id.at 5-9 (The Council accepts that there is a relationship between flow. water velocity, fish travel time and survival
such that increasing water velocity increases the survival of
salmon and steelhead from the onset of active downstream
migration to adult spawner."): id. at 5-10 (The 'biologically important" aspect of the relationship between flow, water velocity, and
transportation 'is water velocity.").
374. Id.at 5-2 ("Analyses conducted by the Council indicate
that, absent additional action and a substantial change in ocean
conditions, salmon populations in the Snake Basin will not
rebuild and will, in all likelihood, go extinct.").
375. Id.at 5-3, 5-10.
376. Id. at 5-2 ("The salmon runs were able to survive poor
natural conditions in the past and would be able to survive in
today's conditions but for a wide vanety of human-caused
sources of mortality.i.
377. See id. at 2-5 ('Congress directed the Council
not to
await scientific certainty prior to acting."). The Council also
established a research agenda aimed at clarifying the effects of
increased flows on smolt survival, announcing that the relationship requires "the highest priority in the region's research efforts."
Id.at 5-13. To accomplish the needed research, the Council called
for the establishment of a technical working group to be organized by an independent Scientific Group. Id., § 5.0Fi, at 5-14.
378. Id. at 5-14 to 5-32. The affordable economic consequences of using drawdowns to increase water velocity in the
lower Columbia and lower Snake Rivers apparently helped convince the Council to include a reservoir drawdown plan in the
Program amendments issued in December 1994. See infra notes
389-393, 403 and accompanying text. The Council decided to
delay the planned drawdowns in order to allow adequate time for

ordered three reservoirs to be lowered over the next
five years and committed itself to decide whether to
drawdown two others.?8 On the lower Snake River,
the amendments call for Lower Granite reservoir to
be lowered to an elevation of 710 feet during the
spring of 1995119 and an additional twenty feet commencing during the spring of 1996.11' Little Goose
reservoir is to be drawn down to "near spillway
crest" during the two spring months beginning in
1999 "1 Based on the results of the Lower Granite
and Little Goose drawdowns, the Council will
decide, before 2002, whether to draw down the
reservoirs behind Lower Monumental and Ice
Harbor Dams to spillway or natural river levels."
The objective of the Snake River drawdowns is
to achieve a water velocity of 140 kcfs." 3 That velocity, which would be a substantial improvement over
that achievable under the Strategy for Salmon, is to
be attained by establishing a minimum monthly
average flow of 85 kcfs. TM However, drawdowns do
not make more water available for increased flows.
Accordingly,.the Council issued a number of directives aimed at acquiring additional water for
Program implementation. First, the Council
required BPA and the dam operating agencies to
shift storage water between reservoirs in low-flow
years " ' To make such shifts possible, the Council
modifying salmon passage facilities at Lower Granite and Little
Goose Dams and irrigation pumps at John Day reservoir, as well
as to permit the study of how best to modify John Day Dam to
allow continued irrigation and navigation and minimize drawdown impacts on power production and flood control. Id.
379. Id., § 5.3A.1, at 5-25.
380. Id., § 5.3B.2(1i, at 5-26.
381. Id., § 5.3B.2(2), at 5-26.
382. Id.. § 5.3B.9. at 5-27. To effectively monitor the effects
of the Snake River drawdowns, the Council established an oversight committee that will include representatives of BPA, the dam
operating agencies, federal and state fish and wildlife agencies,
and treaty tribes. The committee is also assigned responsibility
for overseeing implementation of the drawdown program. Id,
5.3B.14, at 5-27.
383. Id.at 5-24.
384. Id.at 5-20. The velocity target applies between April 10
and June 20 in all water years. Id. Thus, the 1994 amendments
should avoid the risk that inadequate fish flows will be available
in low water years. Between June 21 and luly 31, dam operators
are to maintain a monthly average flow equivalent of 50 kcfs Id,
These flow standards had been recommended by the Oregon
Department of Fish and Wildlife. Id.at 15-29. Interestingly, CRITFC did not recommend Snake River flow targets, Instead, it
sought "flow augmentation volume obiectives" that would apply
between April 15 and September 30 and which would have maintained the underlying methodology of the Water Budget. See
NoRmwEsT POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, I RECOMMENDATIONS 'ro AMEND
THE AADRoMoUs FISH SECTIONS OFTHE COLUMBA RIvER BASIN FIsH AND

WILDUFE PROGRAM.
§ 5-2, at 2-3 (1994).
385. Id.. § 5.2A.1, at 5-20.
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directed that Dworshak reservoir be raised as close
to its power-production role curve as possible by
April 10 each yearm and that 1 million acre-feet of
water be made available for flows from Dworshak
during the spring and summer migration season. 7
In addition, the Council asked BPA, the Bureau, and
the states of Washington, Idaho and Montana to
allocate 90 kaf of storage toward spring migration
flows,3 and to increase that annual dedication by
500 kaf in 1996 and 19 9 8 ." The Council also

requested state water agencies to facilitate water
transactionsm and directed that Brownlee Reservoir
be operated to achieve spring flow targets and
release substantial storage between the spring and
September of each year."'
Flows must also be improved on the lower
Columbia River. Accordingly, the Council established a series of flow equivalents at The Dalles
Dam ranging between 300 kcfs between April 15 and
June 15 in 1995; 200 kds between June 16 and July
31 in 1995; and 160 kds between August 1-31.
1995.92 In 1996, and in the second years of future
biannual "critical periods," the spring flow equivalents are lower: 260 kds between April 15-June 15;
200 kds between June 16-July 31; and 160 kcfs
between August 1-31. During 1997 and the third and
fourth years of a "critical period," the spring flow
equivalent is set at 220 kds.m Thus, the Council has
not wholly retreated from its paradoxical approach
to fish flows during drought years: when less rainfall
386. id.at 5-21.
387. Id.To achieve the Dworshak targets during summer
migration season, the Corps must draft the reservoir to an elevation of 1520 feet by July. Id., § 5.2B.2, at 5-23.
388. Id., § 5.2A.2, at 5-21.
389. Id.. § 5.2A.3, at 5-21. The additional 1.09 maf thus allocated would be in addition to the 427 kaf provided for by the
Strategy for Salmon. Id.However, the Council's directive may not
be implemented because ihe needed water must be acquired
through voluntary sales transactions, 'non-structural approaches,' new storage, or a combination of these possibilities. Id.Early
indications are that Idaho farmers may be unwilling to sell any
water for fish recovery efforts. See Rocky Barker, NMFS Plan Lets
FarmersControi Tap, IDAHoFAus POST-REGT.R Mar. 2, 1995, at A-I
(noting that Bureau is offering $150 per acre-foot for water purchased by imgation districts from federal government for $2.50
per acre-foot and is expenencing difficulty finding willing sellers).
390. 1994 PROCRAM, supra note 358. § 5.2A.5, at 5-22.
391. Id., 4 5.2A.9-5.2A.10. To comply with the Council's
request. Idaho Power Company, the Corps, the Bureau, and FERC
must guarantee that 110 kaf of water could be made available if
needed during the spring migration season and avoid refilling In
June. providea maximum of 137 kaf of storage for summer migration in July. pass through 50-140 kaf in August and allocate 100
kaf to fall flows in September. Id., § 5.2A.10. In addition, Idaho
Power Company is directed to modify operations at its Hells
Canyon complex to achieve coordinated fall and spring flows and
maintain chinook spawning, incubation, and emergence. Idaho
Power Company must also examine how Hells Canyon can pro-

creates more adverse river conditions for fish, less
water is provided. That method of allocating the
Columbia River system's waters was a flaw in the
Water Budget of the 1980s."4 and will continue to be
an unjustified and counter-intuitive barrier to effective salmon recovery efforts in the future.
The Council's lower Columbia River goal is 3.45
maf for the Water Budget's fish flow allocation, to be
supplemented by a firm allocation of 4 maf during
spring migration?' The Council directed that adequate water, beyond the Water Budget volume, be
available to assist summer migration behind The
Dalles Dam by April 30 .r To achieve its lower
Columbia River velocity goals, the Council decided
to lower John Day reservoir to a minimum irrigation
pool between May I-August 31 starting in 1996 and
to require an evaluation of whether to require an
additional thirty-seven foot drawdown, to spillway
crest, before April 30. 1996."
As an additional device to reduce juvenile mortality, the Council commanded the Corps to spill
enough water over dam spillways to allow eighty
percent of the smolts migrating between April 15
and July 31 on the Snake and between May I and
August 31 on the Columbia to avoid encountering
hydroelectric turbines during their voyage to the
sea. 3 The Council mandated additional improvements in facilities allowing adult salmon to bypass
the dams and intensified efforts to control predation of juveniles in hydropower system reservoirsP'
vide more water downstream to assist migration at Brownlee
Reservoir. U. § 5 2a,1l .
392. U at 5-29.
393. Ild

394. Srz notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
395. The Water Budget allocation of 3.45 maf is the aggregate of a monthly rmlnirmur velocity standard of 58 kcfslmonth. I..
§ 5.4A. at 5-29
396, Id.. § 5.4A3. at 5-29 to 5-30. Other measures to assist
summer migration include directives to BPA to allocate nonTreaty Dam storage during luly and August of lo'w-water years:

seek energy exchanges to facilitate greater summer flows. and
allow the reservoir behind Grand Coulee Dam to draft to an elevation of 1.280 feet if necessary to achieve flow targets. I1. § 5,4B.
at 5-31.
397. IU.§ 54C. at 5-32.
398. Id.. § 5,6A. at 5-36. To reduce the likelihood that
Increased spills will cause juveniles to contract nitrogen super-

saturation disease, the amendments require the Corps to conduct the spills in compliance with Washington and Oregon laws

limiting dissolved gases in reservoir waters. Id.. § 5.6C1. at 5-40.
Accordingly, the 1994 Program amendments also ask the Corps to

accelerate dams" modifications that reduce gas supersaturation.
Id., § 5.6E.2, at 5-4 I.The Council also required the Corps to install
slotted spllIway gates at all FCRPS darns and to continue improvIng hydropower turbine screens. Id.
399. IU.§§ 5,6A-5.6B. 5.7. at 5-36 to 5-40.542 to 5-47.
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Of course, the 1994 amendments do not focus
exclusively on flows and the means necessary to
achieve them. The Council also directed that a number
of steps be taken to improve adult salmon survival during up-river migration, including: (1) initiating
upgrades to existing 'passage facilities at the Basin's
dams;"*° (2) performing evaluations of the necessity for
new passage facilities, more effective attraction flows
and corrected fishery hydraulics;4'0 and (3) retaining
fish screens in place after the juvenile migration season ends where adult fallback is a documented problem.'1 Moreover, the Council recommended that additional water be allowed to flow into the lower Snake to
reduce water temperatures.40 To improve the Basin's
efforts to protect spawning habitat, the Council mandated immediate efforts to gather data on wild stocks,
review the impacts of the hatchery system, and coordinate all supplementation activities.4 ' In addition, the
Council called for changes in land and water management, water diversion screening, habitat pnorities, and
an expedited funding process.The Council's adoption of velocity goals, greater
flows and increased allocation of storage to assist
migration is consistent with recommendations long
advanced by fish and wildlife agencies and tribes and
indicates that the Council took its statutory obligation to afford deference on scientific issues seriously.
Those measures will, if implemented, be a positive

step toward salmon recovery, and the Council accordingly deserves credit for committing the region to
them. Unfortunately, for all of the Council's willingness to accept that restored runs require healthy river
conditions, the Council failed to take the one step
that could have, more than any other, left no doubt
that the Basin is willing to invest in a renewed fishery
making plain its commitment to ending transportation as a means of assisting smolt migration.
The Council remains convinced that barge and
truck transportation may, under some circumstances,
improve salmon survival.'" Thus, the Council concluded that it could achieve its objective of "an effective fish
and wildlife rebuilding effort'- 7 that "meets the needs
of salmon with a level of certainty comparable to that
accorded other operational purposes" by continuing
the region's reliance on the transportation program.
But transportation, as a tool for improving smolt survival, has never been assessed in terms of its performance relative to allowing luvenile salmon to pass
over dam spillways.- Moreover, transportation actually harms wild fish. 09 In fact, studies of the effects of
transportation on salmon have been performed on all
species. 10 Some of these studies show that transportation increases the number of smolts that successfully
pass Bonneville Dam, but there is also evidence that
fewer transported fish return from the ocean." 1 Thus, the
biological merits of transportation are at least debat-

400. The Council directed the Corps to automate all control
systems; place measuring devices in accessible areas; place
velocity meters in low velocity areas of collection channels; construct additional ladders at Lower Granite and Little Goose Dams
by 1999; provide increased attraction water for all ladder collection channels and entrances by 1997; modify the collection channel at McNary Dam by 1996; construct collection channel extensions at Lower Granite and Little Goose Dams by 1998; complete
fishway modifications and improvements at Bonneville Dam by
1997; and determine whether to cover existing ladders. Id., §
6.IA.4, at 6-2. The Council also mandated compliance with existing fishway operating and passage centers, including, among
other things, minimization of power peaking; establishment of
ramping rates; elimination of zero-flow operations; and reduction
of ladder watEir temperatures. Id. at 6-1, 6-2. The owners of the
mid-Columbia's dams were ordered to determine whether adult
losses are occurring between those hydroelectnc projects and to
evaluate whether establishment of optimum flows and spill configurations is necessary. Id., § 6.1E.I. at 6-5. Douglas County
Public Utility District (PUD). Chelan County PUD, and Grant
County PUD were directed to rectify and correct fishery problems
at Wells, Rocky Reach, Priest Rapids and Wanapum Dams. Id., §§
6.1 E2-6.1 E.4, at 6-5.

405. Id., § 7,6-7.8. The 1994 amendments also focus on resl.
dent fish and wildlife; however, detailed discussion of those
aspects of the Program are beyond the scope of this Article,
406. See id. at 5-12 ('The Council accepts that under some
passage conditions, transportation can Increase the survival of
salmon and steelhead from the onset of active downstream
migration to their return as adult spawners relative to survival
experienced by fish migrating in the river.").
407. Id. at 1-3.
408. The Council acknowledges this. See Id.at 5-12 n.6.
409. Some studies show that smolts of some species lose
some of their ability to survive in saltwater after undergoing
barge transportation. See Carl B. Schreck & James L. Congleton,
EVALUATION OF FACILITIES
FOR COLLECTION, BYPASS. AND TRANSPORTATION
OF OUTMIGRATING CHINOOK SALMON (abstract)(Oct. 193).

410.

NMFS,

ADMINISTRATION,

NATIONAL
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7 BIOLOGICAL

OPINION ON THE REINITIATION OF CONSULTATION AND 1994-98 OPERATION
FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND JUVENILE

OF THE

TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM (Mar. 1995) Ihereinafter 1994-98
BIOLOGICAL OPINIONI (discussing several scientific studies).

401. Id., § 6.IA.2, at 6-2. The Corps is commanded to install
backup parts, attraction water pumps, or fish turbines as necessary. Id.
402. Id., § 6.1A.3, at 6-2.

411. See Ad Hoc Transportation Review Group, Review of
Salmon and Steelhead Transportation Studies with Columbia and Snake
Rivers (1984-89) (Dec. 31. 1992); P.R. MUNDY ETAL, TRANSPORTATION

403. Id.. § 6.1D.3, at 6-4 (requirng releases of 100 kaf of storage from Brownlee Dam and Hells Canyon complex, reduction of
water temperatures at Ice Harbor Dam, and studies of whether cool
water releases from Dworshak Dam and Hells Canyon complex in
August and September improves adult fall chinook survival).

(concluding that available evidence indicates that transportation
can improve adult survival under some adverse river conditions,
but also declaring that the evidence also indicates that transportation cannot ensure reconstruction of Snake River and upper
Columbia River runs). The Council acknowledged these studies.
1994 PROGRAM. supra note 358, at 5-12 n.7.

404. Id., § 7.0-7.5.

OF JUVENILE SALMONIDS FROMHYDROELECTRIC PROIECTSIN THE COLUMBIA
RIVER
BASIN (FINAL REPORT) 116 (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 1994)
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able and possibly entirely absent!" The most likely
result of continued reliance on transportation of
migrating smolts will not be restored runs, but the perpetuation of collective indecision. Transportation is an
anaesthetic that dulls the region's awareness of the
choice that must be made: manage the Columbia River
system in a manner likely to afford adequate habitat for
salmon, or allow that resource to disappear in the
interests of continued dependence on the cheapest
electric power in the nation, subsidized navigation and
irrigated agriculture.
Aside from the Councirs commitment to transportation in the face of increased concern among
41
scientists that this form of passage harms salmon,'
the Program also continues to depend on hatcheries as a means for sustaining the Pacific
Noithwest's fishing industry and satisfying treaty
obligations to Indian tribes.4' This is equally unlikely to advance the Council's restoration goals.
Hatchery production damages the adaptive capability of wild stocks"'41 which are ecologically unique as
a result of genetic differences fostered by the isolation of one stock from another.4 6 Hatchery production also tends to reduce genetic diversity, impair

natural reproduction '7 and harm wild fish by transmitting disease and increasing competition for
available food and habitat."6' But the risks to existing populations of wild fish are not the only reasons
that hatchenes should be used sparingly, if at all.
Artificially produced fish do not adapt well to life in
the wild."'9 Continued reliance on hatcheries therefore will not prove to be an efficient mechanism for
sustaining the region's fish harvests.

412. 1994 PROG iS.supra note 358, § 5.0F, at 5-13. The
Council wisely requested that research on the effects of transportation be afforded the -highest pnority" and appropriately
labeled the barging program an 'expenment.

Ford assembly plant It functions best when the product you're
working on is all uniform: Sandy Daughton. Hatcheries on the Hot
Sul, JTAco."Al Ncws TsME:.. Dec. 27. 1994, at Al.

413. The transportation prograrp may violate the ESA. Many
critics, including state fish and wildlife agencies, the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, the region's tribes, and other fishery advocates, believe that transportation has not increased smolt survival. They argue that transportation may actually Increase luvenile mortality by contributing to increased stress levels, disease
transmission, and disorientation created by the process. S
Blumm, Parity V. supra note 8. at 693: note 410. supra (discussing
recent scientific studies). Because the transportation program
requires the capture of endangered iuvenile salmon, the ESA
requires the Corps to obtain an incidental take permit- for the
program. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(d). Environmentalists have challenged the program on grounds that NMFS should not have
granted such a permit when alternative methods for Improving
in-nver conditions for iuvenile migration exist. The district court
reiected this argument. See Northwest Resource Info. Center, Inc.
v. Natl Marine Fisheries Sew.. Civ. No. 93-870-MA (slip op.) (D.
Or.. Dec. 22. 1993). afd in part and reV'd In part on other grounds. 56
F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1995). The issue is again before ludge Marsh In
Amencan Rivers. et al. v. Narl Marine Fishenes Sew., et al.. Civ.
No. 94-940-MA (D. Or.. filed August 4. 1994).
414. The region's fishers and tribes generally support
reliance on hatchery supplementation of wild runs. lessica
Maxwell. How to Save a Salmon. AUDUBON 28. 30-31. luly-Aug. 1994:
Rob Taylor, Hatcheries That Once Aided Coelo Salmon Are Now Potential
Foes. HOUSTON CHRONIcLE. Nov. 13, 1994. at AI0.
415. Michael Blumm, Parity V. supra note 8. at 695.
416. Michael L. Goodman, Preserving the Genetic Dhusity of
Samonid Stocks: A Call for Federal Regulation of Hatchery Programs, 20

Ervn_. L 111. 116, 119 (1990) (citing Bevan. Problemsof Managing
Mird-Stock Salmon Fisheries. in SALMON PRODUCION. MANAGN tEu.
AND ALLOcAiON: BIoLoGicAL, ECONO.UC. AND POUcY ISSUES 103. 104
(W. McNeil ed. 1988)). This point was made recently, somewhat
more colorfully, by biologist Jim Lichatowich. -A hatchery Is like a

4. Aftermath of the 1994 ProgramAmendments
Recent political developments in the Basin and
in Washington. D.C. may render the Council's
actions temporary. Seven of the region's eight
United States Senators, all but one a member of the
Senate's new Republican majority, have expressed
opposition to the December 1994 Program amendments.1 At least one. Slade Gorton of Washington.
has indicated a willingness to push a legislative
cancellation of the Council's actions.'' Impacts on
Idaho's agriculture also underlies Idaho Governor
Phil Batt's opposition. Batt does not believe that
the water supplies currently used by his state's
farmers are adequate to allow the Council to

417. Goodman. supra note 416. at 123-31. 164 (citing
Reisenbichler & McIntyre. R quirerrntsfor Integrating Natural ani

Arfificlil Prcuatn cl Anadromous Salr ns In the Pacif&Northrest. in
FlS CULTUR tu FisHErIES M.uzGe-EtE
372 (R. Stroud ed. 1986)
Ihereinafter FsIi CuiLuREl); Blumm. Parity V. supra note 8. at 695
(citing Fit Cut-um and William Bakke. Revie-w of Scientific
Literature on the Supplementation of Anadromous Fish from
Hatcheries with Comments for the Northwest Power Planning
Council (Nov. 1987) (unpublished manuscript)).
418. Blumm, Saving IdafYs Salmon. supra note 2. at 630;
Blumm, Cclumba Rh-ir Basin. supra note 35. at 89-90.
419. One study found that wild salmon spawn nine times as
successively as hatchery fish. Sit Paul Koberstein. Are Hatdeies
ProlucingSalmon "Vimps?, HicH Cou:r' NEVs, Apr 27. 1991. at 27
(citing NMFS study of Kalama River steelhead).
420. See Letter from Senators Larry E Craig. Conrad Bums.
Max Baucus, Mark 0. Hatfield. Dirk Kempthome, and Slade
Gorton to Angus Duncan. Chairman. Northwest Power Planning
Council (Dec. 13. 1994) (on file with author): loan Laatz. De zy
Dtdssin. Senators Urgi, OR :=: .'r, Dec. 14. 1994. at El. Senators
Craig and Kempthome oppose the 1994 amendments because
they call for reservoir drawdowns. Bill Loftus, Flushng Fish: Cra,
Demands Juslifica.tn [ir Pin. LsrwO; Mo
c;nni
TIBUNE. Mar. 13.
1994, at IC
421, See Al Blggs, Go ton Suggzts Federal Law to Soloe Regn's
Salman Cns s, ITAmc!l Nws Tmzust. Oct. 13.1994. at B6. Any such
attempt will apparently draw strong opposition from Washington
Senator Patty Murray and Oregon Congresswoman Elizabeth
Furse. Se Laatz, Pe-AvrCcurcilOK's Plan to SaeSanmn.supranote 21.
at Al A26- Laatr. Pr -r Ceuns Plan Mats; Walvs fn NW, Elsod
es .rat
86. There is some question as to the ability of these legislators to
prevent such congressional meddling. howevec Both are
Democrats and are therefore In the minority of both Houses of
Congress. Senator Gortons plans may nevertheless fail in the face
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acquire additional water supplies for increased fish
flows and is concerned that the revised Program will
unnecessarily harm navigation interests based at
Lewiston, Idaho. 22 Governor Batt's hostility to the
1994 amendments has already affected their continuing viability. Idaho's new representatives on the
Council are Mike Field, a former aide to anti-salmon
recovery Senator Larry Craig, and Todd Maddock, a
former timber industry lobbyist. Both oppose large
portions of the Program, including drawdowns.' 23 In
Oregon, Governor John Kitzhaber has succumbed to
pressure from conservative Republicans
to seat an
42
eastern Oregonian on the Council. '
The effects of the recent political changes in the
Pacific Northwest have already been felt. Less than
a month after adopting the 1994 amendments, the
Council agreed to "reconsider" the "scientific justification" for them.' 2' Of course, the region's industrial power consumers, irrigators and navigation inter-

ests, as well as BPA, have signaled their opposition
to the recent amendments and have encouraged
politicians to conclude that they are unaffordable126
The basis for the opposition to the Program is the
increased costs that its measures will impose on
BPA, utilities and the DSIs. The Council estimates
that the 1994 amendments will cost approximately
$177 million,'27 resulting in an estimated average
residential electricity bill increase of $2 per month
by 1996, with an additional $1 per month by 2015,
and a projected wholesale electricity rate increase

of Oregon Senator Mark 0. Hatfield's opposition. Hatfield,
Chairman of the Senate Appropnations Committee, has indicated
that he will support legislation to fund actions required under the
1994 amendments. Laatz, Power Council OK's Plan to Save Salmon,
supra. at A26. The Republican 104th Congress may also attempt to
weaken the ESA, which might reduce pressure on the region to
restore the salmon runs. Joan Laatz, The New Order: The Endangered
Species Act and Political Reality Clash as New Leaders Look to Save Salmon.
OREGONIAN. Nov. 29, 1994. at Ai. A7; Cf. Foley's Loss. GOP Gains Stir the
Pot, AMERCAN PoLmcAL NE7woRK: GREENWIRE, Nov. 15. 1994, (available on Westlaw, APN-GR Database) (noting that Washington
Republican Senator Slade Gorton and Idaho Republican Senator
Larry Craig will "have more clout to oppose costly efforts at salmon
protection and perhaps Itol dilute the Endangered Species Act").
By March 1995. both Houses of Congress passed bills forbidding
further ESA listings in 1995, and the House of Representatives has
passed a retroactive regulatory moratorium that would invalidate
nearly all rulemakings, including those under the Northwest Power
Act and the ESA. since November 20, 1994.
422. See Idaho's Governor-ElectAsks Power Council to Delay Salmon
Vote, OREGONIAN. Dec. 13, 1994. at C6; Dan Gallagher, Idaho Governor

(quoting BPA Administrator Randy Hardy's warnings that amended Program will adversely affect power system "reliability" and
increase BPAs "financial" risks). The Columbia River Alliance has
couched its opposition in terms of a warning that greater flows
and water velocity will "destroy" the Basin's economy, Thus,
opponents of a credible recovery effort continue to confuse the
debate with questionable invocation of science to defend a status quo that the courts have warned is legally inadequate,
427. Laatz, Power Council OK's Plan to Save Salmon, supra note
21. at Al; Northwest Power Planning Council, News Release, supra
note 21. at 3. The costs of the 1994 amendments are In addition
to the $250 million cost of preexisting Program measures,
Northwest PowerCouncil Unveils Sweeping Strategy, supra note 357, at 2,
The Council counts in the cost of the 1994 amendments losses of
income suffered by BPA and the additional expense of acquiring
necessary supplemental electric power supplies, Such costs total
$57 million, while the remainder of the newly-modified Program
measures-mainly structural modifications to FCRPS dams-account for the remainder of the $177 million Increase, Laatz,
Power Council OKS Plan to Save Salmon, supra note 21, at Al, A26.
428. Laatz. PowerCouncil OK's Plan to Save Salmon, supra note
21. at Al, A26.
429. BPA 1994 REPORT, supra note 249, at 26. The average residential electricity bill in the Pacific Northwest Is 40% lower than
in other states. Timothy Egan, Fight to Save Salmon Starts Fight Over
Water. N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 1,1991, at Al; Hathorn, Save our Salmon, Save
our Soul, supra note 10, at 14.
430. Subsidies that reduce electricity prices paid by the
DSls, primarily aluminum companies, and the region's users of
irrigation water total approximately $230 million per year See
Natural Resources Defense Council. Sierra Club, and American
Rivers, Changing the Current: Affordable Salmon Strategies for Salmon
Restoration in the Columbia River Basin (1994) (copy on file with

Rips Salmon Recovery Plan. SEATTLE POST-INTELUGENCER,

lan.

15, 1995,

at BI.
423. Id.
424. Governor Kitzhaber recently appointed eastern Oregon
rancher John Brogoitti to replace pro-salmon chairman Angus
Duncan in September 1995. which means the Council will lose
one of its most persistent advocates for bold restoration measures. See Jeff Mapes, PowerCouncil Action Solves Problem, OREGONIAN,
Mar. 17, 1995, at C6.
425. See First Step to Reconsider Plan to Protect Salmon Taken by
Northwest Power Council, BNA NATiONAL ENVIRONMENT DAILY,
Feb. 14,
1995 (available on WESTLAW, BNA-NED database).
426. Litigation challenging the 1994 amendments has
already commenced. See Idaho Power Co. v. Northwest Power
Planning Council, No. 95-70205 (9th Cir.. petition for review filed
Feb. 24. 1995). See Laatz, Power Council OK'S Plan to Save Salmon,
supra note 21, at A26 (quoting Bruce Lovellin, spokesman for
Columbia River Alliance, which represents aluminum companies,
irrigators, utilities, and navigation interests, arguing that costs of
Program are "beyond the region's ability to pay"); Mackenzie &
Laatz, Planners Weigh Cheap Power,Salmon, supra note 349, at Ci, C7

of 7%.28

However, it is difficult to summon sympathy.
BPAs 1994 revenues exceeded $2 billion, and residential electricity rates in the region are significantly lower than elsewhere in the United States."
Meanwhile, the DSIs and irrigators benefit from
huge energy subsidie,4 0 and BPA has not attempted to convince Congress to reduce or eliminate

author); loan Laatz. Report: BPA Off On Claims, OREGONmN, Dec, 8,

1994, at CI. C9. But cf. Ellie Winninghoff, Where Have all the Salmon
Gone?, FoRBEs, Nov. 21. 1994, at 104 (noting that federal government spends more than Si billion per year to subsidize power
consumption by Pacific Northwest residential and industrial
energy users and that BPA's aluminum industry customers pay 2
cents per kilowatt hour for federal hydropower, or one-third the
average industrial electricity rate nationwide).

th-N
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them.4 3' The subsidies continue because BPA is

insulated from the electricity market. BPA is
required by public preference clauses contained in
the Bonneville Project Act and incorporated into
the Northwest Power Act to sell the region's hydroelectric power at cost and to offer it first to publicsector agencies, such as public utility districts .4
Only if power remains available for sale after fulfilling public-sector demand may BPA sell electricity to
private-sector customers at cost.4"1Under this system, the inflation-adjusted price of BPA power fell
from 2.74 cents per kilowatt-hour in 1940 to 2.28

cents per kilowatt-hour in

19 9 0

.4 4

Accordingly, one way to remedy BPA's concern
that salmon conservation costs will result in the
loss of its customers may be to force the agency to
compete in the wholesale electric power market.'"
Although Congress fleetingly attempted to bring
market forces to bear on BPA in the 1960s, when it
authorized construction of an interstate power
intertie.41 the bills that authorized funding for intertie construction continued to constrain BPAs abili431. Interview with K.C. Golden. Northwest Conservation
Act Coalition (Feb. 25. 1995). Other significant adverse impacts to
BPA's financial health are drought and the increasing availability
of low cost natural gas. Hearing Focuses on BPA FinancialPr blems,
AMERICAN PoLmcAL NElwoRc GRnErnwi.

Mar. 17, 1995 (available

on WESTLAW\ APN-GR database).
432. Northwest Power Act. 16 U.S.C. § 839c(a). 839g(c);
Bonneville Proiect Act of 1937. 16 U.S.C. § 832c. See generally
Joseph P. Mertor. Jr. & David C.low. The Preference Clause Revisited:
Central Lincoln Peoples Utility District v.Iohnson and the Pacific Northwest
Eectinc Power Plan and ConsenalionAct. 58 WASH. L REv. 413 (1983).
433. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples Util.
Dist.. 467 U.S. 380, 384 (1984). See generally Jeffrey C. Fereday
Comment. The Meaning of t e Prference Clause in Hylre lcrnc Power
Allocation Under the Federal Reclamation Statutes. 9 ENv. L. 601 (1979).
434. Winninghoff. supra note 430. at 104. Not surprisingly.
one consequence of the artificially low price created by the public preference clause is a reduced incentive to conserve electridty. The Pacific Northwest consumes 61% more electricity, per
capita, than any other region in the country. Id.
435. BPA remains bound by preference requirements
notwithstanding Congress' recent decision to permit private utilities to engage in interstate wholesale -wheeling" of electricity.
See Energy PolicyAct of 1992. Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 723. 106 Stat.
2782. 2919 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824L).
436. SeeAct of Aug. 31. 1964, Pub. L No. 88-552, § 8.78 Stal
758 (1964). BPA may sell power to non-Pacific Northwest consumers and transmit it to them by way of the Intertie only If such
regional power purchasers do not desire to purchase the electricity. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(i)(5). 837a-e. See generally Califomla
Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n v. Bonneville
Power Admin.. 831 E2d 1467. 1470-71 (9th Cir. 1987).
437. See infra notes 438-39 and accompanying text.
438. One promising market for BPA hydropower Is the
southwestern United States. Changes in the power production
operations at Glen Canyon Dam, a significant hydroelectricity
producer in the Colorado River Basin, to protect the ecosystem of
Grand Canyon National Park will force energy purchasers in that

ty to sell power outside the region by granting a
preference to Pacific Northwest electricity consumers." Thus. BPA cannot sell federal hydroelectricity to the buyers who are willing to pay the most
for it. even though doing so may increase the
amount of income produced by the region's hydroelectric system.'1 The net result is that BPA must
increze its wholesale electric rates to compensate
for the preference discount.
BPA's concerns about the financial impacts of
intensified salmon recovery efforts also rest on warnings by some of its customers that they may buy electricity elsewhere.' However, BPA is not facing the
imminent loss of customers because most existing
power contracts bind purchasers to BPA electricity
purchases until 2001.40 The agency could reduce the
financial risks created by the loss of a part of its market by imposing exit fees to compensate for the federal investment in the power system's infrastructure."' An exit fee would not need to be particularly
high. One recent study indicates that BPA could
impose a charge of 7A mills per kilowatt hour to
region to seek alternative supplies during the months of the year
when electricity demand is highest Since those peak demands
occur in the desert southwest in spring and summer BPA could
sell power to interested utilities at the same time the water used
to generate it could benefit migrating smolts. One recent estimate indicates that BPA could increase its revenues $30 million
per year by taking advantage of the southwest market. Salem
Electric Cooperative. BPM Cpetitknes: Stes BPA Can Taie to
APv,Shifting Cots to Treasury 6 (no date) (unpublished report on
file with author) Ihereinafter BPM Competivenossl (noting that
changes in Glen Canyon Dam operations are likely to cause loss
of 450-800 megawatts of firm peaking capacity during months
when increased flows are needed on Columbia Basin rivers to
assist smolts; cost to replace lost Glen Canyon power is estimated at $28 per kilowatt-month, while BPA currently sells power at
approximately $5 per kilowatt-month). Of course, the preference
clause would have to be modified in order to allow BPA to enter
Into long-term contracts with southwest utilities. Unfortunately,
the current Administration apparently opposes any such change
Set Intez",r Ha4 R. O'Leary, 8 N'x REs, & Eft'r. 32. 60 (1994)
(interview with Secretary of Energy).
439. Les Blumenthal. Agmxchs at OdLs C;r Salmon Runs:
Pciyakars Difate Whs to Pay f-or Hafital. ITA o.#AI NVws TraU.
Mar 2. 1995. at AI BPA May Fa:eS;afe c Deftribns, O
Ian.
lwo
axo.
13. 1995. at C2. If BPAs expenses remain high enough that the
agency has difficulty holding onto customers, then BPA may experience difficulty in repaying the federal treasury for the Basin's
hydroelectric infrastructure. But BPAs $16.3 billion debt could be
reallocated to the taxpayers, or BPA could seek to recoup from
fleeing customers the investment in the hydroelectric system.
440, Interview with K.C. Golden, Northwest Conservation
Act Coalition (Feb. 25, 1995).
441. Some states are considering allowing utilities facing
retail competition to impose a transmission charge, which would
allow recovery of a portion of the 'stranded- investment in the
physical facilities needed to generate and deliver energy. See. eg..
California Public Utilities Commn, Order Instituting Rulemaking
and Order Instituting Investigation: On the Commission's
Proposed Policies Governing Restructuring Califomia's Electric
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cover all of the federal investment in the Washington
Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) plants, physical facilities needed for salmon passage and conservation programs mandated by the Northwest Power
Act. A fee of that amount would also allow BPA to
reduce electricity rates charged to its preferred customers by 25% and maintain a price advantage over
competing regional power providers." 2 And an exit
fee would be equitable, because the harm to the

Basin's fisheries has primarily benefited BPA's customers, not caused by the FCRPS taxpayers."'
Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration, faced with
opposition from BPA and Pacific Northwest utility
interests, recently killed a proposal to require exit
fees.'" But an exit fee is not BP.s only available
avenue for recovering its investments on behalf of
customers. BPA could impose a contract charge,
which wotjld require any customer purchasing a service from BPA to pay a share of the WPPSS debt.
Importantly, BPA lawyers apparently believe a contract charge could be assessed without amending
federal law or the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission rules."'
Salmon recovery costs are not even the most
significant cause of BPA's precarious fiscal position.
Services Industry (Docket No. R94-04-031) (Apr. 20, 1994). It is not
clear, however,whether recovery of a stranded investment may proceed unrestricted. See Cajun Elec. Power Coop. v. Fed. Energy Reg.
Comm'n, 28 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994). FERC recently announced a
rule that would permit BPA to impose an exit fee dunng a threeyear experimental window. See Recovenj of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,274 (1994).
442. See BPA's Competitiveness, supra note 438. at 7.
443. The aluminum industry receives approximately $180
billion in subsidies from FCRPS each year. while Pacific
Northwest irrigators receive an annual federal water subsidy of
$50 million, and the region's navigation interests benefit from
federally subsidized sonar on the Columbia and Snake Rivers to
the tune of approximately $30 million each year. See Cost the $64
Million Question for Salmon, 14 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION ACT REPORT
3, 6 (an. 13, 1995). The irrigation subsidy figure does not include
approximately $300 million in power revenues lost when water
stored in federal reservoirs is diverted to farms. Id.
444. Michael C. Blumm & Eric Lemelson, BPA Plight
Exaggerated by Industry (editorial opinion). OREGONIAN, Mar. 6, 1995.
at B9. Congress is also apparently unwilling to sanction exit fees.
See Bill Mackenzie, Power Players Mull FeesFor Those Leaving BPA,
OREGONIAN, Mar.31, 1995, at BI.
445. See Nuke Debt: Hole That May Become A Grave, supra note
249,at I. 3.
446. See ASSURING POWER SUPPLY, supra note 256, at 17. BPA
does not, however, appear to face imminent financial failure.-See
BPA 1994 REPORT, supra note 249, at 26 (noting 1994 net operating
revenue of $315,614,000).
447. See BPA 1994 REPORT. supra note 249, at 25 (listing net
non-federal projects debt of $7,141126); ASSURING POWER SUPPLY,
supra note 256, at 27 (WPPSS debt accounts for approximately
45% of BPA's total debt and interest costs and for about one-fifth
of its net revenue requirement).

There is little doubt that BPA's resources are
stretched,- but that is mostly the result of the debt
accrued when the region launched its effort to build
nuclear power plants during the 1970s."' Nor has
BPA seriously pursued an effort to force the region's
utilities to bear a portion of the costs of the WPPSS
fiasco.' 4 In any event, much of the Program's finan-

cial impact on BPA is in the form of lost revenues,
not increased outlays.' 9 BPA's zeal to contain its
expenses is also not aimed at all the sources of its
financial stress, as it has not publicly expressed
similar concerns about the loss of hydropower generating capacity created when irrigators divest large
quantities of Snake River Basin waters at very low
prices.40 BPA has been content to continue the

region's traditional approach of forcing the fishery
to bear the costs of the region's energy choices and
water allocation decisions; its complaints that
increased costs caused by the 1994 amendments
threaten it with financial doom are not matched by
a willingness to confront more significant threats to
the health and role in the region's economy.
Nevertheless, whether credible or not, BPAs complaints about the costs of restoring the Basin's
salmon runs have received the sympathetic attention of the Clinton Administration. The President
448. Interview with K.C. Golden, Northwest Conservation
Act Coalition (Feb. 25, 1995). The financial disaster spawned by
the WPPSS has a long and tortured history, During the 1970's,
utility planners and BPA determined that the Pacific Northwest
faced an imminent power shortage and backed the construction
of five nuclear power plants to produce additional electriclty BPA
provided crucial assistance in launching the projects by Issuing
net billing agreements, under which participating utilities could
trade their share of nuclear plant output for a credit toward their
purchase of energy from BPA. Eventually, nearly 100 of the
region's utilities agreed to finance the WPPSS nuclear plants.
However, construction of the fourth and fifth nuclear plants was
accompanied by a variety of financial and technical problems,
including spectacular cost overruns and a failure of the expected
power demand to materialize. In January 1982, WPPSS defaulted
on repayment of $2.25 billion in construction bonds, Lengthy litigation over the question of liability on the bonds followed the
default, with BPA eventually agreeing to assume most of the
region's nuclear power plant debt, See generally WAYNE H. SucAl,
NUCLEAR POWER AND RATEPAYER
PROTEST.
THE WAsHINGTON PUBLIC

POWER SUPPLY SMsTEM CRISIS 22-92 (1987); Benjamin E. Walters &
David F.Sugarman, WPPSS and the Pacific Northwest; A Mere Possibllity
of Unravelinga Hopelessly Twisted Debt, 16 ENVrL, L, 91,93-104 (1985),
As of the summer of 1995. BPKs WPPSS-related debt exceeds $7
billion. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, QUARTERLY REPORT FOR

THE NINE MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30. 1995 (1995). Other financial consequences of the region's experiment with nuclear power are also
not in the past. WPPSS plant number 2 remains in operation, and
dunng fiscal year 1993-94 the cost to BPA to operate and maintam it was 39 mills per kilowatt-hour (m/kh), Unfortunately, BPA
sells the power generated by the plant to its utility customers for
27 m/kh. Utilities Rain on BPA's Funeral Parade, 14 NORTHWEST
CONSERVATION
Act REPORT I, 2 (Feb. 10, 1995),
449. Id.
450. Id; See supra note 443.
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has agreed to provide $100 million during FY 1996
and 1997 to implement NMFS' recovery plan for the

listed runs.4"

BPAs financial condition aside, it is not likely
that the 1994 amendments violate the Northwest

Power Act's requirement that an adequate, efficient,
reliable and economical power supply be maintained.4'

2

Increased hydroelectricity generation

costs do not transgress this constraint,"' and the
Program does not threaten the region's ability to
meet energy demands." Congress recognized that
the region's economy would see electricity costs
rise since salmon recovery efforts began, and the
Council has concluded that significant adverse
financial consequences for some economic interests, such as the aluminum industry and public utility districts, does not render the power supply as a
whole uneconomic. 4" BPA can protect its financial
viability by forcing its customers to bear a more
equitable proportion of the region's hydroelectricity
investment, and therefore the Northwest Power
Act's implicit mandate to preserve BPA as the
region's predominant electricity wholesaler is not
violated by the 1994 amendments.4"
B. The Revised 1994-98 Biological Opinion and
the Proposed Recovery Plan
In March 1995, NMFS issued a revised 1994-98

biological opinion on the FCRPS and a proposed
recovery plan. The agency responded to judge
Marsh's criticism in Idaho Department of Fish & Game

and concluded that status quo operations of the
451. See Salmon Cost Shift to Taupayers OK'd. 14 Noan-rsTm
Acr REPORT 4 (Mar. 17, 1995). The agreement will
enable BPA to shift $60-70 million per year in salmon costs to the
treasury, depehding on water conditions. After two years, the shift
will be $30-40 million per year. In return. BPA must reduce its
operating expenses by $30-40 million, but may reduce its required
cash reserves and therefore make less probable the payment on
its debt to the treasury. Id.in committing the federal treasury to
pay a portion of BPXs salmon costs, the Administration invoked
section 4(h)(10)(C) of the Northwest Power Act. 16 U.S.C. §
839b(h)l IO)(C). Section 4(hl(10)(C) authonzes BPA to allocate the
costs of Program activities "as appropriate" to "various prolect
purposes." The Administration apparently believes that a substantial portion of the responsibility for the salmon runs should
be absorbed by parties that receive benefits other than energy
from the FCRPS. but there is not an available mechanism for taxing all users other than energy consumers. Salmon costs can be
recovered only from federal taxpayers or regional ratepayers.
Some of the Northwest's representatives in Congress also apparently believe that salmon recovery costs are the most significant
threat to BPRs financial health. Congress is considenng bills that
would cap BP~s salmon-related expenditures at percentage of Its
gross power revenues. S.481, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.
1905, § 509. 104th Cong.. Ist
Sess. (1995). The bills' definition of
cost include foregone power revenues and the cost of power needed to replace generating capacity lost when stored water is
-released for increased flows. The bills also forbids the use of
transmission rate increases to pay salmon costs. Id.
452. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b~h)(5).
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hydroelectric system would jeopardize the listed
stocks."' Nevertheless, the measures contained in
the revised 1994-98 biological opinion and the
recovery plan can be considered, at best, small steps

toward salmon recovery. After Idaho Department of Fish
& Game and Northwest Resource Information Centerwere
decided, the Clinton Administration repeatedly
promised the region that it would require recovery
efforts similar to those mandated by the Council's
1994 Program amendments. Unfortunately, NMFS
produced an array of restoration ;neasures substantially weaker than those required by the 1994
Program amendments. NMFS' approach is therefore
also less likely to prevent further declines in the
endangered runs. While the revised 1994-98 FCRPS
biological opinion and the recovery plan, if finished
in its current form, may survive a future challenge
based on arguments that the agency failed to con-

sider all available information. NMFS has not adequately responded to ludge Marsh's warning that
aggressive action is needed to save the Basin's
salmon runs.
I. Compliance with Idaho Departmentof Fish & Game

In-the aftermath of Idaho Department of Fish &
Game, NMFS opted to reconsider the 1994-98 biological opinion on FCRPS operations that it had
issued soon before Judge Marsh's decision." NMFS
also decided to include the states and treaty tribes
in the ESA section 7 consultation process."
Accordingly, NMFS held discussions with these
interested parties throughout much of 1994. These
453. Sa Nortrbist R-laurce
Info. Cernt.r, 35 F3d at 1371 n.13
(noting that requirement applies to 'power supply" not hydroelectric system).
454. See Asswm; Pown SuFrnY.supra note 256. at 11. The
Program allows system operators to draft reservoirs below elevations needed for fish purposes to meet firm loads.
455. Assumri Paw Suptw. supra note 256, at 3, 13-16.
456. The Council has Interpreted the "economical" power
supply constraint as a requirement that BPA be maintained as an
entity that can offer energy for sale at pnces more economical
than those offered by alternative suppliers. Assurun Pown
Suy.,
supra note 256. at 1 3.
457. 1994-93 B:oLocc.,On:o:u, supra note 410, at 88 (Snake
River sprng/summer chinook), 89 (Snake River fall chinook). 91
(Snake River sockee). Because NMFS proposed recovery plan

Indudes essentially the same measures for mitigating hydropower system Impacts on listed stocks, It will not be discussed in
detail. See NMFS. NAronuA OcEmn c A.' D AmrosnHnrc
AmNirwwnio.r Pmxri-_o REcovmv Pm i FOR Smsmi RivR SAL-An,
V.2.10 - V.2.90 (Mar. 1995).
458. See Letter from Fred R. Disheroon, Esq.. Speaal
Litigation Counsel. U.S. Department of Justice. to Hon. Malcolm
F.Marsh (Apr. 7.1994) (copy on file with author).
459. 1994-98 B:owarcAL Oa.or. supra note 410. at 8-9 (citIng Federal Defendants' Report on Compliance with the
judgment. Idaho Dept of Fish &Game v. Natr Marine Fisheries
Sew.. 850 E Supp. 886 (D,Or. 1994) (June 28. 1994)).
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meetings were intended to achieve a consensus on
the scientific evidence that should be obtained and
considered during the consultation process and the
alternatives to current FCRPS operations that
should be considered. 4" The Corps, the Bureau and
BPA reinitiated consultation on the FCRPS in
December 1994.'6 The final FCRPS 1994-98 biological opinion was issued on March 2, 1995.
The revised 1994-98 biological opinion
addressed each of the holdings of Idaho Departmentof
Fish & Game.4 2 NM FS considered the "low case" test
results and the demographic risks associated with
low populations that it had previously ignored.463
NMFS also repeated its 1993 finding that the existence of the hydroelectric dams must be considered
a part of the "environmental baseline"4" against
which the effects of the proposed operation of the
hydroelectric system must be measured. In addition, NMFS considered population levels during
high and low water years, rather than population
levels only during high water years, as it did in the
1992 and 1993 consultation processes.
2. Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives
NMFS acknowledged that adult returns among
each of the listed stocks are expected to be very low
in the next few years.'-' Nevertheless, the agency set
low survival and recovery targets. For Snake River
spring and summer chinook, NMFS expects survival
to be assured if 11,000-22,000 natural spawners are
counted at Lower Granite Dam. 4" For fall chinook,
460. Id.at 9.
461. See Letter from Mal. Gen. Ernest 1. Harrell, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, to William W. Stelle, Jr., National Marine
Fisheries Service, and Michael Spear, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (Dec. 15. 1994) (transmitting U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS. ETAL., SUPPLEMENTAL BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ON FEDERAL

COLUMBIA RIVER POWER OPERATIONS) (copy on file with author).
462. Because the proposed recovery plan duplicates the
measures contained in the revised biological opinion in its section dealing with hydropower impacts on the listed runs, it will
PLAN FOR
not be discussed separately. See PROPOSED RECOVERY
SNAKE RIVER SALMON, supra note 457, at V.2.10 - V.2.90.
OPINION. supra note 410, at 68-69
463. 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL
(Snake River sockeye test results); 69-71 (Snake River spnng/summer chinook test results), 71-73 (Snake River fall chinook results).
The three tests for luvenile mortality, which are performed as a
computer simulation of the effects of passage through the hydroelectnc system, are (1) the Columbia River Salmon Passage
(CRISP) model; (2) the Passage Analysis Model (PAM); and (3) the
Fish Leaving Under Several Hypotheses (FLUSH) model. Id. at 6667. The three models -charactenze luvenile passage in a similar
fashion when input is standardized and results are presented on a
relative scale, but reflect different hypotheses. Id.at 67. These are:
(i) the distribution of survival over the lifespan of the fish; (2) the
effect of flow on survival; and (3) the benefit. in terms of reduced
mortality, of juvenile transportation. Id.(citing L. BARNTHOUSE, et aL,
COLUMBIA BASIN SALMONID MODEL REVIEw

(intenm Report, Oct. 1994)

(available from Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Oak Ridge. TN)).

the survival threshold is 300 spawners, while for
Snake River sockeye it is 150-300 returning fish.46
Recovery targets are set substantially higher. For
Snake River sockeye, the goal is 1000 naturally-produced salmon in one lake and at least 500 in each
of. two other lakes in the Stanley River Basin,
Idaho.- For fall chinook, the recovery objective is
2,500 naturally-produced fish in the lower Snake
River and its tributaries.1 9 For spring and summer
is 31,440 wild salmon at Lower
chinook, the target
0
Granite Dam.'
To achieve these targets, NMFS mandated four
basic oblectives for FCRPS management during
1994-98. First, the agency recognized that juvenile
salmon need more water to assist their migration,
and therefore included a variety of measures aimed
at augmenting flows in the biological opinion.
Second, NMFS acknowledged that releases of
stored water over dams allow smolts to avoid passage through hydroelectric turbines and established criteria for such spills at several lower Snake
and lower Columbia dams. The objective of the flow
and spill criteria is the achievement of an 80% juvenile fish passage efficiency (FPE). Third, NMFS
required changes to the physical structures of the
dams to improve adult migration. Finally, the
agency made clear that an "improved" transportation program is essential to allow juveniles to reach
the sea.
Although NMFS committed the federal government to the drawdown of John Day reservoir and the
464. Id.at 12. The environmental baseline "includes the past
and present impacts of all Federal, State, or private activities In
the action area, the anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal
projects in the action area that have already undergone formal or
early [ESAI section 7 consultation, and the impact of State or private actions which are contemporaneous with the consultation In
process." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (definition of "effects of the action").
Thus, the environmental baseline describes the current status of
the listed species "in relation to the risks presented by the continuing effects of all previous actions and resource commitments
that are not now subject to further exercise of federal discretion,"
1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 410, at 12, In Idaho
Department of Fish & Game, Judge Marsh rejected arguments that
the existence of the FCRPS dams could not be considered part of
the environmental baseline. See supra notes 317-319 and accompanying text.
465. Only two Snake River sockeye, 500 Snake River fall chinook. and less than 2,000 Snake River spring and summer chinook are expected to reach the mouth of the Columbia River in
1995 under the current method of operating the federal hydroelectric power system. 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 410,
at 33-37.
466. Id.at 27.
467. Id. at 30, 32.
468. Id.at 32.
469. Id. The lower Clearwater River Is excluded.
470. Id.
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four lower Snake River dams to minimum operating
pool by 1996, the agency postponed until 1999 any
decision on whether to lower the Snake River reservoirs below that elevation in an effort to further
enhance water velocity. 47 Thus, even if NMFS eventually concludes that drawdowns below minimum
operating pool are necessary, none will occur before
the twenty-first century.'" Although recent tests
have demonstrated that drawdowns are beneficial
to juveniles and economically feasible.' the agency
asked the Corps to perform another complete feasibility study before 1996.''
3. Flow Augmentation Measures
NMFS recognized the value of greater flows for
luvenile salmon. 7' But the agency failed to require
the biologically optimum flow targets long advocated by state fish and wildlife agencies and treaty
tribes.4 76 To provide maximum benefit to smolts,
flows on the lower Snake River should average 140
kcfs.' On the lower Columbia, flows should average
300-350 kcfs.4" Under the revised 1994-98 biological
opinion, the spring freshet on the lower Snake River
is to be maintained at 85-100 kds, while the average
spring flow oblective on the lower Columbia River is
set at 220-260 kcfs.'" During the summer, the flow
requirements are respectively 50-55 kds and 200
kcfs.'" If flows on the lower Snake River are permitted only at the mandated minimum levels, then the
region will continue to find it necessary to remove
most iuvenile salmon from the river.4"3
NMFS also suggested reasonable and prudent
alternatives that are unlikely to achieve the recommended minimum flows. Although the agency allocates 11.5 maf more water tovrard flows than does the
Council's 1994 Program amendments, the biological
471. Id.at 92-94.

472. Id.at 92 ("lllmplementation of drawdown
In the
Snake River may begin by 2000.).
473. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
474. 1994-98 BiOLOGiCAL OpiioN, supra note 410, at 92-94.
475. Id.at 95-104.
476. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
477. THE WATER BUDGET, supra note 58.
478.1981 CoALIION REcommENOAmoNs. supra note 57, at 167-69.1.
479. 1994-98 BiOLOGicAL OPINION, supra note 410, at 104.
480. Id.
481. When flows on the lower Snake average 85 kcfs. approximately 74% of migrating spnng and summer chinook juveniles
must be transported; at flows of 100 kcfs, the proportion Is 56%.
Id.at 112.
482. 1994-98 BIOLOGICAl. OPINION, supra note 410, at 99-100.
This is because NMFS calls for the purchase of less than 500 kay

of water from upper Snake River basin users each year between
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For Fcc S~mn?
U~w Ifare Far Fixilk Sc~rnan?
opinion actually provides 1 maf lEss Water for flows in

the lower Snake River than the Council called for.'"
The only definite source of the water needed to provide increased flows is the drawdown of Dworshak
Reservoir by 80 feet during the summer.'" The success
of other methods for acquiring the needed water
depends on whether the federal government can persuade pnvate parties to provide the volume needed.
NMFS reiterated its earlier recommendation that the
Corps and the Bureau obtain 427 kaf from the upper
Snake River from willing sellers, but thus far it
appears that the government is experiencing difficulty finding sellers even at a very high price.'" NMFS
also commanded the federal government to negotiate
the acquisition of an additional volume of storage
from the Canadian treaty projects to enhance spring
and summer flows." Releases from Brownlee
Reservoir are also made voluntary because NMFS has
no authority over the Idaho Power Company through
the ESA section 7 consultation process.
To compound the revised biological opinion's
lower water acquisition target, NMFS required the
dam operating agencies to obtain additional water
only when it proves convenient for third parties to
provide it.' This approach will not guarantee the
achievement of flow targets. NMFS further undercut
its own emphasis on flows by including in the biological opinion numerous constraints that may
make achievement of the flow levels impossible.
Lake Roosevelt (behind Grand Coulee Dam).
Hungry Horse Reservoir, and Libby Reservoir must
be filled by April 20 each year and are to remain that
way until releases for other project purposes draw
down the elevations.' - That requirement eliminates
the prospect of flow enhancement from upstream
prolect storage during the fall. Minimum reservoir
1995-97. Moreover. the Bureau is not actually obligated to
acquire that much water, t4MFS directed the Bureau only to
"taklel such actions as are necessary to ensure a high probability
of providing provision of that volume by 1998. Id.at 99.
483. Stephen Steubner NMFS Dxon Lea5 Industry Intset,
F'Wh
UIIr Hce, IDH.O FALLS P05-REGiMTER. ?.ar 2. 1995. at Al.
484. Rocky Barker. NMFS Plin Lits Farmas Control Tap. IDcOi
FAL.S PosT-REc
. Mar 2. 1995. at Al.
485. 1994-98 B:oiLc.CiA Ou.o:0.,. supra note 410, at 100-101.
However. the agreement must be revenue neutral: which means
It probably cannot result In any lost power revenues for either
BPA or Canadian power sellers or Increased energy costs associated with power generated at the Canadian plants. L.
486. Id. at 99 ('iTIhe IBureaul shall secure water for flow
augmentation ... from willing sellers.-). The Bureau is also forbidden to Invoke the federal govemrnenrs condemnation power
NMFS directed It to obtain water in a manner that is consistent
with applicable state law.: Id.
487. Id. at 95. The practical consequence of this proviston
will be to encourage flood control releases In March. before
migration season begins.
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elevations are also established for Lake Roosevelt
and Dworshak Reservor. 8
4. Spills
The biological opinion recognizes that hydroelectric turbines have a catastrophic impact on
migrating luveniles and relies on spills at all of the
federal dams in order to avoid forcing the young fish
through them.- Spill requirements are established
for each hydroelectric project where transportation
collection does not occur.'9 At Little Goose and
Lower Monumental Dams, however, spill is only
required when flows exceed 85 kcfs in the Snake
River, while spills are mandatory at Lower Granite91
Dam only when flows on the Snake exceed 100 kcfs.4
Similarly, at McNary Dam no spills are mandated
when flows on the Columbia fall below 220 kcfs.'4
These spill thresholds are not reinforced by
NMFS' decision to allow FPE goals to be achieved
by exceeding gas supersaturation limits imposed by
the four Pacific Northwest states. 93 The biological
opinion specifies that flows should not allow luveniles to be exposed, over the long term, to more
than 115% or, in the short run, to more than 120% of
the gas saturation levels mandated by the respective state water quality agencies.' 9' By contrast, the
Council established the same FPE target but
required the Corps to stay generally within statemandated gas supersaturation limits between April
15-July 31 on the Snake River and4 between May IAugust 31 on the Columbia River "
5.Changes to Dam Structures to Assist Adult Passage
NMFS established a fish guidance efficiency
(FGE) target of 80% of adults on the way to upriver
spawning beds.49 To achieve that goal, the biological opinion requires the Corps to improve adult
488. Id.
489. Id. at 45 (recognizing that mortality associated with
passage through turbines exceeds mortality caused by spillways
and bypasses).
490. Id. at 105.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 104.
493. Id.at 107-08. Fish passage efficiency refers to the proportion of fish passing the dams without moving through turbines. Id.at 45.
494. Id. at 107.
495. 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 358, § 5.6C.1, at 5-40.
496. 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 410. at 105. Fish
guidance efficiency refers to the proportion of fish passing the
dams through luvenile bypass systems. Id. at 45.
497. Id. at 114-15, 125.
498. Id.at 112. However, NMFS sanctioned nearly exclusive
reliance on transportation to assist migrating Snake River fall chi-

routing and bypass systems and calls for improvement in spill efficiency through modifications to
dam baffles, flip-lips and stilling basins.'
6. Transportation
NMFS decided to reduce the number of juvenile salmon transported to the base of Bonneville
Dam below the levels currently subject to such handling when conditions permitting the achievement
of flows above 100 kcfs in the lower Snake River
exist.'4 The agency also recognized that improvements in the methods of transporting fish are necessary to reduce the stress inflicted on smolts, as
well as the occurrence of predation and disease.'
The problem with these "improvements" is that they
fail to address the basic flaw in the plan. The state
fish and wildlife agencies and tribes believe that
transportation will not assist the endangered runs
to recover so long as in-river conditions are not
improved.w Moreover, NMFS decided to disregard
test results that indicate that transportation may
actually decrease the likelihood of salmon recovery 01 The agency compounded this mistake by
establishing procedures for tests to be conducted
over the next several years that are unlikely to provide an accurate assessment of the impacts of the
barging and trucking programs on wild juveniles. 02
7. Putting it All Together: Will the 1994-98
Biological Opinion and Proposed Recovery Plan
Restore Wild Salmon to the Pacific Northwest?
The 1994-98 biological opinion on FCRPS operations recommends recovery measures that are
likely to be less effective than those mandated by
the Council in the 1994 Program amendments,
Nevertheless, the cost of NMFS' plan is not substantially lower than that of the Program.' Nor
nook, since the biological opinion failed to require full flows adequate to permit in-river migration. Id.Moreover, nearly all migrating spnng/summer chinook would be transported. NMFS estimated that 74% would have to be barged when flow levels are
between 85-100 kds, with 56% taken out of the river when flows
exceed 100 kcfs. Id.
499. Id.at 111.
500. See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 358, at 15-116 to 15-123
(discussing various studies of transportation program effects on
salmon).

501. 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION. supra note 410, at Ill
("NMFS recognizes the validity of the concerns raised by the
states, tribes, and others both about the absolute benefits of
transportation and of its ultimate efficacy as a recovery tool,"),
502. Id. at 111.NMFS proposes to compare adult returns
from transported smolts to survivals In the same river, However,
this methodology entirely fails to take account of survival rates
on nvers with adequate flows and therefore cannot accurately
assess the efficacy of transportation as a recovery tool.
503. NMFS' recommendations, If fully Implemented, may
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does NMFS' plan reflect the urgency so clearly
demanded by the plight of the Basin's salmon and
which both the Ninth Circuit and Judge Marsh
thought necessary. NMFS failed to provide adequate flows or to mandate spills at all of the projects where they would be most helpful to migrating
juveniles. The agency has not summoned the
courage to re-orient river management toward a
velocity-based scheme or acknowledged that lasting improvement in the health of the runs can be
achieved only if the federal dam operators let the
Columbia and Snake Rivers be rivers again. Despite
convincing evidence of their value,- NMFS punted
into the next century a decision on whether to drawdown Snake River reservoirs in order to improve
smolt travel time. Most damningly of all, the 199498 biological opinion steadfastly upholds a fifteenyear experiment in transporting juveniles that offers
little evidence that human technological fixes can
do better by the salmon than can the river."'NMFS should have required much bolder
efforts. To give the rapidly disappearing salmon
runs their best chance to survive into the next century. NMFS should put into practice the tenets of
adaptive management. Fifteen years of experience
has-taught the region that barges and trucks are not
an adequate substitute for rapids and fast water.
The Corps, the Bureau and BPA should be forced to
end the transportation program. Much higher flow
levels on the Columbia and Snake Rivers during the
spring and summer migration seasons should also
be mandated. Minimum average flows should be
maintained much closer to the biologically optimum beneficialevels.6 To avoid the huge mortality rates created by hydroelectric turbines, spills
should be mandatory at all of the hydroelectric projects. Finally. NMFS should accept that juvenile
mortality can be reduced most substantially if the
speed of the river's flow is increased. NMFS should
pursue quickened recovery by implementing reservoir drawdowns while enough fish to rebuild the
remaining tiny wild populations can benefit from
them.

VIll. Conclusion

actually cost the region more than the Council's Fish and Wildlife
Program. See Letter from E Lorraine Bodi. American Rivers to
William Stelle. National Marine Fisheries Service, and Michael
Speer U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Feb. 9. 1995) at 2 (copy on
file with author).

505. Sit 1994 P
.oG,supra note 358. at 15-116 to 15-118
(discussing state fish and wildlife agency and tribal critiasms of
transportation program and noting that "IThe Council agrees
that transportation is not a substitute for changes in the river:).
506. Ste supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of biologically optimum flos.

504. See supra note 332.

The 1994 Program amendments responded
admirably to the court's holdings and expression of
impatience in Northwest Resource Information Center.
They briefly promised some hope that the region's
leaders recognize that aggressive actions are needed if healthy wild salmon runs are to be returned to
the Pacific Northwest. Nevertheless, the Council's
new-found willingness to lead the recovery effort
may prove fleeting. The new Republican majority in
Congress and the changed political leadership in
Idaho have already indicated strong sympathy
toward the economic interests that may have to sacrifice subsidies if the salmon are to be saved. The
loss of Idaho as an advocate of bold efforts to stave
off the extinction of salmon may further facilitate
the breakdown of the fragile consensus behind the
1994 Program amendments. Thus. the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Northwest Resource Information
Center. while a useful and unprecedented interpretation of the Northwest Power Act. may ultimately
prove insignificant.
NMFS unfortunately failed to produce a blueprint for salmon recovery that responds to Judge
Marsh's warning that the salmon cannot, for much
longer, survive the entrenched resistance to fundamental change. Although Idaho Department of Fish &
Game forced NMFS to include all relevant scientific
information in the revised 1994-98 biological opinion on FCRPS operations, NMFS avoided the hard
choices that must be made. The 1994-98 biological
opinion appropriately calls for increased flows in
the lower Columbia and lower Snake Rivers during
smolt migration seasons, but fails to provide the
means to achieve them. NMFS'also unwisely postponed the measures essential to achieve improved
water velocity. Reservoir drawdowns are put off until
the next century at the earliest, and NMFS again
failed to urge a step away from continued reliance
on barge and tru& transportation as a means for
helping juvenile salmon reach the ocean. NMFS
may have complied with the ESA. but not with
Judge Marsh's warning that the region's river managers, fish and wildlife agencies, electricity consumers and concerned fish advocates must quickly
reconcile the needs of salmon to the energy
demands of the Pacific Northwest.
Northwest Resources Information Center and Idaho
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Department of Fish.& Game could have prompted the
end of "business as usual" in the Columbia River
Basin. The Ninth Circuit and Judge Marsh clearly
warned of their impatience with the status quo and
of their skepticism toward any approach that continues to place the economic considerations of
power consumers before the urgent priority of
returning thriving wild salmon runs to the region.
For all of that, however, the decisions have failed to
convince the region's entrenched economic powers
that the Pacific Northwest's hydroelectric system
should not be maintained without changes at the
expense of the Columbia River Basin's most significant cultural and biological resource.
IX. Afterword
Developments over the summer have cast further doubt on the region's willingness to change the
status quo in the Columbia River Basin. NMFS has
sought to avoid implementing measures included
in its proposed recovery plan and in the 1994-98
biological opinion on the FCRPS that might antagonize upper Basin irrigators. In August 1995 the
agency agreed to scale back plans to increase flows
during the final weeks of the Snake River fall chinook smolt migration. NMFS caved in to pressure
from Montana Governor Marc Racicot and irrigation
and flatwater recreation interests opposed to an
increase in releases from Libby Dam of 4000 cfs."7
Meanwhile, the Corps allowed only 360,000 of 1.8
507. See Bob Baum. U.S. Action Draws Fire of Salmon Advocates,
OREGONIAN. Aug. 10, 1995, at C-i, C-3.
508. Notice of Suit Against NMFS BiOp Filed, 14 NORTHWEST
CONSERVATION
ACT REPORT 2 (July 24, 1995). The Corps transported
13 million smolts this year. id.
509. Id.
510. Id. The reductions in spills were apparently deemed
necessary because the turbines at ice Harbor Dam malfunctioned.
511. As discussed earlier, see supra notes 446-456 and
accompanying text, BPA's financial condition cannot be said to be
the result of salmon recovery costs.
512. Shareholders Have Practical Solutions. 14 NORTHWEST
CONSERVATION Acr REPORT I (May 12, 1995). Thus, BPA has shown
an unwillingness to spend the amount of money required to
implement the provisions of the 1994 Fish and Wildlife Program
intended to benefit salmon. Id.
513. loan Laatz, BPA May Get a Break From Environmental Laws,
OREGONIAN, Sept. 12, 1995, at Al, A7. There are several bills pending before Congress that would grant BPA the cost cap and
exemptions. One, introduced by Sen. Mark 0. Hatfield (R.Oregon), is expected to be included as an amendment to a fiscal
year 1996 appropriations bill. The others, introduced by Senators
Slade Gorton (R.-Washington) and Larry Craig (R.-Idaho), would
also exempt other hydroelectnc dam operators in the region,
including the Idaho Power Company and the mid-Columbia

million wild Snake River spring and summer chinook smolts to migrate in the river.2 The Corps also
failed to implement the spills mandated by the
1994-98 biological opinion on the FCRPS until May,
with the result that 16% of spring migrants were
killed in turbines or while in the reservoirs.'0 The
Corps also cut back required spills later in the summer, which caused the FCRPS to fall below the 80%
fish passage efficiency mandated by the biological
opinion. 10°
BPKs behavior has been even more troubling.
Instead of taking Judge Marsh's warning that the
status quo is unacceptable to heart, BPA has continued to focus almost exclusively on salmon recovery as the cause of its financial woes."' The agency
has unilaterally imposed an $83 million cost cap on
direct fish and wildlife costs, including habitat
restoration, systems improvement programs, and
the cost of BPA and Council management operations related to fish."2 BPA has also aggressively
pushedLegislation that would exempt operation of
the hydroelectric system from virtually every environmental law, including the ESA and the
Northwest Power Act." ' The proposed legislation
would also place a cap on BPA's annual salmon
recovery-related expensesY.4 The cost cap would
count power revenues foregone as a result of spills
or flows as costs."' Congress is likely to decide
whether to impose a limit on BPAs salmon recovery
costs and exempt the agency from environmental
laws during the debate over federal spending for fisPUDs. from environmental laws, As of the date this was written,
the Clinton Administration has not yet agreed to so-called "sulficiency" language that would declare expenditure of costs up to
the annual limit adequate to comply with federal environmental
laws. Id.
514. Senator Hatfield's bill would set the cap as a percentage of BPAs revenues. By contrast, the Gorton and Craig bills
would establish a Fish and Wildlife Enhancement Fund to which
BPA would contribute and which would serve as a sort of "checking account" that imposes a limit on annual spending for salmon
recovery. Shareholders Have Practical Solutions, 14 NORTHWEST
CONSERVATION
Acr REPORT I (May 12. 1995).
515. In whatever form adopted, salmon cost cap legislation
is likely to require that BPs costs be determined from a baseline
assumption as to the amount of power that could be generated If
the Columbia River system were dedicated to maximum energy
production. The bills would also mandate use of the market value
of the power that could have been generated but for increased
spills or flows as the measure for BPA's foregone power revenues,
Id.The Gorton bill would also require that BPA and the
utilities that
buy power from the federal government be compensated for foregone
power revenues that result from reservoir and flow modifications,
Thus. Senator Gorton proposes to mandate taxpayer compensation to users of a publicly-owned resource If the government
decides to redirect use of that resource. Gorton Bill Draft; Write a
Check, and that's "Sufficient," 14 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION
AcT REPORT
4 (Aug. 28, 1995).
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cal year 1996.516
BPA has also decided that it is appropriate to
continue the rate system that has foreclosed any
serious effort to fix the agency's financial problems.
Instead of moving toward a rate scheme that more
equitably allocates BPPs WPPSS-related debt to
those who benefited from the region's investment
in it. BPA has decided to cut electricity rates for the
DSIs for at least the next five years."17 BPA has also
allowed some of the DSIs to purchase power from
competing generators before their existing contracts with BPA expire." 8 Thus. BPA is willingly
allowing its revenues to be reduced at a time when
the agency loudly complains that the costs of
salmon recovery are placing a potentially fatal drain
on its resources."

9

Nor is the outlook for one of the legal foundations supporting efforts to recover Pacific Salmon
bright. The House Resources Committee recently
approved an ESA "reform" bill that would de-list
Columbia River Basin Salmon stocks and forbid
future listings of individual ones without
Congressional approval.' 20

516. The BPA cost cap apparently does not yet have unanimous support from the Pacific Northwest congressional delegation. Idaho Senators Craig and Dirk Kempthome (R.) have Indicated that they oppose Senator Hatfield's proposal because It
'does not adequately address the problem of Dworshak Reservoir
drawdowns, rate increases to Ildahol Power Company customers
and the creation of a regional authority to oversee salmon
restoration." Salmon: Dems Urge Emergency Fund; IDSens Oppose GOP
Plan,AM.IcAN PouncAL NETWORK: GREEW.m Sept. 25. 1995 (available on Westlaw. APN-GR database). Senator Kempthome also
opposes exempting BPA from the ESA. Id. Meanwhile. Senators
Patty Murray (D.-Washington) and Max Baucus (D.-Montana)
have announced that they will support cost cap legislation only If
Congress creates an additional $500 million 'emergency fund."
The fund would cover salmon recovery expenses in years when
water flows in the Basin are inadequate to provide for all existing
uses of the river system. Id.
517. Joan Laatz. BPA Generates Static Over Power Deals.
OREGONIAN. Sept. 14. 1995. at Al. BPA defends its desire to cut the
DSi's power rates as a 'pragmatic business decision- intended to
secure a reliable customer base for federal power. Id. However.
the effect of the DSI rate cut is to repudiate every other obligation
of the agency except providing power to the aluminum smelters.
since BPA has attempted to make up for the lost revenues concessions to the DSIs create by reducing expenditures on salmon
recovery and energy conservation. Special Report: BPA
Competitiveness Bill a Crossroads. 14 NORTmwEST CoNSRvAmoN Act
REOirr 1.2 (June 26. 1995). Nevertheless. after initially opposing
the DSI rate cuts, the Clinton Administration - pressured by sev-

eral of the DSI subsidies - signed several power contracts. The
new DSI contracts will allow several aluminum companies to
avoid any liability for BPAs salmon recovery costs or WPPSS debt.
Bill Mackenzie. BPA Zi-Tzas, 1rin Sign Contracts. OREo:N. Sept.
29. 1995. at A4.
518. Ve BPA Ratcas.e. BSaiground an, Outline cf Issues. 14
NoRTHWmir Cc: scnwao Act Rpo;t I. 2 (Aug. 28. 1995). The DSI
rate cut would lower per unit electricity costs for aluminum and
other intensive energy-using industries from 26 mills to 22.6 mills
per kilowatt hour. Robert T Nelson. BPA CaIW[ on Carpet Over Rate
Plan. Se&TrL, Tmos, Sept. 19. 1995. at BI,
519. BPAs willingness to waive DSI contract provisions
could cost the agency as much as $30 million. Sez Enviars Seei to
VoV BPA Biz Concessins. GR .imRE. Apr. 27. 1995 (available on
Westlaw. APN-GR database). Moreover. BPA has offered to allow
the DSIs continued free access to the federal transmission system for twenty years. even if a contractee decides to purchase
power from another generator BPA GeneratesStatic. supranote 509.
at AI.Thus. BPA is unwilling to force the DSIs to contribute to the
costs of salmon recovery or to defray part of BPAs WPPSS debt
through an access charge, even though the DSIs have benelitted
greatly from the FCRPS and encouraged construction of the illfated WPPSS plants.
520. See H.R. 2275. 1041 Cong.. Ist. sess. (1995): Young--Pomfo ESA Reautfnrzatbn Big Apprc l fy House Comite, BNA
NAno:uA. &ROW £-t Dui. Oct. 16. 1995 (available on LEXIS,
BNA Ubrary.}

Michael C. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon: A History of Failure
and a Dubious Future, 28 IDAHo L. REV. 667 (1991-92).
Blumm's article examines the reasons behind the decline of Idaho's
salmon and options for preventing extinction of the states salmon
population. Focuses on the effects of Columbia Basin water prolects
on salmon spawning grounds, briefly exploring the hlstory of eight
malor federal dam systems on the lower Snake and Columbia rivers
and their particular Impact on juvenile salmon. After discussing past
efforts to save the landlocked state's salmon. including the
Northwest Power Act's Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program.
the author concludes that salmon advocates must adopt a broadbased strategy to contend with both state water laws and federal
hydropower laws and press for greater accommodations to salmon
In the operation of Columbia Basin dams.
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Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin. The Unraveling of the Parity
Promise: Hydropower. Salmon, and Endangered Species in the
Columbia Basin, 21 Ert,. L. 657 (1991).
One In a series on the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program;
analyzes the effects of the Program since its adoption in the
Northwest Power Act of 1930. Blumm and Simrin criticze the
Northwest Power Planning Council as the agency responsible for
implementing the program, blaming the Council for a failure to fulfill the Program's promise of placing salmon on"equal footing with
the hydroelectric power system, while crediting the agency with preventing further developments in the Columbia Basin hydroelectric
system. Tracks the various amendments to the Act. and proposes
pressuring the Council to fulfill its mandate of parity between
salmon and hydroelectricity.
Michael C. Blumm. Reexamining the Parity Promise: More
ChallengesThan Successes to the Implementation of the Columbia
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ErvL.L. 461 (1986).
Evaluates the first three-and-a-half years of the Columbia Basin Fish
and Wildlife Program. from 1932 to 1936. Outlines amendments
adopted by the Northwest Power Planning Council in 1984, 1985 and
1986. in the heart of the article. Blumm discusses the various legal
challenges to the Program's implementation and the outcomes of
those cases, concluding that the jury is still out" on the Program's
legal status.
Michael C. Blumm. Implementing the Parity Promise: An
Evaluation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Prograt, 14
ENvrL. L. 277 (1984).
Revievs the goals of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program
as adopted In 1982. Blumm provides the details of the Program 's
mandates, focusing on the precedent setting provisions to (1)
change water project operations to benefit fish and wildlife; (2) give
priority to rehabilitation of fish stocks and their natural habitat; (3)
adopt a series of conditions for future hydroelectric projects in order
to avoid problems created by systems built prior to 1982.
Michael C. Blumm, Fulfilling the Parity Promise:A Perspective on
Scientific Proof, Economic Cost and Indian Treaty Rights in the
Approval of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 13
ENvrL. L. 103 (1982).
Blumm begins with an analysis of the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act, hailing the Act as Congress'
recognition of the debt owed by society to the fish and wildlife of the
Columbia Basin, whose habitat has been sacrificed for energy consumption. This article explores possible definitions of approval
standards listed in the Act, advocating a biological feasibilityv. cost-
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benefit standard where biological concerns overnde economics, giving deference to the biological judgment of the
region's fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes.

Michael B. Early & Egil Krogh, Balancing Power Costs
and FisheriesValues Under the Northwest Power Act, 13

Michael C. Blumm, Hydropowervs. Salmon: The Struggle
of the Pacific Northwest's Anadronhous Fish Resources
for a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal Columbia

The central thesis of this article Is that the Northwest
Power Act requires that appropriate mitigation measures
for the fisheries must be determined by balancing the
fisheries values against the costs incurred by electric
power consumers. Early and Krogh contend that the Act
has been misinterpreted and discuss whether the
Council's actions have been consistent with the Act, concluding that balancing power cost and fisheries values is
not an easy balance to strike.

River PowerSystem, 11 ENVTL. L. 211 (1981).
Examines the evolution of the conflict between hydroelectric power and anadromous fish protection in the
Columbia basin. Explores the reasons behind the development of a vast hydroelectnc power system to supply
most of the region's energy needs at the expense of the
world's largest runs of chinook salmon and steelhead
trout. The author also describes the role of Indian treaty
rights, the National Environmental Policy Act and other
federal acts in protecting the region's fish population,
calling for an overhaul of the decisionmaking structure
regarding the region's hydroelectric power system and fish
population to minimize conflicts between the various
entities involved.

Kelly R. Bryan, Note, Swimming Upstream: Trying to

Enforce the 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty, 28
CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 241 (1995).
Examines the 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty beginning
with a recounting of the history of the fishing industry and
past fishing treaties of North Arnencan-Japanese and
Russo-Japanese relations. After discussing the provisions
of the new Treaty and problems of illegal salmon fishing,
the note concludes with an assessment of the Treaty's
enforcement provisions at land and sea.
ROBERT CLARK, RIVER OF THE WEST: STORIES FROM THE
COLUMBIA (1995).
Chronicles the uneasy history of natives and settlers
along the Columbia River. Clark reconstructs for his reader how settlers, naturalists, histonans and politicians all
impacted the rivers destiny.
JOSEPH CONE, A COMMON FATE: ENDANGERED SALMON
AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (1995).
Traces the history of the plight of the Pacific salmon and
the Americans fighting against the salmon's extinction.
Cone reconstructs the factors which caused the rapid
depletion of salmon stocks and traces the parallel growth
in concern over the problem. A Common Fate is ultimately about creating a viable future for salmon and people.
The book provides a framework for understanding what
solutions will be genuine and which ones will save the
Northwest Salmon.
WILLIAM DIETRICH, NORTHWEST PASSAGE: THE GREAT
COLUMBIA RIVER (1995).
Beginning with an extensive history of the Columbia River,
this book then focuses on the total transformation of the
river to provide electricity and reliable navigation.
Dietrich claims not to make a judgment on whether the
transformation from river to energy source was a good
thing, with his main concern being the lack of argument
and debate over the transformation, and the possibility
the other side was simply not heard.

U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 281 (1990).

JEFFREY

P. FOOTE Er AL.,

BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION,

POWER AND THE PACFiC NoRTHWESr: A HISTORY OF THE
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION (1976).
Traces the development of the Bonneville Power
Administration from an obscure federal agency to an
agency that has a dominant role in power planning for the
Pacific Northwest. The arena of judicial activity is explored
as it has forced the BPA into the area of long-term environmental planning. The article concludes with a discussion of then current planning efforts to bridge the gap
between energy supply and demand and the various legislative proposals then being advanced.

Dale D. Goble, The Council and the Constitution: An
Article on the Constitutionalityof the Northwest Power
Planning Council, 1 J. ENvL. L. & LITIG. 11 (1986).
Discusses constitutional challenges to Congress' authority in creating the Northwest Power Planning Council as a
state-appointed body authorized to guide the actions of a
federal agency. Provides a history of legislation which lead
to the Council's creation and focuses on the Impact of the
Council on the Appointments Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. This author ultimately concludes that the
challengers' arguments are flawed and serve only as a "red
herring- in the environmental battle over water rights.
Thomas C. Jensen, The United States-Canada Pacific
Salmon Interception Treaty: An Historical and Legal
Overview, 16 ENVTL. L. 363 (1986).
Provides an overview of the United States-Canada Salmon
Treaty beginning with the political, legal and resource
management problems stemming from United States and
Canadian interception of each other's Pacific salmon, and
the interception of each nation's salmon by third-party
fishing nations. The article then discusses other events
leading up to the treaty such as the cultural and economic significance of Pacific salmon, the Frasler River
Convention, and the last minute maneuvering In the three
years leading up to the final agreement, After an overview
of the treaty's text, the author speculates on the treaty's
probable future.
Judith A. Johansen, Is Hydropower an Endangered
Species?, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT 13 (1994).
Considers critical questions about the future of
hydropower. Delves into the historical development of
hydropower, the role of hydropower in the development of
the electnc utility industry and how society's attitude
toward hydropower has changed. Presents the Issues of
environmental protection that impact hydroelectric
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plants and whether such plants will be able to continue
operating within the bounds of environmental regulations.

Kai N. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence: Salmon. Science, and
the Law in the Columbia Basin. 21 ENVrL. L. 745
(1991).
Discusses vanous approaches advocated by academics
and activists to the threat of extinction of salmon populations. Describes the effect of human Intervention In the
Columbia River Basins ecosystem and explores various
bases for protecting salmonids. Advocates utilizing the
Endangered Species Act in conlunction with the authority
of the Northwest Power Planning Council and other relevant government agencies as a viable method of saving
the salmonids from extinction.

Michael V. McGinnis. On the Verge of Collapse: The

Columbia River System. Wild Salmon and the
Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 NAT.
RFSOURCES . 63 (1995).
Describes the vanous fish species threatened with extinction in the Columbia River Basin. Discusses the scope of
authority vested in the Northwest Power Planning Council
in determining the future of the Columbia River fish
stocks. Concludes that efforts to save the Columbia River
fish population depend on the development of a non-conquenng approach to nature on the part of government
and pnvate agencies utilizing the resources of the area.

Andrew S. Noonan, Just Water Over the Dam? A Look at

the Endangered Species Act and the Impact of
Hydroelectnc Facilities on the Anadromous Fish Runs of
the Northwest. 28 IDAHO L. REv. 781 (1992).
Noonan examines the environmental Impact of the
Northwest's dependence on Inexpensive electricity produced by hydroelectnc dams, concluding that hydropower dams account for more than ninety-five percent of the
human impact causing a decline in the salmon population. His article explores the ESAs impact on the
Northwest nvers' salmon, focusing on the no-jeopardy
and takings clauses of the ESA.

Panel, Issues Under the Northwest Power PlanningAct, 2 1.
ENVTL. L. & LrnG. 153 (1987).
A panel with separate presentations by Michael C.
Blumm. John M. Volkman. Terence Thatcher and Bill Kloos
on a vanety of issues affecting the Act. Blumm evaluates
the innovative measures and unfulfilled promises contained within the Act, while Volkman focuses on Indian
treaty fishing nghts. Thatcher discusses the proposed
expansion of electncal lines in the Northwest and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's handling of fishery issues in its hydroelectnc licensing process. Kloos
provides a bnef overview of litigation before the Federal
Regulatory Commission.

Michael T. Pyle, Beyond Fish Ladders: Dam Removal as a
Strategy for Restoring America's Rivers, 14 STAN.
ENvn.. L.I. 97 (1995).
Provides a rationale for removing dams from American
nvers in order to restore the wildlife and fish populations
dependent on affected rivers. Discusses the social and
economic effects of removing the dams, and tackles the
political question of succeeding in such a strategy
through the Federal Power Act and license expirations.
Concludes that dams can and should be removed.

Colloquium, Who Runs the River?. 25 Ervn. L. (1995)
Includes articles by Lorraine Bodi, Michael C.Blumm and
Adam Berger. Bodi provides the history and legislative
background of the Northwest Power Act. while Blumm
discusses two recent ludicial decisions: Idafo,Departmentof
Fish & Came v. Natinal Marine Fisheries Serme and Northwest
Rcaurre Informalon Centn-v. Northfist PowerPlanning Council.
Berger also analyses the Northwest Resource Information
Centers challenge to the Council. but as an insider working for the Center.

Symposium, Seattle Master Builders and Creative
Cooperative Federalism. 17 Etrmn. L. (1987).
Symposium Issue covenring the effects of the Ninth
Circuit's decision In SeailL, Master Buiflees Ass'n v. Paciffc

NorthWet Eleanc Power & Conservation Planning CouncilAuthor Dave Frohnmayer reviews the court's ruling that
the Council was not sublect to the Appointments Clause
and saved what Frohnmayer called an 'imaginative. complex and very important experiment in regional federalsm. The case tested the authority of the Northwest
Power Planning Council as a multistate agency setting
energy conservation guidelines for the region. Other symposium articles examine federal acts affecting conservation efforts In the Columbia River gorge and the potential
for new forms of governing decisions affecting river
basins.

John M. Volkman. Making Room in the Ark: The
EndangeredSpeies At and the Columbia River Basin,
34 EN",ROUMEMT 18 (1992).
One of three articles on regional efforts in the Northwest
to protect fish stocks of the Columbia River using the ESA.
Volkman discusses efforts to list various salmon species
as endangered and the reasons behind the region's failure
to gain protection of the river basin's fish population
through the Act's listing procedures. Concludes that the
Act, combined with regional political efforts, can still save
the dwindling salmon populations.

RicHARD WHITE, THE ORGANIC MACHINE THE RFAXING
OF THE COLUMBIA RiVER (1995).
Chronicles the history of the Columbia River. Throughout
his narrative White takes what he calls an unromantic and
dogma free approach. White argues that the effort to
transform nature Is not a defiling of nature. Rather, the
combined efforts of groups who push for transformation
purify society by freeing both human labor and nature.
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CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN:
LAND, WATER AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST (1992).
Provides a broad overview of environmental issues facing
the Western states, covering mining rights, ranchers, and
forest preservation. Wilkinson dedicates several chapters
to the fish of Western river systems, including the oncebountiful salmon. Advocates the adoption of a sustainable yield in order to preserve the West's delicate eco-systern.

Charles F. Wilkinson & Daniel K. Conner, The Law of

the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation
of a Transboundary Common Property Resource, 32. U.
KAN. L. REv. 17 (1983-84).
Authors Wilkinson and Conner begin with the premise
that salmon and steelhead trout are among the most
intensively exploited resources, leading into a discussion
on why these fish are vulnerable to such exploitation. The
article also traces the history of fisheries in the Pacific
Northwest, starting with the practices of Indian tribes in
the area, followed by destructive methods of the new settlers, culminating in a free-for-all era of the early 1900's.
The authors end with modern-day attempts at restoration
and the difficulties of balancing the competing interests
of hydroelectic dams, conservationists and Indian treaty
rights.

